Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

KOPILUWAK

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs14Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitation
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishing
Platforms
Windows

KopiLuwak is a JavaScript-based Turla malware used primarily as an early-stage reconnaissance, victim-profiling, and staging backdoor in espionage operations. Public reporting has linked it to the Russian state-aligned Turla cluster, also tracked as Snake, Uroburos, Venomous Bear, Waterbug, and Secret Blizzard. Its observed targeting has centered on government, diplomatic, and foreign ministry entities, particularly in Europe, with later reporting also tying its use to operations involving Ukrainian organizations and broader government-focused campaigns.

KopiLuwak has been delivered through malicious email attachments, including macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents used in spearphishing campaigns, and has also been deployed by intermediary droppers such as .NET/MSIL loaders and self-extracting archives in multi-stage intrusion chains. In some campaigns, decoy diplomatic or policy-themed documents were used to lure victims into execution. Turla has also incorporated KopiLuwak into broader toolchains that include trojanized installers and follow-on implants.

Once executed, KopiLuwak performs host and network reconnaissance by invoking native Windows commands to collect system, user, process, and network-share information, including discovery of current TCP connections and user context. It stages command output locally, encrypts collected data in memory, and exfiltrates the results to command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP POST. Observed variants generate victim-specific identifiers and communicate with actor-controlled endpoints hosted on compromised legitimate websites.

KopiLuwak supports persistence in some variants through mechanisms such as Run key registration or scheduled tasks. Beyond profiling, it can receive tasking from command and control to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, and later variants added file upload and download functionality, reinforcing its role as a lightweight backdoor and staging implant. Reporting consistently characterizes it as a reconnaissance-focused foothold used to assess victims and enable deployment of more capable Turla malware in subsequent stages.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Turla

Since the end of November 2016, Kaspersky Lab has observed Turla using this new JavaScript payload and specific macro variant.

via securelistsecurelist.com
UNC4210

"KOPILUWAK is a JavaScript-based reconnaissance utility used to facilitate C2 communications and victim profiling."

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Assuming this variant of KopiLuwak has been observed in the wild, there are a number of ways it may have been delivered including some of Turla’s previous attack methods such as spear phishing or via a watering hole.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Assuming this variant of KopiLuwak has been observed in the wild, there are a number of ways it may have been delivered including some of Turla’s previous attack methods such as spear phishing

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence6

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has been delivered to victims as a malicious email attachment.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Execution

7 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The “work” command is used to task the victim’s system to run arbitrary commands via Wscript.shell.run().

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands on the victim system using “cmd.exe /c”

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

The document contains a malicious macro... the macro did contain a few modifications to it, mainly the XOR routine used to decode the initial JavaScript and the use of a “marker” string to find the embedded payload in the document.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence6

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) had used Javascript to perform its core functions.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence5

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has gained execution through malicious attachments.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Next, it will establish persistence on the victim by writing to the following registry key: Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\mailform Value: wscript.exe /b “<PATH_TO_JS> NPEfpRZ4aqnh1YuGwQd0”

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Scr.js first creates a scheduled task named PolicyConverter for persistence. This scheduled task should execute shortly after being created and is then scheduled to run every 10 minutes.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Next, it will establish persistence on the victim by writing to the following registry key: Key: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run\mailform Value: wscript.exe /b “<PATH_TO_JS> NPEfpRZ4aqnh1YuGwQd0”

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The only function of mailform.js is to decode the third layer payload stored in the JavaScript file as a Base64 string. This string is Base64 decoded, then decrypted using RC4...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

the JS is named Scr.js while the PDF is named Save the Date G20 Digital Economy Taskforce 23 24 October.pdf

Discovery

12 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence5

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) to discover a target's network configuration setttings.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence7

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can conduct basic network reconnaissance on the victim machine with `whoami`, to get user details.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands... net view net view /domain netstat -nao arp -a net share net use

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence4

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) to discover current TCP connections.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence6

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can enumerate current running processes on the targeted machine.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence5

After establishing its persistence, it will then execute a series of commands on the victim system using “cmd.exe /c”... systeminfo

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

dir %systemdrive%\Users\*.* dir %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\*.* dir %userprofile%\Desktop\*.* dir “%programfiles(x86)%” dir “%programfiles%” dir %appdata%

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

net user net user administrator net user /domain net user administrator /domain

T1124System Time DiscoveryEvidence1

Next, the hardcoded key “ Prc1MHxF_VB0ht7S ” is used to encode the infected system’s OS installation date

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence4

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can use [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104) and [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) to discover network shares.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Despite moving the machine fingerprinting code to the dropper, all of the commands are the same as in the older sample (and executed in the same order) except for the following three additions: dir “%programfiles%\Kaspersky Lab” dir “%programfiles(x86)%\Kaspersky Lab”

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence3

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can discover logical drive information on compromised hosts.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence5

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) can gather information from compromised hosts.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1074.001Local Data StagingEvidence3

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has piped the results from executed C2 commands to `%TEMP%\result2.dat` on the local machine.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The backdoor still communicates with what appear to be two compromised, legitimate websites using HTTP POST requests

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence7

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has used HTTP POST requests to send data to C2.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

If the response from the server after this acknowledgement is “200 OK”, then the system will proceed to read the response data into memory... then write it out to the “mailform.pif” file... The command file is run

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence8

[KOPILUWAK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1075) has exfiltrated collected data to its C2 via POST requests.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

14 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching14Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.