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MalwareRansomware

V3G4

V3G4 is a Linux-targeting Mirai-derived botnet identified by Cyble Research Intelligence Labs that is paired with a stealthy, fileless XMRig-based Monero miner. It targets Linux servers and IoT devices across multiple CPU architectures, including x86_64, ARM64, ARM7, ARM5, MIPS, and MIPSEL. The malware uses a multi-stage infection chain beginning with a shell script referred to as the Universal Bot Downloader, which determines the victim architecture via uname -m, downloads an architecture-specific binary from 103.149.93.224, writes it to /tmp, sets executable permissions, and executes it.

The bot binary is described as UPX-packed and stripped. It performs host reconnaissance, including checking kernel details and process limits, and has been observed printing the banner string "xXxSlicexXxxVEGA," which was linked by Cyble to previously documented V3G4-Mirai strains. For stealth, it masquerades as legitimate system processes such as systemd-logind, closes standard input and output, detaches from the controlling terminal using setsid, and disguises the miner process as /tmp/.dbus-daemon.

V3G4 supports both botnet and monetization functions. It conducts raw TCP socket activity and multi-threaded SYN scanning against port 22 to identify SSH services for brute-force propagation. It also performs multi-threaded DNS queries to 8.8.8.8 and resolves the domain baojunwakuang.asia, which maps to 159.75.47.123, for command-and-control. The infrastructure uses non-standard ports including 60194. A later-stage payload deploys an XMRig-based miner that retrieves its configuration dynamically at runtime over TCP as a JSON blob containing wallet addresses, pool URLs, and algorithm settings, avoiding static on-disk configuration files.

Supporting reporting also mentions V3G4 in the context of Mirai resurgence, describing it as using 13 CVEs for Linux propagation and brute-forcing SSH. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include 103.149.93.224, baojunwakuang.asia, 159.75.47.123, port 60194, the banner string "xXxSlicexXxxVEGA," and process names systemd-logind and /tmp/.dbus-daemon.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

The attack begins with a compact shell script called Universal Bot Downloader that automatically identifies the victim system’s CPU architecture using the uname -m command.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Once executed, the UPX-packed and stripped binary gathers system information through environment reconnaissance

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Once executed, the UPX-packed and stripped binary gathers system information through environment reconnaissance

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence1

Rather than embedding static configuration files, the malware fetches mining parameters dynamically from the C2 server at runtime... receiving a JSON blob containing wallet addresses, pool URLs, and algorithm settings without creating on-disk artifacts.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The bot then enters stealth mode by attempting to masquerade as the legitimate systemd-logind daemon through prctl system calls... The loader disguises the miner as /tmp/.dbus-daemon to blend with legitimate processes.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Multiple worker threads simultaneously perform high-velocity SYN packet spraying on port 22 across the internet, enabling rapid SSH brute-force propagation to new victims.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Multiple worker threads simultaneously perform high-velocity SYN packet spraying on port 22 across the internet, enabling rapid SSH brute-force propagation to new victims.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

Once executed, the UPX-packed and stripped binary gathers system information through environment reconnaissance, checking kernel details and process limits to determine operational parameters.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Once executed, the UPX-packed and stripped binary gathers system information through environment reconnaissance, checking kernel details and process limits to determine operational parameters.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Once executed, the UPX-packed and stripped binary gathers system information through environment reconnaissance, checking kernel details and process limits to determine operational parameters.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

the bot performs multi-threaded DNS queries against Google’s public DNS server (8.8.8.8) to resolve the C2 domain baojunwakuang.asia, which maps to 159.75.47.123 and serves both botnet commands and miner configuration through non-standard ports like 60194

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The attack begins with a compact shell script called Universal Bot Downloader that automatically identifies the victim system’s CPU architecture using the uname -m command... the script constructs a tailored download URL and fetches the appropriate bot binary from the attacker-controlled server at 103.149.93.224.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

the bot performs multi-threaded DNS queries against Google’s public DNS server (8.8.8.8) to resolve the C2 domain baojunwakuang.asia, which maps to 159.75.47.123

Impact

1 technique
T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

The third-stage payload deploys a covert XMRig-based Monero miner... receiving a JSON blob containing wallet addresses, pool URLs, and algorithm settings without creating on-disk artifacts.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
4 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping14

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.