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Mallory
Malware4 associated actors

ERMAC

Tracked since Dec 12, 2025 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs221Tracked
Type
Banking trojan
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationDefense evasionReconnaissanceCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingLanding pageLureFake update
Platforms
Android

ERMAC is an Android banking trojan that emerged in 2021 and is derived from leaked Cerberus source code. Promoted by the cybercriminal actor DukeEugene, it is offered through a malware-as-a-service model in which customers rent management infrastructure and distribute malicious Android applications. Early campaigns targeted Poland, with subsequent activity targeting users internationally. Its targets include banking, payment, cryptocurrency, ecommerce, email, and social applications; ERMAC 2.0 expanded its credential-theft target list to 467 applications.

ERMAC abuses Android Accessibility Services to monitor application launches, manipulate the interface, and display credential-stealing HTML overlays over legitimate applications. It enumerates installed applications and sends this inventory to its command-and-control server, which supplies corresponding injection content. Its capabilities include SMS and contact theft, account harvesting, sending SMS messages, call forwarding, USSD execution, and launching applications. Observed ERMAC.C variants additionally support keylogging, Gmail email theft, authentication-code theft, and cryptocurrency-wallet seed-phrase theft. Interception of SMS and authenticator codes enables operators to circumvent some multifactor authentication workflows. ERMAC uses packing, string obfuscation, and encrypted command-and-control communications to hinder analysis and detection.

Distribution includes phishing websites, fake browser updates, impersonated delivery and government applications, and trojanized legitimate applications. ERMAC has also been delivered through Google Play dropper campaigns and services including DawDropper, Brunhilda, SecuriDropper, and Zombinder. SecuriDropper campaigns distributed it through Discord and used session-based installation to bypass Android 13 Restricted Settings before requesting accessibility access. Hook emerged as an ERMAC-derived branch with additional remote-control capabilities, while later ERMAC 3.0 infrastructure incorporated HookBot code, reflecting continued development and reuse within the same malware ecosystem.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DukeEugene

ERMAC and HookBot are two branches of one Android banking trojan sold as a service.

via censys blogcensys.com
BlackRock actor(s)

On July 23 a forum post appeared regarding a new Android banking trojan. The attached screenshots show that it is named ERMAC.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
Brunhilda

In the first case, we observed Brunhilda posing as a QR code creator app, Brunhilda dropped samples from established families, like Hydra, as well as novel ones, like Ermac.

via threatfabric blogthreatfabric.com
sybra

...linked to a known threat actor in mobile threat landscape, “sybra”, that we already observed operating one of the Ermac forks, "MetaDroid"...

via threatfabricthreatfabric.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

It was distributed through a fake one-page website containing only two buttons... the “Download for Android” button leads to downloading samples of Ermac... modified legitimate application was downloaded from malicious website mimicking the original website of the application. Victim is navigated there through malicious advertisement.

Execution

2 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

startUssd Executes the specified USSD code

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

users are guided through the process of enabling the necessary permissions for payload installation ... prompting users to install the payload by clicking the "Reinstall" button.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

ERMAC abuses a built-in feature in the Android Accessibility Suite intended for users with disabilities.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Upon launching the payload, a request surfaces, this time seeking user consent to enable AccessibilityService – the frequently exploited permission Restricted Settings was intended to deny to these apps.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

ERMAC abuses a built-in feature in the Android Accessibility Suite intended for users with disabilities.

T1546.008Accessibility FeaturesEvidence2

Upon launching the payload, a request surfaces, this time seeking user consent to enable AccessibilityService – the frequently exploited permission Restricted Settings was intended to deny to these apps.

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence2

startAdmin Triggers request for admin privileges

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

“As is the case with most bankers, it relies heavily on abusing the Accessibility Service.”

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

It started with Wi-Fi authorization app which in fact was Ermac with obfuscation of the malicious code.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

The first major campaign started in late August where ERMAC was masquerading as Google Chrome. We have also seen ERMAC masquerading as antivirus, banking, and media player apps.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

clearCash/clearCashe Triggers opening specified application details

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

getInstallApps Gets the list of applications installed on the device

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | push Shows a push notification (clicking on the notification will result in launching specified app)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Ermac.C, having the following capabilities... Keylogging... It is worth noting that authors of Xenomorph... enhanced with keylogging functionality

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence2

getAccounts/logAccounts Triggers stealing a list of the accounts on the device

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence4

Stealing 2FA codes

Discovery

2 techniques
T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

getInstallApps Gets the list of applications installed on the device

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

This behavior is in line with Anatsa moving from region to region, constantly updating its list of targeted financial institutions.

Collection

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence5

startInject Triggers the overlay attack against the specified application | push Shows a push notification (clicking on the notification will result in launching specified app)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Ermac.C, having the following capabilities... Keylogging... It is worth noting that authors of Xenomorph... enhanced with keylogging functionality

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

webinjects can alter what the user sees on his/her browser, as opposed to what's in fact being sent by the server... the webinject will interpret an identical design of legitimate pages from popular services.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

It uses almost identical data structures when communicating with the C2... Compared to the original Cerberus, ERMAC uses different encryption scheme in communication with the C2: the data is encrypted with AES-128-CBC

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The dropper is responsible for installing a secondary payload, typically malware (spyware or banking Trojans), onto the victim's device.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The most important addition in terms of capabilities comes in the form of what criminals call VNC... In the case of Hook, this is implemented using the Accessibility Services to interact with the different UI elements required to perform a wide array of operations.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Command and Control T1571 Non-Standard Port

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Both Secret Key and IVparameter are used to decrypt hardcoded strings present in the file as well as encrypt the data sent to the C&C server... The harvested credentials are sent to the same C&C server in the encrypted format.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

221 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

29 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching221Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.