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Malware4 associated actors

SSLoad

Tracked since Dec 12, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs78Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Credential theftInitial accessLateral movementPost exploitationReconnaissanceExfiltration
Delivery
PhishingMalspamClickfixLure
Platforms
Windows

SSLoad is a Windows malware family used as an initial access payload in intrusion campaigns and botnet-linked operations. It has been observed delivered through phishing and malspam activity, including JavaScript-based infection chains and socially engineered lures that lead victims to execute malicious content. Reported delivery patterns include email-borne links, archive attachments, and ClickFix-style CAPTCHA impersonation workflows that induce user execution.

Once launched, SSLoad establishes command-and-control communications over HTTPS and performs host and domain reconnaissance, collecting system, user, and network information to help operators validate and triage compromised machines. Observed activity includes enumeration of local and domain context and transmission of collected reconnaissance to attacker-controlled infrastructure. In hands-on-keyboard intrusions, SSLoad has served as the foothold preceding deployment of additional tooling such as Cobalt Strike and remote management software, enabling broader post-compromise operations.

Campaign reporting links SSLoad-enabled intrusions to credential access, lateral movement, and full domain compromise in Windows enterprise environments. Operators have used follow-on tooling to harvest browser-stored credentials, dump LSASS, move to domain controllers and other critical servers, and create privileged accounts. SSLoad activity has also been associated with payload downloading and information-stealing behavior in malspam campaigns. The malware has been discussed in connection with TA578 and has appeared in broader criminal ecosystems overlapping with other loader and botnet operations. Victimology has included geographically diverse organizations, with observed targeting also extending to Ukrainian users in themed phishing campaigns.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ALLANITE

New Actor for win.ssload ... description = "Detects win.ssload." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ssload"

313 Team

New Actor for win.ssload ... description = "Detects win.ssload." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ssload"

Stealth Mango

New Actor for win.ssload ... description = "Detects win.ssload." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ssload"

Tangelo 1937CN

New Actor for win.ssload ... description = "Detects win.ssload." ... malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ssload"

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

The malware is typically introduced into the system through phishing email campaigns. The phishing emails contain a single link which redirects from a mmtixmm[.]org URL to a single JavaScript file which is downloaded onto the victim machine.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The malspam impersonates State Tax of Ukraine... The emails have a .zip attachment containing two .html forms / files

Execution

2 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

GetObject("winmgmts:\\.\root\cimv2") is used to access Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), which in this case is used so the script can perform simple command line operations.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Stage 1: Initial execution: JavaScript [T1059.007] ... Manually executing the single JavaScript file kicks off the code execution chain downloading and executing further stages.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After executing msiexec, the script then attempts to dismount the network drive.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

If a drive is successfully mapped, the script constructs a command to remotely install a .msi package from the mapped network drive (slack.msi) using msiexec.exe. ... Stage 2: MSI file execution [T1218.007]

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

The payload consisted of a semi-randomly named DLL file ... Once executed via Rundll32.exe ... Soon after ... the attackers deployed a Cobalt Strike beacon ... executed manually via rundll32.exe.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

We observed the malware executing the following system commands through cmd.exe ... whoami /groups

T1069.002Domain GroupsEvidence1

exe /c net group "domain admins" /domain

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

We observed the malware executing the following system commands through cmd.exe: exe /c systeminfo

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

wmic.exe /node:localhost /namespace:\\root\securitycenter2 path antivirusproduct get * /format:list

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.002File Transfer ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Tactics Techniques Command and Control T1071.002: Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix ... Command and Control ... T1102: Web Service

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

All traffic was encrypted over port 443 (HTTPS).

Indicators of compromise

Observables

78 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching78Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.