CharmPower
CharmPower is a PowerShell-based malware associated with the Iranian threat ecosystem, with reporting indicating it is likely a successor to GorjolEcho/PowerStar, TAMECURL, and MischiefTut. The provided content attributes it to activity overlapping APT42/TA453 tradecraft. Its capabilities include PowerShell-based payload execution and command-and-control communication, retrieval of C2 domain information from actor-controlled Amazon S3 buckets, and downloading additional modules from actor-controlled S3 buckets. It can also receive additional modules over C2 encoded with Base64. On compromised Windows hosts, CharmPower can use wmic to gather system information, enumerate Uninstall registry values, and list installed applications. Collection capabilities explicitly mentioned include screenshot capture. For exfiltration, it can send gathered data to a hardcoded C2 URL via HTTP POST, and separate reporting in the content states it can also send victim data via FTP using hardcoded credentials in the script. Cleanup and anti-forensics behaviors mentioned include removing persistence-related artifacts from the Registry and deleting created files from the compromised system. The content references CharmPower versions 1.0 to 1.1.
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Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The toolset observed in this infection chain is likely the successor of GorjolEcho/PowerStar, TAMECURL, MischiefTut, and CharmPower.
Techniques & procedures
22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
Bisonal has deleted Registry keys to clean up its prior activity. FIN8 has deleted Registry keys during post compromise cleanup activities. SUNBURST also deleted previously-created Image File Execution Options (IFEO) Debugger registry values and registry keys related to HTTP proxy to clean up traces of its activity.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Discovery
6 techniques
Discovery
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
Examples include 'Action RAT can use WMI to gather AV products installed on an infected host,' 'Bumblebee can use WMI to gather system information,' and 'Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC for execution, remote system discovery.'
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.
"Agent Tesla can capture screenshots of the victim’s desktop"; "AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host"; "APT28 has used tools to take screenshots from victims"; "Cobalt Strike's Beacon payload is capable of capturing screenshots"; "PowerSploit's Get-TimedScreenshot Exfiltration module can take screenshots at regular intervals"; "Hydraq includes a component based on the code of VNC that can stream a live feed of the desktop"
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
IOCs tracked for this family
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
34 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Threat Details and IOCs Malware: BASICSTAR, CharmPower, GORBLE, GorjolEcho, NICECURL, POWERSTAR, TAMECAT
... CharmPower ... (v1.0→v1.1) ...
CharmPower (v1.0→v1.1)
Previously observed TA453 malware referenced as part of the lineage preceding BlackSmith/AnvilEcho.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.