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MalwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

MINOCAT

MINOCAT is a tunneling utility/backdoor used in post-exploitation activity following exploitation of the React Server Components vulnerability CVE-2025-55182 ("React2Shell"). It has been observed in campaigns attributed to the China-nexus espionage cluster UNC6600, and broader reporting also places it among tooling used by China-linked actors exploiting this flaw globally. Google Threat Intelligence Group described MINOCAT as a tunneler based on Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP); specifically, it is a 64-bit ELF executable for Linux that includes a custom "NSS" wrapper and an embedded open-source FRP client for tunneling. Its purpose is to establish persistence and covert network access on compromised systems, maintaining hidden access to victim networks.

Observed delivery involved attackers exploiting CVE-2025-55182 to gain unauthenticated remote code execution against vulnerable React/Next.js workloads, then executing bash scripts that downloaded the MINOCAT binary. In UNC6600 activity, the script created a hidden directory at $HOME/.systemd-utils, killed processes named "ntpclient," and established persistence through a new cron job, a systemd service, and malicious commands inserted into the user’s shell configuration so MINOCAT would run in new shells. High-confidence indicators of compromise associated with this activity include the hidden directory $HOME/.systemd-utils, unauthorized termination of "ntpclient," and malicious modifications to shell startup files such as $HOME/.bashrc. The malware targets Linux systems and has been used in espionage-oriented intrusions against globally exposed, unpatched React and Next.js environments.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-55182React2ShellExploited in the wild

Since exploitation began last week, our team at Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has been tracking widespread activity as multiple threat clusters race to leverage React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182). | Multiple groups including UNC6600 and UNC6603 are deploying custom backdoors and tunnelers such as MINOCAT, HISONIC, SNOWLIGHT, and ANGRYREBEL.LINUX.

via austin larsen blogaustinlarsen.me
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC6603

Multiple groups including UNC6600 and UNC6603 are deploying custom backdoors and tunnelers such as MINOCAT, HISONIC, SNOWLIGHT, and ANGRYREBEL.LINUX.

via austin larsen blogaustinlarsen.me
UNC6600

Multiple groups including UNC6600 and UNC6603 are deploying custom backdoors and tunnelers such as MINOCAT, HISONIC, SNOWLIGHT, and ANGRYREBEL.LINUX.

via austin larsen blogaustinlarsen.me
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

“React2Shell exploitation continues… globally exploited… victims triaged… distinct campaigns leveraging this vulnerability…” and “threat actor use React2Shell as the initial access vector in a ransomware attack.”

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

"establish persistence by creating a new cron job"

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"The threat actor retrieved and executed a bash script used to create a hidden directory... kill any processes... download a MINOCAT binary..."

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

"establish persistence by creating a new cron job"

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

"establish persistence by... a systemd service"

T1053.003CronEvidence1

"establish persistence by creating a new cron job"

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

"establish persistence by... a systemd service"

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

China-Nexus Espionage: Multiple groups including UNC6600 and UNC6603 are deploying custom backdoors and tunnelers such as MINOCAT, HISONIC, SNOWLIGHT, and ANGRYREBEL.LINUX.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"execute a command using cURL or wget to retrieve a script that then downloaded and executed a SNOWLIGHT downloader payload"; and "download a MINOCAT binary"

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1
TacticImpact

"kill any processes named \"ntpclient\""

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.