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Mallory
Malware4 associated actors

Gameover ZeuS

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs95Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationDefense evasionDDOS
Delivery
MalspamExploit kitFake update
Platforms
Windows
Also known asP2P ZeuSPeer-to-Peer ZeuS

GameOver Zeus, also known as Peer-to-Peer Zeus or P2P Zeus, is a Windows banking trojan and decentralized botnet derived from the Zeus malware family. It emerged around September 2011 and primarily stole banking and other account credentials from businesses and consumers. Operators used stolen credentials to initiate or redirect fraudulent wire transfers, with corporate banking accounts a major focus. The FBI estimated that the operation caused more than $100 million in losses.

Unlike earlier Zeus variants that relied on centralized command-and-control infrastructure, GameOver Zeus relayed commands and updates through infected peers. Its infrastructure also incorporated proxy layers and a domain generation algorithm, increasing resilience against disruption. Proxies carried commands and stolen data between infected systems and backend infrastructure. The botnet supported additional criminal activities, including distributed denial-of-service attacks and installation of other malware. During 2013 and 2014, it became a major distribution mechanism for CryptoLocker ransomware.

Distribution included spam campaigns, Upatre downloader infections, and the Blackhole and Magnitude exploit kits. Necurs also delivered GameOver Zeus. Some campaigns redirected Chrome users to fraudulent browser-update pages to persuade them to install malware rather than attempting browser exploitation.

The operation was associated with a criminal network comprising Russian and Ukrainian actors. U.S. authorities charged Evgeniy Mikhailovich Bogachev as an alleged administrator and leader. Before its disruption, GameOver Zeus infected an estimated 500,000 to one million computers worldwide. In June 2014, the multinational Operation Tovar disrupted its infrastructure through coordinated peer-list manipulation, sinkholing, proxy-layer intervention, and domain redirection.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Evgeniy Bogachev

whost aka Mykhaylo Rytikov facilitated malicious operations for high-profile actors such as Evgeniy Bogachev linked to the GameOver Zeus malware

via intel471intel471.com
JabberZeuS

GameOver ZeuS, GOZ, peer-to-peer ZeuS, P2P-ZeuS and ZeuS3 are analogous to each other and refer to a ZeuS based malware family, which was active in the wild from September 2011 till May 2014.

via blackhatblackhat.com
GOLD EVERGREEN

"...operated the Zeus and Gameover Zeus botnets until international law enforcement action in May 2014."

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
Business Club

"...operated the Zeus and Gameover Zeus botnets until international law enforcement action in May 2014."

via secureworks threat profilessecureworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1584.005BotnetEvidence3

There is evidence he also was using his own botnet kit or at least taking a fee to set up instances of it on behalf of buyers. In late 2009, security researchers had tracked dozens of Zeus control servers

T1585.002Email AccountsEvidence1

According to U.S.-CERT, GOZ infected machines can participate in attacks, send spam and swipe user data.

Initial Access

7 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"used the captured information without authorization to falsely represent to banks that the Defendant and co-conspirators were victims or employees of victims who have authorization to access the victims' bank accounts"

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence8

the samples were downloaded from a compromised website located in the United States... Gameover Zeus has also been distributed by the Blackhole and Magnitude exploit kits.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Infection Method Blackhole Exploit Kit • Specific configuration for Gameover Zeus

T1566PhishingEvidence13

The Necurs botnet is one of the largest networks in the spam email threat ecosystem... During a 58-day period in our investigation, for example, we observed that one Necurs-infected computer sent a total of 3.8 million spam emails to over 40.6 million potential victims.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

GOZ typically infects a machine via a phishing attack and other bogus emails.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"the defendant, EVGENIY BOGACHEV, and co-conspirators, created the phishing emails to fraudulently induce recipients to click on a hyperlink falsely represented to be a legitimate link... when in truth and fact, it installed malware"

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

When building an executable... The subbotnet names were typically used for identifying specific campaigns for spreading. Some where dated, and others were named descriptively after the spam service used or the spam theme such as “irs”.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Some of the most commonly used commands used by attackers are: user_execute <url> ... The user_execute command was used specifically for CryptoLocker installations too

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"used the captured information without authorization to falsely represent to banks that the Defendant and co-conspirators were victims or employees of victims who have authorization to access the victims' bank accounts"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the government believes is responsible for building and distributing the ZeuS banking Trojan . Bogachev is thought to be a core architect of ZeuS, a malware strain that has been used to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from bank accounts

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"used the captured information without authorization to falsely represent to banks that the Defendant and co-conspirators were victims or employees of victims who have authorization to access the victims' bank accounts"

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

GOZ, however, utilizes a P2P network of infected hosts to communicate and distribute data, and employs encryption to evade detection.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the government believes is responsible for building and distributing the ZeuS banking Trojan . Bogachev is thought to be a core architect of ZeuS, a malware strain that has been used to steal hundreds of millions of dollars from bank accounts

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

"used the captured information without authorization to falsely represent to banks that the Defendant and co-conspirators were victims or employees of victims who have authorization to access the victims' bank accounts"

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

The principal purpose of GOZ is to capture banking credentials from infected computers. One means by which GOZ accomplishes this is through ... attacks, in which GOZ intercepts sensitive information victims transmit from their computers.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

others used it just as a piece of malware to log information that ZeuS collected from victims from either the keystroke logging, or the built-in POST data logging

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

even in its early days, the malware could receive dynamic configuration files, use web injections to steal money

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence2

The principal purpose of the botnet is to capture banking credentials from infected computers.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Some of the most commonly used commands used by attackers are: ... user_cookies_get ... Most of these commands are used... to... get a session cookie

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Some of the most commonly used commands used by attackers are: ... user_certs_get ... Most of these commands are used... to... get... soft certificate files

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

The Operation Technology • Regular expression support

Collection

8 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

During our research, we found a large amount of search queries which were executed on the victim systems. The search queries consisted of a number of keywords... focused on locating “government classified” material

T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

The principal purpose of GOZ is to capture banking credentials from infected computers. One means by which GOZ accomplishes this is through ... attacks, in which GOZ intercepts sensitive information victims transmit from their computers.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

others used it just as a piece of malware to log information that ZeuS collected from victims from either the keystroke logging, or the built-in POST data logging

T1056.003Web Portal CaptureEvidence3

even in its early days, the malware could receive dynamic configuration files, use web injections to steal money

T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence2

The principal purpose of the botnet is to capture banking credentials from infected computers.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence2

Espionage ... Targeting government and intelligence agencies ... foreign intelligence ... counter intelligence ... top secret

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence3

The token-grabber attack in peer-to-peer ZeuS... The victim would see a normal, or almost normal, login page of their bank... During the victim being on hold, the browser would continuously poll the backend to check if new questions were available to ask the victim.

T1213Data from Information RepositoriesEvidence3

Proxy Nodes • Route C2 communication • Stolen data

Command and Control

11 techniques
T1001.001Junk DataEvidence3

[P2P ZeuS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0016) added junk data to outgoing UDP packets to peer implants.(Citation: Dell P2P ZeuS)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence10

Dridex has been able to escape justice for so long by hiding its main command-and-control (C&C) servers behind proxying layers.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

"Web injects introduce (or inject) malicious computer code into a victim's web browser while the victim browses the Internet and 'hijacks' the victim's Internet session."

T1090ProxyEvidence3

It uses a tiered, decentralized system of intermediary proxies and strong encryption to hide the location of servers that the botnet masters use to control the crime machine.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Apart from the peer-to-peer network, which was only the first layer, there were additional layers of proxies, which protected the real IP addresses of the backends from becoming known. Even the users of the malware would log in to the individual backends via a proxy

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence13

By early 2015, Dridex implemented a kind of P2P network... some peers (supernodes) had access to the C&C and forwarded requests from other network nodes to it.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

The Necurs botnet has historically been used to deliver a torrent of other high profile cyber threats to the world, including the GameOver Zeus and Dridex banking trojans, Locky ransomware and, more recently, the banking trojan turned all purpose cybercrime-as-a-service, Trickbot.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

bot_bc_add vnc <ip> <port> ... Most of these commands are used... to... connect to the victim’s desktop... One specific plugin that was seen, was a VNC component before the plugin VNC was actually built into the malware itself.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

The DGA technique is employed by many sophisticated types of malware. It involves generating a large number of domain names that can be used as “rendezvous points” for malware and its respective operators.

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence5

The Operation Technology • Domain generation algorithm (DGA) ... Controlling the DGA Layer • Reverse-engineered and reimplemented Domain Generation Algorithm

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

It uses a tiered, decentralized system of intermediary proxies and strong encryption to hide the location of servers that the botnet masters use to control the crime machine.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

The Gameover Zeus botnet operates silently on victim computers by directing those computers to reach out to receive commands from other computers in the botnet and to funnel stolen banking credentials back to the criminals who control the botnet.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3

He also launched ransomware attacks years before they were a runaway hit with criminals.

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence7

Bogachev is accused of running the Gameover Zeus botnet, a massive crime machine of 500,000 to 1 million infected PCs that was used for large DDoS attacks

T1657Financial TheftEvidence2

Working around the clock, his criminal gang infected an ever-growing network of computers. It was able to bypass the most advanced banking security measures to quickly empty accounts and transfer the money abroad through a web of intermediaries called money mules.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

95 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

59 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching95Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping38Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.