Cheerscrypt
- Type
- Ransomware
- Capabilities
- Extortion
- Platforms
- LinuxEsxi
Cheerscrypt is a Linux-based ransomware family discovered in May 2022 that targets VMware ESXi servers and their virtual-machine data. It derives from the leaked source code of Babuk’s ESXi encryptor, with modifications to its encryption workflow. Cheerscrypt has been observed in multiple attacks against ESXi environments and is used in double-extortion operations.
The encryptor accepts a target filesystem location as a command-line argument and uses ESXCLI to enumerate and forcibly terminate virtual-machine processes, releasing VMware-related files for encryption. It targets virtual-machine files and logs, renames targeted files before attempting encryption, and deposits ransom notes in affected directories. Files can remain renamed but unencrypted if the process lacks the necessary access permissions.
Cheerscrypt encrypts file contents with the SOSEMANUK stream cipher and derives per-file encryption keys through Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman. For each file, it generates a fresh key pair using operating-system randomness and combines the generated private key with an embedded attacker-controlled public key to derive a shared secret. The generated public key is appended to the encrypted file, while the generated private key is not retained. This design makes decryption dependent on the attacker’s corresponding private key.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Before starting the encryption, BlackCat shuts down the virtual machines with the esxcli command-line utility.
Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli` in order to terminate running virtual machines.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) can search for log and VMware-related files with .log, .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, and .vmsn extensions.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)
Cheerscrypt has leveraged `esxcli vm process list` in order to gather a list of running virtual machines to terminate them.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)
Impact
6 techniques
Impact
[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) can encrypt data on victim machines using a Sosemanuk stream cipher with an Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) generated key.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Emperor Dragonfly October 2022)
[Cheerscrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1096) has the ability to terminate VM processes on compromised hosts through execution of `esxcli vm process kill`.(Citation: Trend Micro Cheerscrypt May 2022)
Upon execution, it implements the following command to terminate VM processes using ESXCLI: “esxcli vm process kill –type=force –world-id=$(esxcli vm process list|grep ‘World ID’|awk ‘{print $3}’)” The termination of the VM processes ensures that the ransomware can successfully encrypt VMware-related files.
For example, -w parameter can be used to stop all running virtual machines with the help of the esxcli command-line utility
However, the ransomware first renames the files it will encrypt before encrypting the files.
Similar to other infamous ransomware families, Cheerscrypt employs the double extortion scheme to coerce its victim to pay the ransom, as shown on their ransom note in Figure 2.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.