Malware

InnaputRAT

InnaputRAT is a Windows remote access trojan used to execute commands and maintain persistent access on compromised hosts. Observed functionality includes launching a shell to run commands on the victim system, executing programs through the ShellExecuteW API, and deleting files on demand. Persistence has been established through Windows autorun mechanisms, including Registry Run entries, and through creation of a Windows service. Variants have also used benign-looking executable and service names to masquerade as legitimate software and reduce suspicion. The malware’s documented behavior is consistent with post-compromise remote administration and defense-evasion tradecraft on Windows systems.

For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence4

Numerous entries state malware can create a remote shell or reverse shell, for example 4H RAT, BLACKCOFFEE, DarkComet, PlugX, QuasarRAT, and others. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using cmd.exe, the Windows command shell, to execute commands, launch payloads, run batch files, and automate actions on compromised hosts.

T1106Native APIEvidence3

The content is a MITRE ATT&CK-style listing of many malware families and threat groups using Windows/native OS APIs for execution, injection, discovery, anti-debugging, and other actions, ending with 'NtCreateProcess' and 'fork()'.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer. They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under Registry Run keys such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and by placing shortcuts or files in Startup folders.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence7

Stealth

4 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

Akira has used legitimate names and locations for files to evade defenses.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence7

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors deleting files, directories, droppers, logs, scripts, temporary files, exfiltrated archives, and uninstalling themselves to cover tracks or reduce forensic artifacts.

Discovery

3 techniques

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence8

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting OS version, computer name, architecture, CPU, memory, disk, BIOS, language, and other host details; examples include use of commands such as ver, systeminfo, hostname, uname -m, and WMI to gather host information.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

Examples include: "Babuk can enumerate disk volumes," "Confucius has used a file stealer that can examine system drives," and "XAgentOSX contains the getInstalledAPP function to run ls -la /Applications to gather what applications are installed."

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

Command and Control

1 technique

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

13 SOURCESView more in app

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Native API, Technique T1106 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote access trojan that uses ShellExecuteW for execution.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion, Sub-technique T1070.004 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote access trojan with a command to delete files.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Sub-technique T1547.001 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote access trojan whose variants persist by modifying a Registry Run key.

mitre attack websiteNews

Oct 21, 2021

Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location, Sub-technique T1036.005 - Enterprise | MITRE ATT&CK®

Remote access trojan that uses benign application-style filenames for disguise.

+9 more in the timeline

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

InnaputRAT