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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

CrossRAT

CrossRAT is a Java-based, cross-platform remote access trojan/backdoor associated in reporting by Lookout and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) with the Dark Caracal cyber-espionage campaign. It targets Windows, macOS, and Linux and has been described as providing persistent remote command-and-control of infected systems in a global surveillance operation that targeted individuals and institutions across more than 21 countries, including governments, militaries, utilities, financial institutions, manufacturing companies, and defense contractors. Reported infection vectors for the broader Dark Caracal activity included social media, phishing, and in some cases physical access.

CrossRAT performs OS detection and host profiling, collecting data including OS name/version, username, and hostname. Its capabilities include filesystem enumeration and manipulation, creating, copying, moving, reading, and writing files, taking screenshots, and executing files or payloads. Screenshot capture is implemented via java.awt.Robot().createScreenCapture, with captured images saved as randomized .jpg files and exfiltrated to command-and-control. On Windows, execution of specified files has been reported via rundll32 with url.dll,FileProtocolHandler; on non-Windows systems it uses Desktop.getDesktop().open().

Persistence is platform-specific. On macOS, CrossRAT creates a LaunchAgent, writing mediamgrs.plist to /Library/LaunchAgents/ when running as root or ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ otherwise, configured to run java -jar on a persisted copy named mediamgrs.jar. On Linux, it creates an autostart entry named mediamgrs.desktop under ~/.config/autostart/ and uses /usr/var/mediamgrs.jar as an install path in the cited analysis. On Windows, it persists via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run using reg add and javaw.exe or java with -jar.

The malware’s main logic has been described as residing in crossrat/client.class. A hardcoded C2 endpoint of flexberry.com on TCP port 2223 was reported. Additional indicators directly mentioned in the content include the sample name hmar6.jar, persisted filename mediamgrs.jar, LaunchAgent name mediamgrs.plist, Linux autostart file mediamgrs.desktop, and MD5 hash 85b794e080d83a91e904b97769e1e770 for the referenced sample/persisted JAR. The content also notes that CrossRAT requires Java to be installed, which may reduce exposure on systems where Java is absent.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dark Caracal

"Dark Caracal also uses a previously unknown, multiplatform tool that Lookout and EFF have named CrossRAT, which is able to target Windows, OSX, and Linux."

via objective seeobjective-see.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence1
T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence2

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.013XDG Autostart EntriesEvidence1

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

"...has a command to retrieve metadata for files on disk as well as a command to list the current working directory." / "...can list files and directories." / "...used the following commands... to obtain information about files and directories: dir c:\ >> %temp%\download ..."

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.