AvosLocker
AvosLocker is a ransomware family and Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation associated with double-extortion activity. The provided content states it emerged in June 2021 and has targeted entities in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain, with a focus on critical infrastructure. Reported initial access vectors include spear-phishing, exploitation of public-facing applications, and compromised RDP credentials. The malware is described as establishing persistence with custom webshells, escalating privileges via credential dumping, and exfiltrating data before encryption. AvosLocker encrypts files and network resources using AES-256 and appends .avos, .avos2, or .AvosLinux extensions; the content also notes systems may be rebooted into Safe Mode with Networking before encryption and that its Linux variant has terminated ESXi virtual machines. Additional observed behaviors include enumerating shared drives on compromised networks, checking system time before and after encryption, hiding its console window via the ShowWindow API, and using obfuscated API calls resolved by checksums. The content further notes defense-evasion and masquerading behaviors, including being disguised as a .jpg file and, in one incident, being disguised using the victim company name as the filename. It is also referenced as a RaaS program advertised on the RAMP cybercrime forum.
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Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.
Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key. | The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.
Examples include AppleSeed creating 'HKCU\Software\Microsoft/Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce', AvosLocker executed via the RunOnce Registry key, NanoCore creating a RunOnce key, and Raspberry Robin setting a RunOnce key. | The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team masqueraded executables as .txt files.
Kapeka masquerades as a Microsoft Word Add-In file, with the extension .wll, but is a malicious DLL file.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
Since early 2023, AvNeutralizer has been used in numerous intrusions, including with the subsequent deployment of well-known ransomware strains such as AvosLocker, MedusaLocker, BlackCat, Trigona, and LockBit.
"AcidPour includes functionality to reboot the victim system following wiping actions..."; "AcidRain reboots the target system once the various wiping processes are complete"; "Apostle reboots the victim machine following wiping"; "APT37 ... issue the command shutdown /r /t 1 to reboot a system after wiping its MBR"; "APT38 ... BOOTWRECK ... initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR"; "Black Basta ... used ShellExecuteA to shut down and restart"; "DarkGate ... used the shutdown command"; "HermeticWiper can initiate a system shutdown"; "NotPetya will reboot the system one hour after infection"; "Shamoon will reboot the infected system once the wiping functionality has been completed"; "WhisperGate can shutdown ... through ... ExitWindowsEx"
Other
3 techniques
Other
Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities.
This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information.
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A ransomware operation and RaaS program advertised on RAMP that also directly sought to buy corporate access.
Named ransomware group referenced as a destination for former Conti members; no additional technical details provided.
Ransomware operation cited as associated with post-Conti member migration/infiltration.
Ransomware name mentioned as a successor/related operation that former Conti members moved to or formed after Conti’s shutdown.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.