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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

ZeroT

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK30Techniques
IOCs57Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationDLL sideloadingDefense evasionPrivilege escalationPersistence
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

ZeroT is a Windows downloader used since at least summer 2016 in cyberespionage campaigns associated with the China-linked threat actor TA459. It primarily installs the PlugX remote access trojan; some campaigns have also delivered PCRat/Gh0st. Documented targets include military and aerospace organizations in Russia and Belarus, as well as financial analysts covering telecommunications at major financial firms operating in Russia and neighboring countries. Its infrastructure has overlapped with NetTraveler activity.

ZeroT is distributed through spear-phishing emails carrying malicious Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Compiled HTML Help droppers, and compressed or self-extracting archives. Word-based infection chains have exploited CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2017-0199. Campaigns have used Russian-language defense-industry and project-themed lures. Execution chains abuse legitimate signed Norman Safeground or McAfee utilities for DLL side-loading, and many samples incorporate a Windows Event Viewer-based User Account Control bypass.

ZeroT decrypts RC4-protected payloads and decompresses them before execution. Its evasion techniques include junk instructions, dummy API calls, altered executable headers, and UPX packing in some associated DLLs. It communicates over HTTP using browser-like headers, with RC4 protecting configuration responses and subsequent beacons. It collects and transmits host information including computer name, local IP address, domain information, system language, and Windows version.

Second-stage payloads can arrive as executable content or be concealed within BMP images using least significant bit steganography. ZeroT extracts the hidden payloads and can create a Windows service to ensure that delivered PlugX malware runs at system startup.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0199via proofpoint threat insight blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code Executionattackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan... In this campaign, attackers used a Microsoft Word document called 0721.doc, which exploits CVE-2017-0199. This vulnerability was disclosed and patched days prior to this attack. | attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan, which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote Access Trojan (RAT).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2012-0158via proofpoint threat insight blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionIn previous campaigns, the group used spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word document attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158... Attackers also continued to send spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158 to exploit the client. | Since the summer of 2016, this group began using a new downloader known as ZeroT to install the PlugX remote access Trojan (RAT) and added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA459

attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan, which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote Access Trojan (RAT).

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

the group used spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word document attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158, or URLs linking to RAR-compressed executables... added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

uses PowerShell to download yet another script: power.ps1. This is a PowerShell script that downloads and runs the ZeroT payload cgi.exe.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

the HTA’s VBScript changes the window size and location and then uses PowerShell to download yet another script

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

Attackers also continued to send spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158 to exploit the client. These documents were built with MNKit

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic by this group. RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

This particular CHM contained an HTM file and an executable file... opening the CHM has the effect of running the executable

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can add a new service to ensure [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can add a new service to ensure [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence6

Many [ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence6

This executable is obfuscated... dummy API calls inserted in between real instructions... the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence5

Some [ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) DLL files have been packed with UPX.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Analysis of the F.bmp image revealed that it is indeed using Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography... embeds data in an image without significantly affecting its appearance.

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1

Defense Evasion. ...Работают сразу две техники: Steganography (T1027.003) для обфускации пейлоада и Embedded Payloads (T1027.009) для сокрытия кода внутри медиафайла.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence4

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has encrypted its payload with RC4.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has obfuscated DLLs and functions using dummy API calls inserted between real instructions.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence12

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) shellcode decrypts and decompresses its RC4-encrypted payload.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1218.005MshtaEvidence1

The payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.

T1574.001DLLEvidence3

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) gathers the victim's IP address and domain information, and then sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) gathers the victim's computer name, Windows version, and system language, and then sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence2

Examples include 'Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed,' 'DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language,' 'Maze has checked the language of the infected system,' and 'SynAck ... checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.'

Collection

2 techniques
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

Examples in the content include 'DropBook can unarchive data downloaded from the C2 to obtain the payload and persistence modules,' 'Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine,' and 'Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.'

T1560.001Archive via UtilityEvidence1

Throughout the second half of 2016 we also found many RAR archives and RAR SFX (self-extracting executables) of ZeroT

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

ZeroT still expects an RC4-encrypted response using a static key ... All posts are encrypted

T1001.002SteganographyEvidence3

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can download additional payloads onto the victim.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

57 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching57Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping30Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.