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Malware1 associated actor

Cheerscrypt

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 17 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Extortion
Platforms
LinuxEsxi

Cheerscrypt is a Linux-based ransomware family discovered in May 2022 that targets VMware ESXi servers and their virtual-machine data. It derives from the leaked source code of Babuk’s ESXi encryptor, with modifications to its encryption workflow. Cheerscrypt has been observed in multiple attacks against ESXi environments and is used in double-extortion operations.

The encryptor accepts a target filesystem location as a command-line argument and uses ESXCLI to enumerate and forcibly terminate virtual-machine processes, releasing VMware-related files for encryption. It targets virtual-machine files and logs, renames targeted files before attempting encryption, and deposits ransom notes in affected directories. Files can remain renamed but unencrypted if the process lacks the necessary access permissions.

Cheerscrypt encrypts file contents with the SOSEMANUK stream cipher and derives per-file encryption keys through Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman. For each file, it generates a fresh key pair using operating-system randomness and combines the generated private key with an embedded attacker-controlled public key to derive a shared secret. The generated public key is appended to the encrypted file, while the generated private key is not retained. This design makes decryption dependent on the attacker’s corresponding private key.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cinnamon Tempest

(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Before starting the encryption, BlackCat shuts down the virtual machines with the esxcli command-line utility.

T1059.012Hypervisor CLIEvidence3

Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli` in order to terminate running virtual machines.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) can search for log and VMware-related files with .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, and .vmsn extensions.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)

T1673Virtual Machine DiscoveryEvidence3

Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli vm process list` in order to gather a list of running virtual machines to terminate them.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)

Impact

6 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence7

[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) can encrypt data on victim machines using a Sosemanuk stream cipher with an Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) generated key.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)

T1489Service StopEvidence4

[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) has the ability to terminate VM processes on compromised hosts through execution of `esxcli vm process kill`.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Upon execution, it implements the following command to terminate VM processes using ESXCLI: “esxcli vm process kill –type=force –world-id=$(esxcli vm process list|grep ‘World ID’|awk ‘{print $3}’)” The termination of the VM processes ensures that the ransomware can successfully encrypt VMware-related files.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

For example, -w parameter can be used to stop all running virtual machines with the help of the esxcli command-line utility

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

However, the ransomware first renames the files it will encrypt before encrypting the files.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Similar to other infamous ransomware families, Cheerscrypt employs the double extortion scheme to coerce its victim to pay the ransom, as shown on their ransom note in Figure 2.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.