MobileOrder
- Type
- Spyware
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- Lure
- Platforms
- Android
MobileOrder is an Android spyware family associated with the Scarlet Mimic threat actor and used in a long-running surveillance campaign targeting the Uyghur community and related supporters since at least 2015. It has typically been distributed outside official app stores through social-engineering lures masquerading as Uyghur-themed documents, images, or audio content. After execution, the malware displays decoy content while operating covertly in the background.
MobileOrder is designed for persistent mobile surveillance and data theft. It collects device information, SMS messages, call logs, location data, files stored on the device, browser bookmarks, and information about running processes. It exfiltrates stolen data over the same channel used for command-and-control communications. The malware also supports extensive remote tasking, including executing shell commands, downloading files, taking screenshots, taking photos, recording ambient audio, recording phone calls, sending SMS messages, placing calls, and deleting SMS messages or call-log evidence.
The malware includes mechanisms to maintain access and resist removal, including hiding its icon, launching background services, using Android broadcast receivers to keep core services active, and in some variants requesting Device Admin or root privileges. It can also install or uninstall APKs, either silently when privileges permit or through standard Android user interface flows. Recent variants use native Android location APIs for real-time tracking and can buffer collected geolocation data locally for later upload when connectivity returns. Command-and-control communications have used encrypted exchanges and, depending on the variant, hardcoded infrastructure, dead-drop resolution, or both.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Since 2015, CPR has identified more than 20 samples of Android spyware called MobileOrder, with the latest variant dated mid-August 2022.
Techniques & procedures
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The malware can receive commands to execute a remote shell, which is done by starting a thread that, in turn, starts a shell process and establishes a socket connection to the same C&C server, but over a different port.
When the victim opens the lure, whether it is a document, picture, or audio file, it actually launches the malicious application, which in turn opens a decoy document to distract the victim from background malicious actions. | As there are no indications that any of them were distributed from the Google Store, we can assume the malware is distributed by other means, most likely by social engineering campaigns. In most cases, the malicious applications masquerade as PDF documents, photos, or audio.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The malware developer also created BroadcastReceiver that starts the core Service. The triggers for this receiver are numerous actions registered in the AndroidManifest, making sure the malware stays active all the time.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The malware developer also created BroadcastReceiver that starts the core Service. The triggers for this receiver are numerous actions registered in the AndroidManifest, making sure the malware stays active all the time.
Some of the versions also ask for Device Admin and root access, which not only gives the malware full access to the device, but also prevents the victim from easily uninstalling the application.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
A few of these changes were clearly developed to reduce the chances of the malware being detected by security solutions: the malware authors experimented with ways to hide the malicious strings..., first by moving them to the resources section, and later encoding them in base64.
To secure communication with the C&C server, the malware encrypts the data with AES. The key is generated in runtime from an encrypted passphrase inside dex by calculating the MD5 digest.
In most cases, the malicious applications masquerade as PDF documents, photos, or audio. When the victim opens the decoy content, the malware begins to perform extensive surveillance actions in the background.
The malware then hides its icon and launches two services: core and open.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload information about all running processes to its C2 server.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server victim mobile device information, including IMEI, IMSI, SIM card serial number, phone number, Android version, and other information.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server information about files on the victim mobile device, including SD card size, installed app list, SMS content, contacts, and calling history.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server victim browser bookmarks.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
98 Take a screenshot.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The core service launches the Communication thread, which connects to the C&C (command & control) server and processes the commands received... The malware then creates a socket connection to the specified IP and port.
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to download a file from the C2 server to the victim mobile device's SD card.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Depending on the sample, the malware can use a hardcoded list of C&C servers, dead drop resolvers, or both... extracting the C&C server from dead drop resolvers which point to additional C&C infrastructure.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)
Observables
46 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.