Mongall

From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Initial Access T1566 – Phishing Threat actor use fake icon executable and document exploit as a decoy

Using a document exploit and tricking the user into opening a weaponized Word document to install a backdoor. Luring users into double-clicking a fake Anti-Virus to execute malware in the victim’s host.

Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros that were automatically executed once the user permitted them... APT29 has used various forms of spearphishing attempting to get a user to open attachments... DarkGate is distributed through phishing links to VBS or MSI objects requiring user interaction for execution.

Starting in 2018, hackers left these tactics behind to resort to using a removable disk shortcut file; clicking this icon triggers a DLL hijack and loads an encrypted payload to deliver a backdoor.

The malware sets the auto start function with the value “EverNoteTrayUService”. When the user restarts the computer, it will execute the “Evernote Tray Application” and use DLL hijacking to load the malicious loader.

Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as achieving persistence by adding values under Run/RunOnce/Policies\Explorer\Run Registry keys or by placing shortcuts/files in the Windows Startup folder.

After decrypting the encrypted payload, DLL-test.dll will execute rundll32.exe and run specific export functions. The loader injects the decrypted payload into memory and runs it persistently.

There are two payloads in this attack chain... the second one is an encrypted backdoor which injects itself into rundll32’s memory.

The malware sets the auto start function with the value “EverNoteTrayUService”. When the user restarts the computer, it will execute the “Evernote Tray Application” and use DLL hijacking to load the malicious loader.

Numerous malware families and threat groups are described as achieving persistence by adding values under Run/RunOnce/Policies\Explorer\Run Registry keys or by placing shortcuts/files in the Windows Startup folder.

Other techniques the attacker has been observed using include DLL hijacking, Themida-packed files, and DNS tunneling to evade post-compromise detection... Actors using Thimda packer to pack the malwares

"Sandworm Team used UPX to pack a copy of Mimikatz"; "APT38 has used several code packing methods such as Themida, Enigma, VMProtect, and Obsidium"; "Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection."

After decrypting the encrypted payload, DLL-test.dll will execute rundll32.exe and run specific export functions. The loader injects the decrypted payload into memory and runs it persistently.

There are two payloads in this attack chain... the second one is an encrypted backdoor which injects itself into rundll32’s memory.

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, deobfuscating, or unpacking payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 responses prior to execution or use.

Starting in 2018, hackers left these tactics behind to resort to using a removable disk shortcut file; clicking this icon triggers a DLL hijack and loads an encrypted payload to deliver a backdoor.

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Discovery T1033 – System Owner/User Discovery Collecting user account and send back to C2

The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.

Multiple entries describe enumerating local, logical, or physical drives and disk/volume information, e.g., 'can enumerate local drives,' 'GetLogicalDrives,' 'fsutil fsinfo drives,' 'list drives,' and 'discover logical drive information including the drive type, free space, and volume information.'

ADVSTORESHELL can list connected devices. APT28 uses a module to receive a notification every time a USB mass storage device is inserted into a victim. APT37 has a Bluetooth device harvester, which uses Windows Bluetooth APIs to find information on connected Bluetooth devices.

From 2018 to present, this actor has also been observed using a fake removable device as an initial infection vector... The spreader component will try to find the removable device in the victim’s environment. This malware component will copy all the malicious modules to any removable device to spread the malware in the target’s network environment

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

Mongall uses base64 or RC4 to encode or encrypt data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect

MITRE ATT&CK TTPs ... Command and Control T1571 – Non-Standard Port Mongall uses port 5050,1352, etc. to communicates with C2

This backdoor profiles the host and sends the details to the C&C using an encrypted channel.

Many entries state malware or actors can upload, transfer, send, or exfiltrate files from compromised hosts to command-and-control servers or attacker infrastructure.