ZeroT
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationDLL sideloadingDefense evasionPrivilege escalationPersistence
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- Windows
ZeroT is a Windows downloader used since at least summer 2016 in cyberespionage campaigns associated with the China-linked threat actor TA459. It primarily installs the PlugX remote access trojan; some campaigns have also delivered PCRat/Gh0st. Documented targets include military and aerospace organizations in Russia and Belarus, as well as financial analysts covering telecommunications at major financial firms operating in Russia and neighboring countries. Its infrastructure has overlapped with NetTraveler activity.
ZeroT is distributed through spear-phishing emails carrying malicious Microsoft Word documents, Microsoft Compiled HTML Help droppers, and compressed or self-extracting archives. Word-based infection chains have exploited CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2017-0199. Campaigns have used Russian-language defense-industry and project-themed lures. Execution chains abuse legitimate signed Norman Safeground or McAfee utilities for DLL side-loading, and many samples incorporate a Windows Event Viewer-based User Account Control bypass.
ZeroT decrypts RC4-protected payloads and decompresses them before execution. Its evasion techniques include junk instructions, dummy API calls, altered executable headers, and UPX packing in some associated DLLs. It communicates over HTTP using browser-like headers, with RC4 protecting configuration responses and subsequent beacons. It collects and transmits host information including computer name, local IP address, domain information, system language, and Windows version.
Second-stage payloads can arrive as executable content or be concealed within BMP images using least significant bit steganography. ZeroT extracts the hidden payloads and can create a Windows service to ensure that delivered PlugX malware runs at system startup.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
attackers opportunistically used spear-phishing emails with a Microsoft Word attachment exploiting the recently patched CVE-2017-0199 to deploy the ZeroT Trojan, which in turn downloaded the PlugX Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
Techniques & procedures
30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
the group used spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word document attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158, or URLs linking to RAR-compressed executables... added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
uses PowerShell to download yet another script: power.ps1. This is a PowerShell script that downloads and runs the ZeroT payload cgi.exe.
the HTA’s VBScript changes the window size and location and then uses PowerShell to download yet another script
Attackers also continued to send spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158 to exploit the client. These documents were built with MNKit
Bundling decoy documents is a common tactic by this group. RAR SFX directives are used to display the decoy while the malicious payload is executed.
This particular CHM contained an HTM file and an executable file... opening the CHM has the effect of running the executable
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can add a new service to ensure [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can add a new service to ensure [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) persists on the system when delivered as another payload onto the system.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Many [ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) samples can perform UAC bypass by using eventvwr.exe to execute a malicious file.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Stealth
11 techniques
Stealth
This executable is obfuscated... dummy API calls inserted in between real instructions... the PE header of ZeroT has been tampered with, specifically the “MZ” and “PE” constants
Some [ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) DLL files have been packed with UPX.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Analysis of the F.bmp image revealed that it is indeed using Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography... embeds data in an image without significantly affecting its appearance.
Defense Evasion. ...Работают сразу две техники: Steganography (T1027.003) для обфускации пейлоада и Embedded Payloads (T1027.009) для сокрытия кода внутри медиафайла.
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has encrypted its payload with RC4.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has obfuscated DLLs and functions using dummy API calls inserted between real instructions.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
The payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.
The encrypted ZeroT payload, named Mctl.mui, is decoded in memory revealing a similarly tampered PE header
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) shellcode decrypts and decompresses its RC4-encrypted payload.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
The payload is actually an HTML Application (HTA) file, not an RTF document.
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) gathers the victim's IP address and domain information, and then sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) gathers the victim's computer name, Windows version, and system language, and then sends it to its C2 server.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Examples include 'Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed,' 'DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language,' 'Maze has checked the language of the infected system,' and 'SynAck ... checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.'
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
Examples in the content include 'DropBook can unarchive data downloaded from the C2 to obtain the payload and persistence modules,' 'Molerats decompresses ZIP files once on the victim machine,' and 'Rocke has extracted tar.gz files after downloading them from a C2 server.'
Throughout the second half of 2016 we also found many RAR archives and RAR SFX (self-extracting executables) of ZeroT
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
ZeroT still expects an RC4-encrypted response using a static key ... All posts are encrypted
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has retrieved stage 2 payloads as Bitmap images that use Least Significant Bit (LSB) steganography.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used HTTP for C2.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) can download additional payloads onto the victim.(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.
[ZeroT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0230) has used RC4 to encrypt C2 traffic.(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)(Citation: Proofpoint ZeroT Feb 2017)
Observables
57 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.