CharmPower
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
CharmPower is a modular PowerShell backdoor targeting Windows systems, associated with the Iran-linked APT35 threat group, also known as Charming Kitten and Phosphorus, and a subgroup tracked by Microsoft as Mint Sandstorm. It has been deployed following exploitation of Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228), including attacks observed in January 2022, and through targeted phishing campaigns using remote template injection. These phishing operations have targeted individuals affiliated with prominent think tanks and universities in Israel, North America, and Europe, particularly those connected to security and policy communities.
CharmPower uses PowerShell for payload execution and command-and-control communication, with additional modules transferred through C2 using Base64 encoding. Its discovery capabilities include gathering system information through WMIC, enumerating network settings with ipconfig, and querying Windows Registry uninstall values to identify installed applications. It can exfiltrate collected data through HTTP POST requests to a hardcoded C2 endpoint or through FTP using credentials embedded in its scripts. It also supports cleanup by removing persistence-related Registry artifacts. PowerStar is a refined variant of CharmPower.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CharmPower is a modular backdoor written in PowerShell that this subgroup delivers in phishing campaigns that rely on template injection.
Techniques & procedures
46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
In Mid-January, the Iran-linked APT35 group has been observed leveraging the Log4Shell flaw to drop a new PowerShell backdoor tracked as CharmPower.
Microsoft has also observed this Mint Sandstorm subgroup using a distinct attack chain involving low-volume phishing campaigns and a third custom implant.
In an effort to further gain the target’s confidence, Charming Kitten continued the interaction with another benign email containing a list of questions... After multiple days of benign and seemingly legitimate interaction, Charming Kitten finally sent a “draft report”... a password-protected RAR file containing a malicious LNK file.
The initial emails are most commonly lures designed to social engineer recipients into clicking a OneDrive link hosting a PDF spoofed to resemble information on a topic involving security or policy in the Middle East.
Execution
8 techniques
Execution
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can use `wmic` to gather information from a system.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Level 2: Kills all malware related processes and then deletes the corresponding files; also deletes a scheduled task that was not created by any file observed by Volexity during this investigation
POWERSTAR can execute commands in two programming languages, PowerShell and CSharp... start PowerShell, CSharp Executes a code block in a new thread.
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can use PowerShell for payload execution and C2 communication.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
The C# implementation of the [CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) command execution module can use <code>cmd</code>.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
This file has been weaponized with macros to perform remote template injection
Check Point publicly reports on the exploitation of the Log4J vulnerability by Charming Kitten, resulting in subsequent execution of POWERSTAR hosted on an Amazon S3 bucket.
This LNK, when executed by the user, downloads POWERSTAR from Backblaze and attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
Level 2: Kills all malware related processes and then deletes the corresponding files; also deletes a scheduled task that was not created by any file observed by Volexity during this investigation
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
As detailed by PwC, the downloaded template establishes persistence by replacing the user’s previous default Microsoft Word template.
Persistence via Startup tasks, Registry Run keys, and Batch/PowerShell scripts... This module establishes persistence for an additional POWERSTAR payload... a Run key is added to execute the file.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Level 2: Kills all malware related processes and then deletes the corresponding files; also deletes a scheduled task that was not created by any file observed by Volexity during this investigation
Persistence via Startup tasks, Registry Run keys, and Batch/PowerShell scripts... This module establishes persistence for an additional POWERSTAR payload... a Run key is added to execute the file.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
High-level obfuscation and custom code: Designed to bypass security tools that rely on identifying known malware signatures or behaviors.
Their malware often tries to behave like legitimate web browser activities to evade Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS).
Cleanup Modules... Level 3: Deletes all the persistence-related registry keys and corresponding files Level 4: Kills all processes whose executable resides in the directory %appdata%/Microsoft/Notepad , then deletes all files recursively in this directory
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can delete created files from a compromised system.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can decrypt downloaded modules prior to execution.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Microsoft reports Mint Sandstorm distributing OneDrive-hosted PDF files containing URLs to download a DOTM from Dropbox. Once executed, template injection is abused to execute POWERSTAR which is hosted on OneDrive.
The decrypted code is then executed in memory within the same PowerShell instance. This is the primary POWERSTAR backdoor payload. The same general technique is repeated throughout the POWERSTAR framework, with additional modules downloaded and executed in memory.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can remove persistence-related artifacts from the Registry.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) has the ability to enumerate `Uninstall` registry values.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) has the ability to use <code>ipconfig</code> to enumerate system network settings.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can use `netsh wlan show profiles` to list specific Wi-Fi profile details.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) has the ability to list running processes through the use of `tasklist`.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can enumerate the OS version and computer name on a targeted system.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can enumerate drives and list the contents of the C: drive on a victim's computer.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can list the installed applications on a compromised host.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can collect data and files from a compromised host.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) has the ability to capture screenshots.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Command and Control
11 techniques
Command and Control
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can change its C2 channel once every 360 loops by retrieving a new domain from the actors’ S3 bucket.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
When successfully executed, the primary POWERSTAR backdoor payload collects a small amount of system information from the compromised machine and sends it via a POST request to the C2 address... screenshots taken by the malware can be exfiltrated via HTTP or FTP
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can use HTTP to communicate with C2.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can download additional modules from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can retrieve C2 domain information from actor-controlled S3 buckets.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) has the ability to download additional modules to a compromised host.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can send additional modules over C2 encoded with base64.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
In this version, POWERSTAR initially tries to retrieve its C2 server by decoding a file stored on the IPFS... This C2 address-retrieval mechanism is designed to allow the attacker to update the C2 if the original C2 is blocked or taken down.
Encrypted communication channels: Used for C2 interactions.
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can send additional modules over C2 encrypted with a simple substitution cipher.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Exfiltration
4 techniques
Exfiltration
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can exfiltrate gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Agent Tesla has routines for exfiltration over SMTP, FTP, and HTTP.
Thrip has used WinSCP to exfiltrate data from a targeted organization over FTP.
[CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can send victim data via FTP with credentials hardcoded in the script.(Citation: Check Point APT35 CharmPower January 2022)
Observables
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.