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Malware1 associated actor

MobileOrder

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs46Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
Android

MobileOrder is an Android spyware family associated with the Scarlet Mimic threat actor and used in a long-running surveillance campaign targeting the Uyghur community and related supporters since at least 2015. It has typically been distributed outside official app stores through social-engineering lures masquerading as Uyghur-themed documents, images, or audio content. After execution, the malware displays decoy content while operating covertly in the background.

MobileOrder is designed for persistent mobile surveillance and data theft. It collects device information, SMS messages, call logs, location data, files stored on the device, browser bookmarks, and information about running processes. It exfiltrates stolen data over the same channel used for command-and-control communications. The malware also supports extensive remote tasking, including executing shell commands, downloading files, taking screenshots, taking photos, recording ambient audio, recording phone calls, sending SMS messages, placing calls, and deleting SMS messages or call-log evidence.

The malware includes mechanisms to maintain access and resist removal, including hiding its icon, launching background services, using Android broadcast receivers to keep core services active, and in some variants requesting Device Admin or root privileges. It can also install or uninstall APKs, either silently when privileges permit or through standard Android user interface flows. Recent variants use native Android location APIs for real-time tracking and can buffer collected geolocation data locally for later upload when connectivity returns. Command-and-control communications have used encrypted exchanges and, depending on the variant, hardcoded infrastructure, dead-drop resolution, or both.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Scarlet Mimic

Since 2015, CPR has identified more than 20 samples of Android spyware called MobileOrder, with the latest variant dated mid-August 2022.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The malware can receive commands to execute a remote shell, which is done by starting a thread that, in turn, starts a shell process and establishes a socket connection to the same C&C server, but over a different port.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When the victim opens the lure, whether it is a document, picture, or audio file, it actually launches the malicious application, which in turn opens a decoy document to distract the victim from background malicious actions. | As there are no indications that any of them were distributed from the Google Store, we can assume the malware is distributed by other means, most likely by social engineering campaigns. In most cases, the malicious applications masquerade as PDF documents, photos, or audio.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware developer also created BroadcastReceiver that starts the core Service. The triggers for this receiver are numerous actions registered in the AndroidManifest, making sure the malware stays active all the time.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware developer also created BroadcastReceiver that starts the core Service. The triggers for this receiver are numerous actions registered in the AndroidManifest, making sure the malware stays active all the time.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Some of the versions also ask for Device Admin and root access, which not only gives the malware full access to the device, but also prevents the victim from easily uninstalling the application.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

A few of these changes were clearly developed to reduce the chances of the malware being detected by security solutions: the malware authors experimented with ways to hide the malicious strings..., first by moving them to the resources section, and later encoding them in base64.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

To secure communication with the C&C server, the malware encrypts the data with AES. The key is generated in runtime from an encrypted passphrase inside dex by calculating the MD5 digest.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

In most cases, the malicious applications masquerade as PDF documents, photos, or audio. When the victim opens the decoy content, the malware begins to perform extensive surveillance actions in the background.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The malware then hides its icon and launches two services: core and open.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence7

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload information about all running processes to its C2 server.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence11

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server victim mobile device information, including IMEI, IMSI, SIM card serial number, phone number, Android version, and other information.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server information about files on the victim mobile device, including SD card size, installed app list, SMS content, contacts, and calling history.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence5

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to upload to its C2 server victim browser bookmarks.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence6

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) exfiltrates data collected from the victim mobile device.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

98 Take a screenshot.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The core service launches the Communication thread, which connects to the C&C (command & control) server and processes the commands received... The malware then creates a socket connection to the specified IP and port.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) has a command to download a file from the C2 server to the victim mobile device's SD card.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Depending on the sample, the malware can use a hardcoded list of C&C servers, dead drop resolvers, or both... extracting the C&C server from dead drop resolvers which point to additional C&C infrastructure.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence8

[MobileOrder](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0079) exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.(Citation: Scarlet Mimic Jan 2016)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

46 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching46Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping18Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.