Cuckoo Stealer is a macOS infostealer, and some reporting in the provided content also describes it as having RAT-like functionality. It has been delivered through social-engineering campaigns, including ClickFix-style lures and fake Homebrew pages that trick users into running malicious Terminal commands. Researchers Alden Schmidt and Intego documented its use in counterfeit Homebrew campaigns, and the content states Cuckoo Stealer and SHAMOS operators used this method in Homebrew malvertising campaigns between May 2024 and January 2025. Additional reporting in the content describes a Homebrew-impersonation campaign using the typosquatted domain homabrews[.]org and related infrastructure, where a first-stage script validated stolen passwords with dscl . -authonly before downloading the second-stage Cuckoo Stealer payload.
On infected hosts, Cuckoo Stealer can capture passwords by displaying a GUI prompt claiming that macOS needs to access System Settings. It can collect and send host information to command-and-control infrastructure, including captured passwords, OS build, hostname, and username. It can discover the username on a compromised host and transmit it to C2, determine the victim’s geographical location by checking language settings, and check the LANG environment variable to avoid infecting devices configured for Armenia (hy_AM), Belarus (be_BY), Kazakhstan (kk_KZ), Russia (ru_RU), and Ukraine (uk_UA).
The malware targets Safari data, including bookmarks, cookies, and browsing history. The content also states it stages collected application data from Safari, Notes, and Keychain to /var/folder. In one campaign description, it copied its binary and scraped passwords into a hidden folder in the /Users directory; another report states it copied its binary to a hidden directory ~/.local-{session_id}/ using the filename BrewUpdater. It has also been observed copying and renaming itself to DumpMediaSpotifyMusicConverter.
For persistence, Cuckoo Stealer can create LaunchAgents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads; one cited persistence filename is com.homebrew.brewupdater.plist. The content also notes reporting that associates it with LoginHook-style persistence. It can remove macOS quarantine attributes with xattr in campaign activity described in the content.
For communications, Cuckoo Stealer can use sockets for C2, and one campaign report states it used HTTPS C2 with X25519 ECDH key exchange and libcurl. The same reporting says it supports commands including shell execution, rebooting, self-destruct, starting or stopping exfiltration, and exfiltrating specific files. High-confidence infrastructure and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include homabrews[.]org, raw.homabrews[.]org, IP 5.255.123[.]244, the downloaded binary name brew_agent, the hidden path ~/.local-{session_id}/BrewUpdater, the LaunchAgent com.homebrew.brewupdater.plist, staging to /var/folder, and hidden storage under /Users.
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34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial commands leverage curl to fetch obfuscated payloads, which are piped directly into shell interpreters (bash/zsh), minimizing the disk footprint.
ClickFix variant that uses the applescript:// URL scheme to invoke the macOS Script Editor... This URL-encoded hyperlink runs a dual-track routine... while silently executing the curl command in the background to deliver an infostealer, bypassing Gatekeeper via user-coerced interaction.
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Long-term access is secured via LaunchAgents and .plist files, often masquerading as legitimate system or software updaters.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.
DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.
Agent Tesla has created hidden folders. AppleJeus has added a leading . to plist filenames, unlisting them from the Finder app and default Terminal directory listings. APT28 has saved files with hidden file attributes. FIN13 has created hidden files and folders within a compromised Linux system /tmp directory and also used attrib.exe to hide gathered local host information.
Bundlore prompts the user for their credentials. Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password. Cuckoo Stealer has captured passwords by prompting victims with a "macOS needs to access System Settings" GUI window. Dok prompts the user for credentials. FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials. iKitten prompts the user for their credentials. Keydnap prompts the users for credentials. Proton prompts users for their credentials. RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up. SILENTTRINITY's credphisher.py module can prompt a current user for their credentials. XCSSET prompts the user to input credentials using a native macOS dialog box leveraging the system process /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/SafariForWebKitDevelopment.
Exfiltration efforts focus on high-value data, including ... messaging session tokens (Telegram/Discord)
Exfiltration efforts focus on high-value data, including browser credentials (Chromium/Firefox), macOS Keychains
Exfiltration efforts focus on high-value data, including ... macOS Keychains
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
APT38 has collected browser bookmark information to learn more about compromised hosts, obtain personal information about users, and acquire details about internal network resources.
DarkGate queries system locale information during execution. Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.
"Bazar can query the Registry for installed applications." / "BRONZE BUTLER has used tools to enumerate software installed on an infected host." / "LightSpy ... enumerate the Applications folder to collect the bundle name, bundle identifier, and version information..." / "Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software."
"Amadey does not run any tasks or install additional malware if the victim machine is based in Russia"; "DarkGate queries system locale information... determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries"; "Ragnar Locker checks... GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country"; "Saint Bot has conducted system locale checks..."
Avaddon checks for specific keyboard layouts and OS languages to avoid targeting Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) entities... Bazar can perform a check to ensure that the operating system's keyboard and language settings are not set to Russian... Clop has checked the keyboard language using the GetKeyboardLayout() function... Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage.
Bundlore prompts the user for their credentials. Calisto presents an input prompt asking for the user's login and password. Cuckoo Stealer has captured passwords by prompting victims with a "macOS needs to access System Settings" GUI window. Dok prompts the user for credentials. FIN4 has presented victims with spoofed Windows Authentication prompts to collect their credentials. iKitten prompts the user for their credentials. Keydnap prompts the users for credentials. Proton prompts users for their credentials. RedCurl prompts the user for credentials through a Microsoft Outlook pop-up. SILENTTRINITY's credphisher.py module can prompt a current user for their credentials. XCSSET prompts the user to input credentials using a native macOS dialog box leveraging the system process /Applications/Safari.app/Contents/MacOS/SafariForWebKitDevelopment.
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
Rather than allowing users to highlight and copy the install command, the page forces them to use a single Copy button. That restriction is purposeful: it enables the attacker to inject an extra hidden command into the clipboard, outside of what is shown to the user on the webpage, which downloads a malicious payload in parallel with the Homebrew installer.
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
24 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A macOS infostealer used in ClickFix campaigns to exfiltrate sensitive user data from compromised systems.
Information stealer delivered via fake Homebrew pages that mimic the official install flow to trick users into installing malicious commands, enabling secret exfiltration and possible persistent access.
macOS infostealer/RAT delivered via typosquatted Homebrew-themed ClickFix lures; establishes LaunchAgent persistence, removes quarantine attributes, uses encrypted HTTPS C2, and steals browser credentials/session tokens, Keychain data, notes/messaging sessions, VPN/FTP configs, and data from numerous crypto wallet apps.
Second-stage macOS infostealer/RAT delivered via a ClickFix/Homebrew-typosquat paste-and-run command. Establishes LaunchAgent persistence, removes quarantine attributes, uses encrypted HTTPS C2 (X25519 ECDH-derived), supports remote command execution and file exfiltration, and steals high-value data including browser credentials/cookies, Keychain, Apple Notes, Discord/Telegram sessions, VPN/FTP configs, Steam sessions, and data from 20+ cryptocurrency wallets.
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Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
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Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.