Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

zgRAT

Tracked since Dec 9, 2025 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK25Techniques
IOCs65Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingLureFake updateClickfixLanding page
Platforms
Windows

zgRAT is a detection and reporting label applied to Windows malware associated with remote access and information theft. The name is inconsistently applied to samples identified as PureRAT or PureLogs, which are distinct .NET malware families. Consequently, zgRAT does not reliably identify a single malware family, and capabilities attributed to either family should not automatically be assigned to every zgRAT-labeled sample. Some detections also broadly match .NET Reactor-protected binaries, further complicating classification.

Malware identified as zgRAT has been distributed through phishing emails, counterfeit browser updates on compromised websites, and ClickFix-style verification lures. Campaigns have targeted hotels, travel companies, and other hospitality organizations using guest complaints, bed-bug complaints, and booking-related impersonation. Observed delivery chains include Cruciferra-protected payloads, DOILoader-based DLL side-loading, and secondary installation through other malware, including StealC and Rhadamanthys.

Samples reported under the zgRAT label have used Discord webhooks to exfiltrate sensitive information, including credentials, browser cookies, and cryptocurrency-wallet data. Other samples have been delivered as heavily obfuscated .NET payloads. Remote-control functions and detailed information-stealing capabilities depend on the underlying sample's actual family identity; the label alone is insufficient to establish a uniform feature set or threat-actor attribution.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TA558

As an example, here is the IP address of the zgRAT C2 server.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
Aggah

This PowerShell script ran Rhadamanthys malware. Rhadamanthys was then observed to download and run zgRAT.

via proofpointproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

25 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

It tricks unsuspecting users into downloading what appears to be an update to their Chrome browser, but is actually a remote access trojan (RAT).

T1566PhishingEvidence6

Like many phishing stories, this one starts with a lure urging the recipient to review a purchase order and check for dates related to shipping times to ensure they are correct.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

As shown in Figure 1, the file “Purchase Order FG-20220629.xlsx” is attached to the email. Opening this file begins the process of infection.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence4

Most importantly, at the very bottom of the source code the bad actors lodged JavaScript code which triggers the malicious download whenever a user clicks on the “Update” button.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

These messages contained URLs masquerading as links to evidence provided by a guest, but led to the download of a zipped LNK file that launched a PowerShell command, which then executed a PowerShell script.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

At the very bottom of the source code the bad actors lodged JavaScript code which triggers the malicious download whenever a user clicks on the “Update” button.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

These messages contained URLs leading to a download of a JavaScript file hosted on Microsoft Azure. The JavaScript called PowerShell to run a remote PowerShell script.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Execution User Execution: Malicious Link T1204.001 ClickFix/FakeCaptcha pages

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The RAR file contained the executable “Rechnung DE009100019000.exe”... When the .exe was executed, it sideloaded the included PYTHON27.DLL...

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Persistence Boot or Logon Autostart: Registry Run Keys T1547.001 HKCU...\CurrentVersion\Run

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Persistence Boot or Logon Autostart: Registry Run Keys T1547.001 HKCU...\CurrentVersion\Run

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The DLL is heavily obfuscated. However, it’s still possible to pick out the primary namespace, class, and entry function.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files: Software Packing T1027.002 Donut + .NET Reactor + ZgRAT (three-layer packing)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

The file is described as “WinRAR” (legitimate file compression and archiving software). In addition, the original and current file names do not match... “receipt.doc” ... is not a Microsoft Word document. Instead, it is a Rich Text File (RTF).

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name T1036.005 msedge_elf.dll, libpsl-5.dll

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 Benign API calls (catfact.ninja, httpbin.org) for timing

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

According to Trellix's data, various malware families, including Agent Tesla, UmbralStealer, Stealerium, and zgRAT, have also used Discord webhooks over the past few years to steal sensitive information like credentials, browser cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets from compromised devices.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

According to Trellix's data, various malware families, including Agent Tesla, UmbralStealer, Stealerium, and zgRAT, have also used Discord webhooks over the past few years to steal sensitive information like credentials, browser cookies, and cryptocurrency wallets from compromised devices.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Discovery System Owner/User Discovery T1033 Username, admin status collection

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 PS1 fingerprinting (OS, model, AV products)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion T1497 Benign API calls (catfact.ninja, httpbin.org) for timing

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence3

Victims received a ZIP pairing a legitimate executable with a malicious DLL.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation C2 Application Layer Protocol: Web T1071.001 HTTPS to asmweosiqsaaw[.]com

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation C2 Web Service T1102 Cloudflare-proxied C2

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

This script uses an intermediary chromium-themed domain to fetch the URL of the final download, which is normally hosted on a compromised third-party site.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 Via zgRAT C2 protocol

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Discord's permanent file hosting capabilities have frequently been misused to distribute malware and exfiltrate data gathered from compromised systems using webhooks.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

65 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

23 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+19 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching65Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping25Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.