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Malware2 associated actors

USBStealer

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistenceLateral movementDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
USB
Platforms
Windows
Also known asWin32/USBStealer

USBStealer is a Windows information-stealing malware family used by APT28, also known as Sednit, Sofacy, and Fancy Bear, for espionage against air-gapped systems, including governmental institutions in Eastern Europe. It uses removable USB media to propagate between compromised computers and transfer sensitive information across network isolation boundaries. Its propagation abuses Windows AutoRun or AutoPlay, while removable media also provides an offline communication channel.

USBStealer monitors removable-drive insertion and enumerates connected drives on newly infected systems. It automatically collects files matching predefined criteria from non-removable drives and stages them locally for later exfiltration. Data collected on a second compromised computer is carried on removable media and retrieved when that device returns to the first compromised computer. The malware establishes persistence through Registry-based autostart, masquerades as legitimate USB security software, and supports commands to delete its associated files. It also manipulates dropper file timestamps to match those of a legitimate Windows library, helping conceal its artifacts.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 3)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
APT29

“...the data stealer for air-gapped machines USBStealer.”

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

the methods observed do not differ much from what we see in general malware: emails with malicious attachments, links, or USB worms.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Attempted to register itself as a service named “USBGuard”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Attempted to register itself as a service named “USBGuard”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence10

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) registers itself under a Registry Run key with the name "USB Disk Security."(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

Most strings in [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) are encrypted using 3DES and XOR and reversed.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

actors used the following command to rename one of their tools to a benign file name: ren "%temp%\upload" audiodg.exe ... APT1 ... used ... AcroRD32.exe ... as a name for malware ... APT28 ... changed extensions on files containing exfiltrated data to make them appear benign ... APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence3

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) mimics a legitimate Russian program called USB Disk Security.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence10

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) has several commands to delete files associated with the malware from the victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence4

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) sets the timestamps of its dropper files to the last-access and last-write timestamps of a standard Windows library chosen on the system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence2

Files marked with hidden or system attribute

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Frameworks gather information such as computer name, username, domain name, list of running processes, listing of files in directories, drives and network shares, as well as network configuration information

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) searches victim drives for files matching certain extensions (“.skr”,“.pkr” or “.key”) or names.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence6

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) monitors victims for insertion of removable drives. When dropped onto a second victim, it also enumerates drives connected to the system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence5

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a user opens the removable media on another system.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

USBStealer, USBCulprit, Retro, USBThief, PlugX and Ramsay, for example, were clearly built to steal specific files.

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence5

Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)

T1074Data StagedEvidence2

collects information that is staged on the USB drive for exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) collects files matching certain criteria from the victim and stores them in a local directory for later exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence5

For all non-removable drives on a victim, [USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) executes automated collection of certain files for later exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The stolen data is copied into a hidden directory as “ %MYPICTURES%\%volume serial number% “, from where it can be exfiltrated by the attackers using one of the AZZY implants.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1092Communication Through Removable MediaEvidence3

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the attacker sends commands to the malware placed on the air-gapped network; this is done via a covert communication channel often placed on a USB drive

Exfiltration

4 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence3

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) automatically exfiltrates collected files via removable media when an infected device connects to an air-gapped victim machine after initially being connected to an internet-enabled victim machine. (Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The stolen data is copied into a hidden directory as “ %MYPICTURES%\%volume serial number% “, from where it can be exfiltrated by the attackers using one of the AZZY implants.

T1052Exfiltration Over Physical MediumEvidence1

used USB drives as the physical transmission medium to transfer information across air gaps.

T1052.001Exfiltration over USBEvidence3

[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.