Carbon

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques Tactic Technique ID Technique name Execution T1059 ... Command-line Interface

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

“Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer… replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary… [multiple groups/malware] creating a service / installing as a service / modifying service configurations for persistence.”

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

"Carbon has a command to inject code into a process."

“Sandworm Team used an arbitrary system service to load at system boot for persistence for Industroyer… replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary… [multiple groups/malware] creating a service / installing as a service / modifying service configurations for persistence.”

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

"Carbon has a command to inject code into a process."

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

BlackEnergy has gathered information about network IP configurations using ipconfig.exe and about routing tables using route.exe.

"Carbon uses the netstat -r and netstat -an commands."

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

"Carbon uses the net group command."

Multiple malware and threat groups are described as collecting/deriving local system time, date, timestamp, tick count, or time zone (e.g., "used time /t and net time \ip/hostname for system time discovery"; "collects the timestamp from the victim’s machine"; "can collect the time zone information from the system").

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

"Carbon creates a base directory that contains the files and folders that are collected."

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control ... T1001 Data Obfuscation ... When accessing the Pastebin URL, an encrypted blob is downloaded that requires a corresponding RSA private key from the configuration file.

the Carbon instance had been updated to include a Pastebin project to receive encrypted tasks alongside its traditional HTTP C&C infrastructure. | Accenture researchers recently identified novel command and control (C&C) configurations for Turla’s Carbon and Kazuar backdoors on the same victim network.

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control ... T1090 Proxy ... The October sample likely acts as a transfer agent used to proxy commands from the remote Turla operators to the Kazuar instances on internal nodes in the network via an internet-facing shared network location.

"Carbon uses TCP and UDP for C2."

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control T1102 ... Web Service ... Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin.

To compromise the organization's network, the attackers used a combination of recently updated remote administration trojans (RATs) and remote procedure call (RPC)-based backdoors including HyperStack

the attackers used a combination of recently updated remote administration trojans (RATs) and remote procedure call (RPC)-based backdoors

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

Examples include: "encrypts some C2 with RSA", "RSA encryption for C2 communications", "hard-coded RSA public key", "RSA-2048", "RSA-4096", and "REvil has encrypted C2 communications with the ECIES algorithm". | Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2").

"Carbon uses HTTP to send data to the C2 server."