KOPILUWAK
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitation
- Delivery
- SpearphishingPhishing
- Platforms
- Windows
KopiLuwak is a JavaScript-based Turla malware used primarily as an early-stage reconnaissance, victim-profiling, and staging backdoor in espionage operations. Public reporting has linked it to the Russian state-aligned Turla cluster, also tracked as Snake, Uroburos, Venomous Bear, Waterbug, and Secret Blizzard. Its observed targeting has centered on government, diplomatic, and foreign ministry entities, particularly in Europe, with later reporting also tying its use to operations involving Ukrainian organizations and broader government-focused campaigns.
KopiLuwak has been delivered through malicious email attachments, including macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents used in spearphishing campaigns, and has also been deployed by intermediary droppers such as .NET/MSIL loaders and self-extracting archives in multi-stage intrusion chains. In some campaigns, decoy diplomatic or policy-themed documents were used to lure victims into execution. Turla has also incorporated KopiLuwak into broader toolchains that include trojanized installers and follow-on implants.
Once executed, KopiLuwak performs host and network reconnaissance by invoking native Windows commands to collect system, user, process, and network-share information, including discovery of current TCP connections and user context. It stages command output locally, encrypts collected data in memory, and exfiltrates the results to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP POST. Observed variants generate victim-specific identifiers and communicate with actor-controlled endpoints hosted on compromised legitimate websites.
KopiLuwak supports persistence in some variants through mechanisms such as Run key registration or scheduled tasks. Beyond profiling, it can receive tasking from command and control to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, and later variants added file upload and download functionality, reinforcing its role as a lightweight backdoor and staging implant. Reporting consistently characterizes it as a reconnaissance-focused foothold used to assess victims and enable deployment of more capable Turla malware in subsequent stages.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Since the end of November 2016, Kaspersky Lab has observed Turla using this new JavaScript payload and specific macro variant.
"KOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance utility used to facilitate C2 communications and victim profiling."
Techniques & procedures
32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
Assuming this variant of KopiLuwak has been observed in the wild, there are a number of ways it may have been delivered including some of Turla’s previous attack methods such as spear phishing or via a watering hole.
Assuming this variant of KopiLuwak has been observed in the wild, there are a number of ways it may have been delivered including some of Turla’s previous attack methods such as spear phishing
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has been delivered to victims as a malicious email attachment.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Execution
7 techniques
Execution
Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.
The “work” command is used to task the victim’s system to run arbitrary commands via Wscript.shell.run().
After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands on the victim system using “cmd.exe /c”
The document contains a malicious macro... the macro did contain a few modifications to it, mainly the XOR routine used to decode the initial JavaScript and the use of a “marker” string to find the embedded payload in the document.
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) had used Javascript to perform its core functions.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has gained execution through malicious attachments.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.
Next, it will establish persistence on the victim by writing to the following registry key: Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\mailform Value: wscript.exe /b “<PATH_TO_JS> NPEfpRZ4aqnh1YuGwQd0”
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.
Next, it will establish persistence on the victim by writing to the following registry key: Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\mailform Value: wscript.exe /b “<PATH_TO_JS> NPEfpRZ4aqnh1YuGwQd0”
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
The only function of mailform.js is to decode the third layer payload stored in the JavaScript file as a Base64 string. This string is Base64 decoded, then decrypted using RC4...
the JS is named Scr.js while the PDF is named Save the Date G20 Digital Economy Taskforce 23 24 October.pdf
Discovery
12 techniques
Discovery
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) to discover a target's network configuration setttings.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can conduct basic network reconnaissance on the victim machine with `whoami`, to get user details.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands... net view net view /domain netstat -nao arp -a net share net use
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) to discover current TCP connections.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can enumerate current running processes on the targeted machine.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands on the victim system using “cmd.exe /c”... systeminfo
dir %systemdrive%\Users\*.* dir %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.* dir %userprofile%\Desktop\*.* dir “%programfiles(x86)%” dir “%programfiles%” dir %appdata%
net user net user administrator net user /domain net user administrator /domain
Next, the hardcoded key “ Prc1MHxF_VB0ht7S ” is used to encode the infected system’s OS installation date
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) to discover network shares.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Despite moving the machine fingerprinting code to the dropper, all of the commands are the same as in the older sample (and executed in the same order) except for the following three additions: dir “%programfiles%\Kaspersky Lab” dir “%programfiles(x86)%\Kaspersky Lab”
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can discover logical drive information on compromised hosts.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can gather information from compromised hosts.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has piped the results from executed C2 commands to `%TEMP%\result2.dat` on the local machine.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
The backdoor still communicates with what appear to be two compromised, legitimate websites using HTTP POST requests
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has used HTTP POST requests to send data to C2.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
If the response from the server after this acknowledgement is “200 OK”, then the system will proceed to read the response data into memory... then write it out to the “mailform.pif” file... The command file is run
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has exfiltrated collected data to its C2 via POST requests.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
Observables
14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
21 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.