REPTILE is an open-source Linux loadable-kernel-module rootkit that combines concealment capabilities with backdoor access. It can hide its own kernel module, files, directories, processes, selected file contents, and network connections. It also supports granting root privileges and provides an encrypted reverse shell based on TinySHell, enabling remote command execution on compromised systems.
REPTILE uses the KHOOK framework to intercept kernel functions and alter filesystem, process, and networking visibility. Its packet-triggered access mechanism monitors TCP, UDP, or ICMP traffic for specially crafted packets before initiating an outbound reverse-shell connection. Its custom loader decrypts an embedded kernel-module image in memory and loads it directly through the init_module system call rather than relying on standard module-loading utilities. REPTILE can establish reboot persistence through udev rules; deployed variants have also used boot-time startup scripts. Process masquerading further helps conceal its activity.
REPTILE has been used by the China-nexus espionage actor UNC3886 on compromised Linux systems and Fortinet management appliances, including alongside TABLEFLIP to restore remote access. Modified REPTILE components have also appeared in Mélofée intrusions, and REPTILE has been documented in attacks against South Korean organizations. Fire Ant has deployed REPTILE and related variants on Linux management infrastructure for durable access. It is primarily a post-compromise tool for stealth and continued control rather than an initial infection mechanism.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
REPTILE like binary later renamed to masquerade as security agent processes.
Reptile is an open-source kernel module rootkit that targets Linux systems and is publicly available on GitHub. Unlike other rootkit malware that typically only provide concealment capabilities, Reptile goes a step further by offering a reverse shell, allowing threat actors to easily take control of systems.
21 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The Reptile rootkit demonstrates this technique by installing a malicious udev rule under /etc/udev/rules.d/... RUN+="/lib/udev/reptile".
upon examining the rc.local autorun script, it is evident that a command to ensure persistence exists between the tags “#<intel_audio>” and “#</intel_audio>” | It also supports persistence through Udev. The following rules file is created in the /lib/udev/rules.d/ directory... to ensure that it will be executed even after a reboot.
Aside from the concealment and Port Knocking features, Reptile provides a feature where the “root” command can be used to give the current user root privileges.
The Reptile rootkit demonstrates this technique by installing a malicious udev rule under /etc/udev/rules.d/... RUN+="/lib/udev/reptile".
upon examining the rc.local autorun script, it is evident that a command to ensure persistence exists between the tags “#<intel_audio>” and “#</intel_audio>” | It also supports persistence through Udev. The following rules file is created in the /lib/udev/rules.d/ directory... to ensure that it will be executed even after a reboot.
“The rootkit writes a jump instruction at the start (prologue) of a kernel function, which diverts execution to the rootkit’s own code.” | “Rootkits are stealthy malware designed to conceal malicious activity, such as files, processes, network connections, kernel modules, or accounts.”
Stripping binaries and appending a single null byte significantly degraded static detections; limited XOR string/configuration encoding and lightweight packing were also used.
Rootkits often rename their processes and threads to match benign system components... kworker, migration, rcu_sched, sshd, systemd, dbus-daemon, or bash.
BridgeAgent ... маскировал свой процесс под /usr/bin/gnome-shell. Некоторые бинарники злоумышленники переименовывали ... чтобы выдать файлы за легитимные агенты SentinelOne и Cybereason.
Некоторые бинарники злоумышленники ... меняли их временные метки ... Также хакеры меняли временные метки файлов, чтобы затруднить расследование и восстановление хронологии атаки.
Reptile provides a concealment feature for files, directories, processes, and network communications. | Reptile provides a file tampering feature, which allows the contents of a file to be hidden... the strings between these tags are concealed. | When a PID is given along with the “hide” or “show” command, the process of the PID is concealed... hooking next_tgid() makes it so that the concealment target’s process is skipped, making it invisible in the /proc/ list.
TABLEFLIP passively listens on all active interfaces for specialized command packets that contain an XOR encoded IP address and port to redirect traffic to using iptables commands.
6 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
26 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
The advisory lists a REPTILE-like binary among the campaign's indicators and states that it was renamed to impersonate security-agent processes. This is a similarity-based identification; the content does not confirm that the binary belongs to the REPTILE family or describe its specific capabilities.
A Linux rootkit deployed for long-term access on compromised Linux management hosts.
REPTILE-like binaries were renamed and masqueraded as Cybereason and SentinelOne security-agent processes to reduce detection.
Open-source Linux rootkit used by Fire Ant to maintain durable access on Linux management hosts.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.