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Mallory
Malware

GravityRAT

GravityRAT is a spyware/RAT family active since at least 2015 and believed to be linked to Pakistani threat actors. Reporting cited in the content states Cisco Talos published research on it in 2018 and that CERT-IN first discovered the Trojan in 2017; it was used to target the Indian armed forces and more broadly employees of Indian defense, police, and related organizations. The malware was initially associated with Windows, then expanded to Android in 2018 and later to macOS. Delivery described in the content includes trojanized or fake applications such as Travel Mate Pro, Enigma, Titanium, WeShare, TrustX, Click2Chat, Bollywood, Sharify, MelodyMate, GoZap, StrongBox, TeraSpace, OrangeVault, CvStyler, and SavitaBhabi, with victims reportedly lured via fake Facebook accounts.

Capabilities directly described in the content include collecting the victim username and account details such as account type, description, full name, SID, and status; gathering host information via WMI including Win32_Processor data such as processor ID, name, manufacturer, and clock speed; obtaining system date and time; collecting the victim IP address, MAC address, and account domain name; listing running processes; listing available services; using netstat to identify open ports; executing commands remotely on the infected host; and stealing files with extensions including .docx, .doc, .pptx, .ppt, .xlsx, .xls, .rtf, and .pdf. One described behavior is stealing files based on an extension list when a USB drive is connected. Persistence on Windows is achieved by creating a scheduled task to re-execute daily; a macOS Enigma variant established persistence with a cron job.

Android-related activity in the content states that the trojanized Travel Mate Pro exfiltrated device data, contact lists, email addresses, call logs, SMS logs, and files from device and removable storage, including .jpg, .jpeg, .log, .png, .txt, .pdf, .xml, .doc, .xls, .xlsx, .ppt, .pptx, .docx, and .opus files. A Windows-related sample, ZW.exe, is described as collecting system information, searching for documents, listing running processes, intercepting keystrokes, taking screenshots, executing shell commands, and scanning ports.

Infrastructure and IoCs explicitly mentioned in the content include HTTP C2 over non-standard TCP port 46769 and related use of port 64443; domains n1.nortonupdates[.]online and n2.nortonupdates[.]online, which resolved to 213.152.161[.]219; n3.nortonupdates[.]online:64443; enigma.net[.]in; titaniumx.co[.]in; windowsupdates[.]eu; mozillaupdates[.]com; mozillaupdates[.]us; u01.msoftserver[.]eu; and msoftserver[.]eu:64443 with path /ZULU_SERVER.php. Additional sample and payload names mentioned include Enigma.ps1, enigma.exe, Xray.exe, ZW.exe, RW.exe, TW.exe, Whisper, Wpd.exe, Taskhostex.exe, WCNsvc.exe, SMTPHost.exe, and CSRP.exe. The content also notes RW.exe used C2 path /ROMEO/5d907853.php and TW.exe used /TANGO/e252a516.php, and that older Whisper variants contained the strings "lolomycin2017" and "lolomycin&Co."

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

It is safe to assume that the current GravityRAT campaign uses similar infection methods — targeted individuals are sent links pointing to malicious apps.

Execution

4 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1053.003CronEvidence1

The Mac version has a similar functionality and adds a cron job.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

The Mac version has a similar functionality and adds a cron job.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

The Mac version has a similar functionality and adds a cron job.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Examples throughout the content include 'encrypted payloads decrypted and executed in memory,' 'encrypts its configuration file,' 'AES-encrypted resource,' 'RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'payload includes an encrypted main component.'

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The attackers used a version of the app published on Github in October 2018, adding malicious code and changing the name to Travel Mate Pro.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the Trojan checks if it is running on a virtual machine

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

The cybercriminals also started using digital signatures to make the apps look more legitimate.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... intercept keystrokes

Discovery

10 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... scan ports

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1069Permission Groups DiscoveryEvidence1

Examples include 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host' and multiple entries checking whether the current user is an administrator or has elevated privileges.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

Examples include 'Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host,' 'Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information,' and 'Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery.'

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence2

Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'DRATzarus can obtain a list of users from an infected machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine,' and 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.'

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

the Trojan checks if it is running on a virtual machine

Collection

5 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence2

AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices. APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device. Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices. BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... intercept keystrokes

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The spyware receives commands from the server, including to: ... take screenshots

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

record audio (not implemented in this version)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

We focused on port 46769, used by the above Trojans. The same port was used by the GravityRAT family.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the Trojan checks if it is running on a virtual machine, collects information about the computer, downloads the payload from the server, and adds a scheduled task.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The spyware’s functions are fairly standard: it sends device data, contact lists, e-mail addresses, and call and text logs to the C&C server.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
44 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
32 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching76

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.