DEADWOOD
DEADWOOD, also referred to as Detbosit, is a destructive wiper malware with reported but unconfirmed links to an Iranian threat group. It has been associated with the Iran-linked threat actor Agrius, which used it in destructive operations masquerading as ransomware against targets in the Middle East, including Israeli organizations beginning in 2020; the malware had also reportedly been used against a target in Saudi Arabia in 2019. DEADWOOD contains an embedded AES-encrypted payload labeled METADATA that provides configuration information for follow-on execution. It can set a timestamp to control when wiping begins, executing immediately if the configured timestamp is in the past. DEADWOOD can run as a Windows service and attempts to masquerade its service execution with benign-looking names such as ScDeviceEnums. Its destructive behavior includes overwriting files with random data and then deleting them, as well as opening each drive and writing zeroes to the first 512 bytes to delete the master boot record (MBR). It then sends the IOCTL_DISK_DELETE_DRIVE_LAYOUT control code to ensure the MBR is removed from the drive, rendering systems inoperable.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attacks were carried out using DEADWOOD ( aka Detbosit), a wiper with unconfirmed links to an Iranian threat group.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
Examples include 'contains an embedded, AES-encrypted resource named METADATA that contains configuration information for follow-on execution,' 'binary contains RC4 encrypted embedded scripts,' and 'initial payloads included encoded follow-on payloads located in the resources file of the first-stage loader.'
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
Initially engaged in espionage activity, Agrius deployed a set of destructive wiper attacks against Israeli targets, masquerading the activity as ransomware attacks.
APT37 has access to destructive malware that is capable of overwriting a machine's Master Boot Record (MBR). APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK to render systems inoperable. CaddyWiper has the ability to destroy information about a physical drive's partitions including the MBR, GPT, and partition entries.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Destructive wiper malware family referenced as part of Iran-aligned wiper tooling.
Destructive wiper used by Agrius in attacks against Israeli targets; previously involved in a wiping attack in the Middle East and tentatively attributed to an Iranian-nexus actor.
Disk-wiping malware used by Agrius as an alternative wiper capability, previously observed in attacks in Saudi Arabia (2019).
Contains an embedded AES-encrypted payload labeled METADATA that provides configuration for follow-on execution.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.