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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

NetTraveler

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Spyware
Capabilities
KeyloggingExfiltrationReconnaissanceDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

NetTraveler, also known as TravNet or Netfile, is a Windows espionage malware family used for covert surveillance and theft of sensitive documents. Its capabilities include keystroke logging, collection of application window titles to contextualize captured input, file-system enumeration, and document exfiltration. It primarily collects Microsoft Office and PDF documents, with some configurations also targeting engineering and computer-aided-design formats. The earliest identified samples carry timestamps from 2005, and extensive activity was documented between 2010 and 2013.

NetTraveler is distributed through spear-phishing emails containing weaponized Microsoft Word documents or links to compressed, self-extracting executables. Document-based attacks have exploited CVE-2010-3333 and CVE-2012-0158. Lures use victim-relevant geopolitical, military, and energy-related subjects, sometimes accompanied by decoy documents. Observed implants use DLL sideloading through legitimate signed executables, encrypted configuration data, and in-memory loading that unpacks core functionality into private memory with DLL-like page permissions.

NetTraveler has been used by China-linked espionage operators, including TA459, alongside other families such as PlugX and ZeroT. The campaign documented in 2013 compromised more than 350 high-profile victims across more than 40 countries. Targets included government institutions, embassies, military contractors, research organizations, universities, energy companies, private enterprises, and Tibetan and Uyghur activists. Significant targeting has occurred in Mongolia, Russia, India, Belarus, and neighboring regions, with espionage interests encompassing aerospace, telecommunications, nuclear energy, nanotechnology, and other scientific and strategic technologies.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2012-0158via securelistExploited in the wildMicrosoft Common Controls ActiveX Remote Code ExecutionKaspersky Labs products detect the three Microsoft Office exploits used in the spear-phishing attacks, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-3333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2010-3333via securelistExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Stack Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityKaspersky Labs products detect the three Microsoft Office exploits used in the spear-phishing attacks, including Exploit.MSWord.CVE-2010-3333, Exploit.Win32.CVE-2012-0158.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA459

(Citation: Proofpoint TA459 April 2017)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

the group used spear-phishing emails with Microsoft Word document attachments utilizing CVE-2012-0158, or URLs linking to RAR-compressed executables... added Microsoft Compiled HTML Help (.chm) as one of the initial droppers delivered in spear-phishing emails.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The process creates an empty file called temp.bat... The purpose of the batch file is to register the DLL found at “C:\WINDOWS\system32\FastUserSwitchingCompatibilityex.dll” as a service by adding “ServiceDll” entry.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The primary attack method consists of spear-phishing emails carrying malicious documents that exploit two remote code execution vulnerabilities that affect Microsoft Office, namely CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333, in order to install the malware.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The first file is a dropper used to register a malicious DLL (NetTraveler trojan) as a service... A new service called “FastUserSwitchingCompatibility” is created using CreateServiceA API function... A new key called “Parameters” is created... This will be used to register a malicious DLL as a service.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

the attacker’s purpose is to steal “explorer.exe” process’ token by calling OpenProcessToken... and then it uses ImpersonateLoggedOnUser function to impersonate the security context of a user.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

The first file is a dropper used to register a malicious DLL (NetTraveler trojan) as a service... A new service called “FastUserSwitchingCompatibility” is created using CreateServiceA API function... A new key called “Parameters” is created... This will be used to register a malicious DLL as a service.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

A new service called “FastUserSwitchingCompatibility” is created... which tries to impersonate the legitimate service... Attackers will try to impersonate/use legitimate system binaries or libraries on the host to hide malicious activity.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

If all methods fail, the infection will stop and the following operations are performed (self-deleting malware)... registry keys are deleted... The following files are deleted as well...

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

“Timestomping” is a tehnique used by a malicious actor to modify files’ timestamps... In our case the created and modified timestamps of the DLL file are set to Tuesday, ‎August ‎17, ‎2004, ‏‎9:00:00 PM.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

the attacker’s purpose is to steal “explorer.exe” process’ token by calling OpenProcessToken... and then it uses ImpersonateLoggedOnUser function to impersonate the security context of a user.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Basically the attacker’s purpose is to steal “explorer.exe” process’ token... and then it uses ImpersonateLoggedOnUser function to impersonate the security context of a user.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) contains a keylogger.(Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)

Discovery

6 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence4

[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context.(Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The main purpose of the trojan is to gather information about the environment... the list of processes... A list of processes is retrieved using Process32First and Process32Next APIs...

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The main purpose of the trojan is to gather information about the environment such as user name, host name, IP address of the host, Windows OS version, different configurations of the CPU, information about memory consumption...

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The file will enumerate all files and directories from the “C:\” drive... all information described will be stored in a new file called “C:\Windows\SysWOW64\enumfs.ini”... The operation applied to “C:\” drive is recursive...

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware is interested in WM_DEVICECHANGE (0x219) messages with a parameter of DBT_DEVICEARRIVAL (0x8000) which means that for example a new USB drive has been plugged in...

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Because the value of ScanAll is True in dnlist.ini, the malware scans for all available disk drives... compares the type of them with 3 (DRIVE_FIXED) or 4 (DRIVE_REMOTE)...

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

NetTraveler, also known as Travnet, is designed to steal documents, primarily DOC, XLS, PPT, RTF and PDF, and to perform basic computer surveillance. However, some configurations target extended lists of files, including those with extensions like CDR... or DWG, DXF, CDW and DWF...

T1025Data from Removable MediaEvidence1

The malicious process is interested in .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .txt, .rtf, .pdf files on disk and also on USB drives...

T1039Data from Network Shared DriveEvidence1

The malicious process is interested in .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .txt, .rtf, .pdf files... also on... network shares in order to exfiltrate them.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence4

[NetTraveler](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0033) contains a keylogger.(Citation: Kaspersky NetTraveler)

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

The malicious process is interested in .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .txt, .rtf, .pdf files on disk and also on USB drives and network shares in order to exfiltrate them.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

According to the Kaspersky report, the content of system_t.dll file will be compressed using a custom Lempel-Ziv-based algorithm and encoded with a modified Base64 algorithm.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

The data is compressed using a custom Lempel-Ziv-based algorithm and encoded with a modified Base64 algorithm before it will be exfiltrated to the Command and Control server.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The user agent used in the network communications is always set to “Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0)”... The encoded data is exfiltrated via a GET request to vipmailru[.]com (C2 server).

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

the attacker verifies if he’s able to connect to the same URL using the proxy settings he found in the registry... the malicious process modifies the config_t.dat file by setting UP=1... and then PS (proxy server), PP (proxy port), PU (proxy user), PW (proxy password) are set according to the settings found.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the malware is trying to download a file named updata.exe from the C2 server... The downloaded file is saved as “C:\Windows\install.exe” and run by the malicious process.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

also the malware has the capability to download and execute additional files on the infected machine.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The encoded data is exfiltrated via a GET request to vipmailru[.]com (C2 server).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.