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Winnti for Linux is a Chinese-attributed Linux malware implant comprising a user-mode LD_PRELOAD rootkit and a primary backdoor. Its rootkit is heavily based on the open-source Azazel project and conceals the backdoor’s activity, including processes, files, directories, and network connections, from affected Linux systems. The malware decodes XOR-obfuscated configuration strings at execution and uses custom TCP command-and-control communications protected with four-byte XOR encoding. Observed outbound communications also include ICMP, UDP, and HTTP.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
13 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Rootkits are a type of malware used by threat actors to gain complete control over a compromised resource and hide malicious activity.
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat groups that 'decrypt', 'decode', 'deobfuscate', 'unpack', or 'decompress' payloads, strings, configuration data, shellcode, and files prior to execution or use.
Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing showing numerous malware families and threat groups that 'use HTTP,' 'use HTTPS,' 'HTTP POST requests,' 'HTTP GET requests,' or 'HTTP/S' for command and control communications.
Examples include 'Chaos provides a reverse shell connection on 8338/TCP, encrypted via AES,' 'Winnti for Linux has used a custom TCP protocol with four-byte XOR for command and control,' and 'XCSSET uses RC4 encryption over TCP to communicate with its C2 server.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors that can "download files from C2," "download additional payloads," "upload and download files," "retrieve payloads from the C2 server," and "copy files to remote machines."
The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.
"3PARA RAT command and control commands are encrypted within the HTTP C2 channel using the DES algorithm in CBC mode..."; "APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic."; "Carbanak encrypts the message body of HTTP traffic with RC2 (in CBC mode)."; "Duqu ... data stream can be encrypted with AES-CBC."; "PoisonIvy uses the Camellia cipher to encrypt communications."
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A Chinese-attributed Linux threat comprising a user-mode LD_PRELOAD rootkit and a main backdoor. Its rootkit component, based heavily on Azazel, conceals the backdoor's activity.
Linux backdoor that decodes XOR-encoded configuration strings during execution.
Linux backdoor using a custom TCP protocol with four-byte XOR for C2.
Linux backdoor malware that decodes XOR-encoded configuration strings at runtime.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.