MeshCentral
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Landing pageLure
- Platforms
- WindowsLinuxCloud
MeshCentral is a legitimate, open-source remote management platform that threat actors abuse to obtain unauthorized remote access and maintain persistent control of compromised systems. It is not inherently malicious. Malicious deployments use its remote management agent as a backdoor connecting compromised endpoints to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Its abuse has been observed on Windows systems and in operations spanning Linux and cloud environments.
Attackers typically deploy MeshCentral after gaining initial access. Observed entry chains include malicious WebDAV shortcuts offered through fraudulent freight-platform portals and exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing applications, including Gladinet CentreStack and React-based services. Persistence techniques include scheduled tasks that execute the agent. Operators have also customized agents to masquerade as Microsoft Azure services, used infrastructure impersonating legitimate cloud services, and timestomped agent-related files.
MeshCentral abuse has been associated with the Iranian threat actor Lemon Sandstorm, also tracked as Pioneer Kitten, as well as ShinyHunters, tracked as UNC6240, and Settra ransomware activity. Deployments have occurred in campaigns affecting US trucking and logistics companies, Middle Eastern critical infrastructure, and enterprise application environments. Its role in these intrusions is persistent remote access; accompanying credential theft, lateral movement, and data exfiltration may be performed through separate tools.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The same servers connected to two GhostFrame command servers and a MeshCentral server used to maintain access.
Additionally, the attackers deployed ... the open source remote management platform MeshCentral.
During this stage, the adversary deployed several additional web shells and two additional backdoors—MeshCentral and SystemBC—for persistence. | Scheduled task to run ‘ndinit-fnms.exe’ executable (MeshCentral). No command line arguments provided, created by local administrator account.
Techniques & procedures
35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
4 techniques
Resource Development
k0t has been observed using Namecheap to acquire domains for their campaigns.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: VPS T1583.003 EuroHoster VPS in Bulgaria
ShinyHunters has obtained MeshCentral to deploy agents masquerading as legitimate cloud endpoints. ShinyHunters has obtained WinSCP to gather information on S3 bucket configurations. ShinyHunters has obtained ConnectWise and other RMM tools to gain initial access.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 Open directory on :8000 with 9 tools
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement
Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) disclosed they have observed active compromise and extortion campaign attributed to UNC6240 (ShinyHunters) targeting Oracle PeopleSoft application infrastructure via a zero-day now tracked as CVE-2026-35273, a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Dropbox link to fake VMware installer
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.
Once initial access was gained, the threat actors deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate cloud endpoints, which they used to run queries, perform lateral movement, and deploy custom scripts.
ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command-line interface utility meshctrl.js and npm to interact with compromised systems. Additionally, ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command to execute the propagation script: node meshctrl.js RunCommand --loginuser admin --loginpass '[password]' --id '[agent_id]' --run 'bash /tmp/[victim_abbreviation]_fanout.sh' .
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.
deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement
Persistence scripts automated MeshCentral installation... cleanup_target.sh deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.
Persistence scripts automated MeshCentral installation... cleanup_target.sh deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
Once initial access was gained, the threat actors deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate cloud endpoints
ShinyHunters has disguised MeshCentral agent binaries as Microsoft Azure services, e.g. meshagent32-azure-ops.exe, meshagent64-azure-ops.exe, and meshagent64-v2.exe.
cleanup_target.sh deletes exploitation artifacts, clears auth.log, syslog, nginx logs, kern.log, and user shell histories while deliberately preserving the MeshCentral agent.
Finally, the attackers executed a script designed to remove artifacts associated with vulnerability exploitation and backdoor deployment, along with the PHP web shells [and] MeshCentral deployment scripts.
Immediately after creating these files, the adversary used PowerShell commands to timestomp these files to 12 May 2024 11:14:00.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Посебна скрипта за чистење била напишана со цел да ги избрише дневниците (logs) и да ги отстрани другите алатки на напаѓачот, додека намерно го оставила агентот MeshCentral.
The attacker’s cleanup_target.sh script deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Security researchers have identified exposed directories containing attack tooling, including MeshCentral agents and credential spray scripts.
Discovery
7 techniques
Discovery
The command history showed attackers used the MeshCentral tool to run administrative queries on compromised endpoints and identify additional application servers within victim networks.
The command history showed attackers used the MeshCentral tool to run administrative queries on compromised endpoints and identify additional application servers within victim networks.
Leveraged the MeshCentral CLI utility meshctrl.js to execute administrative command queries on compromised remote endpoints: hostname; id.
Mapped Oracle PeopleSoft system configurations by inspecting the process scheduler configuration file ( psappsrv.cfg ) to extract machine names and IP addresses.
ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command-line utility meshctrl.js to collect hostnames and IDs of compromised systems.
They mapped Oracle PeopleSoft configurations by inspecting mount points, checking the process scheduler configuration file psappsrv.cfg , and reading WebLogic server XML configurations ( config.xml ).
Using the meshctrl.js CLI, they executed targeted reconnaissance commands on compromised hosts ... auditing active NFS mounts ...
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
Post-exploitation tradecraft is worth flagging for your SOC readers: attackers deployed a customized MeshCentral remote management agent disguised as a Microsoft Azure service (meshagent64-azure-ops.exe)...
deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement
Collection
1 technique
Collection
The staging infrastructure hosted ... exposing directory contents that included staging materials, customized agents, and attacker command histories.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
with command-and-control traffic routed to a domain mimicking Azure infrastructure
The meshagent.msh configuration designates www.ayuthayatech[.]com as the management server, reached over WebSocket (/agent.ashx) on port 443.
mesh_fix.sh automated MeshCentral deployment, mi2_vps.sh provided fallback installation, and the staging directory contained exploitation and persistence tooling.
Operators abused a wide array of remote access tools, these included: Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, ngrok as well as MeshCentral/MeshAgents and AdaptixC2.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Non-Standard Port T1571 Ports 4040, 2083, 8181, 11601
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Crypto T1573.002 TLS with self-signed MeshCentral CA
Observables
44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.