Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Phenakite

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPrivilege escalationReconnaissance
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
iOS

Phenakite is custom iOS spyware used by Arid Viper, also known as Desert Falcon and APT-C-23, for targeted cyberespionage. Publicly identified in April 2021, it was embedded in Magic Smile, a trojanized but functional chat application built using the open-source RealtimeChat code. Its deployment was associated with campaigns targeting Palestinian government officials, Fatah members, student groups, and security forces.

Initial installation relies on social engineering: victims are persuaded to install a mobile configuration profile that enables installation of a device-specific signed application. The device need not already be jailbroken. After installation, Phenakite uses bundled Osiris jailbreak and Sock Port exploit code to elevate privileges and access sensitive information beyond normal iOS application permissions. Distribution used a third-party application development platform and attacker-controlled hosting infrastructure.

Phenakite collects and exfiltrates contacts, SMS messages, device metadata, photos, WhatsApp media, selected documents, and messages exchanged through its trojanized chat application. It can record phone-call audio, silently capture audio, and take photographs using the device camera. During chat registration, it can redirect users to Facebook and iCloud phishing pages to steal credentials.

Its observed deployment was limited rather than widespread. Revocation of developer certificates disrupted distribution and appeared to pause Arid Viper's iOS operations in 2021.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Arid Viper

For iOS devices, the group used Phenakite, which is capable of recording phone call audio, collecting and forwarding WhatsApp media files, photos, and files with specific extensions.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

Android malware was typically hosted on convincing looking attacker-controlled phishing sites. At the time of this writing, we discovered 41 such sites.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

It used sprawling infrastructure to support its operations, including over a hundred websites that either hosted iOS and Android malware, attempted to steal credentials through phishing or acted as command and control servers.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

This spike in account creation towards the later half of 2019 was observed alongside an increase in attempts to distribute both iOS and Android malware as well as phish credentials from users.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

In all cases the successful installation of these tools did not require any exploits. This suggests that Arid Viper operators continue to heavily rely on social engineering to distribute their malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

They also bundled Windows malware in the installer package for their own decoy application for journalists to submit human rights-related articles for publication.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

Post-installation, a jailbreak was necessary for the malware to elevate its privileges to retrieve sensitive user information not accessible via standard iOS permission requests. This was achieved with the publicly available Osiris jailbreak that made use of the Sock Port exploit.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

This malware masqueraded as secure chat applications.

T1211Exploitation for StealthEvidence1

Phenakite comes bundled with the publicly available Osiris jailbreak and also includes the Sock Port exploit.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

It relied on social engineering to trick people into clicking on malicious links and installing malware on their devices.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

This malware could also direct people to phishing pages for Facebook and iCloud to steal their credentials for those services.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence2

This malware could also direct people to phishing pages for Facebook and iCloud to steal their credentials for those services.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Retrieve photos from the camera roll ... Retrieve contacts ... Retrieve text messages ... Search for and return the path of files with a doc or PDF extension

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

This malware could also direct people to phishing pages for Facebook and iCloud to steal their credentials for those services.

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically recording audio and notifying C2 infrastructure... Similarly, Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos

T1125Video CaptureEvidence1

Phenakite periodically uses the camera of a compromised device to take photos and sends these automatically to attacker infrastructure.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Once collected, the malware would upload the data to Firebase, a mobile app development platform.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence4

Examples in the content include: 'Riltok can access and upload the device's contact list to the command and control server,' 'Rotexy can access and upload the contacts list to the command and control server,' and multiple entries stating malware can 'exfiltrate' contacts.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.