ERMAC
- Type
- Banking trojan
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theft
- Delivery
- PhishingLanding pageLureFake update
- Platforms
- Android
ERMAC is an Android banking trojan that emerged in 2021 and is derived from leaked Cerberus source code. Promoted by the cybercriminal actor DukeEugene, it is offered through a malware-as-a-service model in which customers rent management infrastructure and distribute malicious Android applications. Early campaigns targeted Poland, with subsequent activity targeting users internationally. Its targets include banking, payment, cryptocurrency, ecommerce, email, and social applications; ERMAC 2.0 expanded its credential-theft target list to 467 applications.
ERMAC abuses Android Accessibility Services to monitor application launches, manipulate the interface, and display credential-stealing HTML overlays over legitimate applications. It enumerates installed applications and sends this inventory to its command-and-control server, which supplies corresponding injection content. Its capabilities include SMS and contact theft, account harvesting, sending SMS messages, call forwarding, USSD execution, and launching applications. Observed ERMAC.C variants additionally support keylogging, Gmail email theft, authentication-code theft, and cryptocurrency-wallet seed-phrase theft. Interception of SMS and authenticator codes enables operators to circumvent some multifactor authentication workflows. ERMAC uses packing, string obfuscation, and encrypted command-and-control communications to hinder analysis and detection.
Distribution includes phishing websites, fake browser updates, impersonated delivery and government applications, and trojanized legitimate applications. ERMAC has also been delivered through Google Play dropper campaigns and services including DawDropper, Brunhilda, SecuriDropper, and Zombinder. SecuriDropper campaigns distributed it through Discord and used session-based installation to bypass Android 13 Restricted Settings before requesting accessibility access. Hook emerged as an ERMAC-derived branch with additional remote-control capabilities, while later ERMAC 3.0 infrastructure incorporated HookBot code, reflecting continued development and reuse within the same malware ecosystem.
Associated threat actors
4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
ERMAC and HookBot are two branches of one Android banking trojan sold as a service.
On July 23 a forum post appeared regarding a new Android banking trojan. The attached screenshots show that it is named ERMAC.
In the first case, we observed Brunhilda posing as a QR code creator app, Brunhilda dropped samples from established families, like Hydra, as well as novel ones, like Ermac.
...linked to a known threat actor in mobile threat landscape, “sybra”, that we already observed operating one of the Ermac forks, "MetaDroid"...
Techniques & procedures
22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
It was distributed through a fake one-page website containing only two buttons... the “Download for Android” button leads to downloading samples of Ermac... modified legitimate application was downloaded from malicious website mimicking the original website of the application. Victim is navigated there through malicious advertisement.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
startUssd Executes the specified USSD code
users are guided through the process of enabling the necessary permissions for payload installation ... prompting users to install the payload by clicking the "Reinstall" button.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
ERMAC abuses a built-in feature in the Android Accessibility Suite intended for users with disabilities.
Upon launching the payload, a request surfaces, this time seeking user consent to enable AccessibilityService – the frequently exploited permission Restricted Settings was intended to deny to these apps.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
ERMAC abuses a built-in feature in the Android Accessibility Suite intended for users with disabilities.
Upon launching the payload, a request surfaces, this time seeking user consent to enable AccessibilityService – the frequently exploited permission Restricted Settings was intended to deny to these apps.
startAdmin Triggers request for admin privileges
“As is the case with most bankers, it relies heavily on abusing the Accessibility Service.”
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
It started with Wi-Fi authorization app which in fact was Ermac with obfuscation of the malicious code.
The first major campaign started in late August where ERMAC was masquerading as Google Chrome. We have also seen ERMAC masquerading as antivirus, banking, and media player apps.
clearCash/clearCashe Triggers opening specified application details
getInstallApps Gets the list of applications installed on the device
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | push Shows a push notification (clicking on the notification will result in launching specified app)
Ermac.C, having the following capabilities... Keylogging... It is worth noting that authors of Xenomorph... enhanced with keylogging functionality
getAccounts/logAccounts Triggers stealing a list of the accounts on the device
Stealing 2FA codes
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
getInstallApps Gets the list of applications installed on the device
This behavior is in line with Anatsa moving from region to region, constantly updating its list of targeted financial institutions.
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | push Shows a push notification (clicking on the notification will result in launching specified app)
Ermac.C, having the following capabilities... Keylogging... It is worth noting that authors of Xenomorph... enhanced with keylogging functionality
webinjects can alter what the user sees on his/her browser, as opposed to what's in fact being sent by the server... the webinject will interpret an identical design of legitimate pages from popular services.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
It uses almost identical data structures when communicating with the C2... Compared to the original Cerberus, ERMAC uses different encryption scheme in communication with the C2: the data is encrypted with AES-128-CBC
The dropper is responsible for installing a secondary payload, typically malware (spyware or banking Trojans), onto the victim's device.
The most important addition in terms of capabilities comes in the form of what criminals call VNC... In the case of Hook, this is implemented using the Accessibility Services to interact with the different UI elements required to perform a wide array of operations.
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Command and Control T1571 Non-Standard Port
Both Secret Key and IVparameter are used to decrypt hardcoded strings present in the file as well as encrypt the data sent to the C&C server... The harvested credentials are sent to the same C&C server in the encrypted format.
Observables
221 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
29 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.