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Malware3 associated actors2 associated CVEs

MeshCentral

Tracked since Dec 15, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK35Techniques
IOCs44Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Landing pageLure
Platforms
WindowsLinuxCloud

MeshCentral is a legitimate, open-source remote management platform that threat actors abuse to obtain unauthorized remote access and maintain persistent control of compromised systems. It is not inherently malicious. Malicious deployments use its remote management agent as a backdoor connecting compromised endpoints to attacker-controlled infrastructure. Its abuse has been observed on Windows systems and in operations spanning Linux and cloud environments.

Attackers typically deploy MeshCentral after gaining initial access. Observed entry chains include malicious WebDAV shortcuts offered through fraudulent freight-platform portals and exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing applications, including Gladinet CentreStack and React-based services. Persistence techniques include scheduled tasks that execute the agent. Operators have also customized agents to masquerade as Microsoft Azure services, used infrastructure impersonating legitimate cloud services, and timestomped agent-related files.

MeshCentral abuse has been associated with the Iranian threat actor Lemon Sandstorm, also tracked as Pioneer Kitten, as well as ShinyHunters, tracked as UNC6240, and Settra ransomware activity. Deployments have occurred in campaigns affecting US trucking and logistics companies, Middle Eastern critical infrastructure, and enterprise application environments. Its role in these intrusions is persistent remote access; accompanying credential theft, lateral movement, and data exfiltration may be performed through separate tools.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-35273via security weekUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Oracle PeopleSoft PeopleToolsAdditionally, the attackers deployed ... the open source remote management platform MeshCentral.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-30406via huntress blogHardcoded machineKey ViewState RCE in Gladinet CentreStack and TriofoxThreat actors have also been observed performing lateral movement and performing installation of remote access tooling, namely MeshCentral.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TAG-218

The same servers connected to two GhostFrame command servers and a MeshCentral server used to maintain access.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
ShinyHunters

Additionally, the attackers deployed ... the open source remote management platform MeshCentral.

via security weeksecurityweek.com
Fox Kitten

During this stage, the adversary deployed several additional web shells and two additional backdoors—MeshCentral and SystemBC—for persistence. | Scheduled task to run ‘ndinit-fnms.exe’ executable (MeshCentral). No command line arguments provided, created by local administrator account.

via fortinetfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

35 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

4 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

k0t has been observed using Namecheap to acquire domains for their campaigns.

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: VPS T1583.003 EuroHoster VPS in Bulgaria

T1588.002ToolEvidence1

ShinyHunters has obtained MeshCentral to deploy agents masquerading as legitimate cloud endpoints. ShinyHunters has obtained WinSCP to gather information on S3 bucket configurations. ShinyHunters has obtained ConnectWise and other RMM tools to gain initial access.

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware T1608.001 Open directory on :8000 with 9 tools

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) disclosed they have observed active compromise and extortion campaign attributed to UNC6240 (ShinyHunters) targeting Oracle PeopleSoft application infrastructure via a zero-day now tracked as CVE-2026-35273, a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Initial Access Phishing: Spearphishing Link T1566.002 Dropbox link to fake VMware installer

Execution

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Once initial access was gained, the threat actors deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate cloud endpoints, which they used to run queries, perform lateral movement, and deploy custom scripts.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command-line interface utility meshctrl.js and npm to interact with compromised systems. Additionally, ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command to execute the propagation script: node meshctrl.js RunCommand --loginuser admin --loginpass '[password]' --id '[agent_id]' --run 'bash /tmp/[victim_abbreviation]_fanout.sh' .

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence2

Persistence scripts automated MeshCentral installation... cleanup_target.sh deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Table 11. Scheduled tasks created by the adversary throughout the reported intrusion... The heavy use of scheduled tasks to execute malware aligns with previous Lemon Sandstorm activity. | These backdoors were run using scheduled tasks.

T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence2

Persistence scripts automated MeshCentral installation... cleanup_target.sh deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence12

Once initial access was gained, the threat actors deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate cloud endpoints

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

ShinyHunters has disguised MeshCentral agent binaries as Microsoft Azure services, e.g. meshagent32-azure-ops.exe, meshagent64-azure-ops.exe, and meshagent64-v2.exe.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

cleanup_target.sh deletes exploitation artifacts, clears auth.log, syslog, nginx logs, kern.log, and user shell histories while deliberately preserving the MeshCentral agent.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence4

Finally, the attackers executed a script designed to remove artifacts associated with vulnerability exploitation and backdoor deployment, along with the PHP web shells [and] MeshCentral deployment scripts.

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

Immediately after creating these files, the adversary used PowerShell commands to timestomp these files to 12 May 2024 11:14:00.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence1

Посебна скрипта за чистење била напишана со цел да ги избрише дневниците (logs) и да ги отстрани другите алатки на напаѓачот, додека намерно го оставила агентот MeshCentral.

T1685.006Clear Linux or Mac System LogsEvidence1

The attacker’s cleanup_target.sh script deleted exploitation files, web shells, authentication logs, system logs, and shell histories while intentionally preserving the MeshCentral service.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence2

Security researchers have identified exposed directories containing attack tooling, including MeshCentral agents and credential spray scripts.

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

The command history showed attackers used the MeshCentral tool to run administrative queries on compromised endpoints and identify additional application servers within victim networks.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

The command history showed attackers used the MeshCentral tool to run administrative queries on compromised endpoints and identify additional application servers within victim networks.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Leveraged the MeshCentral CLI utility meshctrl.js to execute administrative command queries on compromised remote endpoints: hostname; id.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Mapped Oracle PeopleSoft system configurations by inspecting the process scheduler configuration file ( psappsrv.cfg ) to extract machine names and IP addresses.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

ShinyHunters has used the MeshCentral command-line utility meshctrl.js to collect hostnames and IDs of compromised systems.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

They mapped Oracle PeopleSoft configurations by inspecting mount points, checking the process scheduler configuration file psappsrv.cfg , and reading WebLogic server XML configurations ( config.xml ).

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

Using the meshctrl.js CLI, they executed targeted reconnaissance commands on compromised hosts ... auditing active NFS mounts ...

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence6

Post-exploitation tradecraft is worth flagging for your SOC readers: attackers deployed a customized MeshCentral remote management agent disguised as a Microsoft Azure service (meshagent64-azure-ops.exe)...

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

deployed customized MeshCentral agents disguised as legitimate Microsoft Azure services for persistent access and lateral movement

Collection

1 technique
T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The staging infrastructure hosted ... exposing directory contents that included staging materials, customized agents, and attacker command histories.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

with command-and-control traffic routed to a domain mimicking Azure infrastructure

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

The meshagent.msh configuration designates www.ayuthayatech[.]com as the management server, reached over WebSocket (/agent.ashx) on port 443.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

mesh_fix.sh automated MeshCentral deployment, mi2_vps.sh provided fallback installation, and the staging directory contained exploitation and persistence tooling.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence33

Operators abused a wide array of remote access tools, these included: Atera, Teramind, AnyDesk, ngrok as well as MeshCentral/MeshAgents and AdaptixC2.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Non-Standard Port T1571 Ports 4040, 2083, 8181, 11601

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping ... Command and Control Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Crypto T1573.002 TLS with self-signed MeshCentral CA

Indicators of compromise

Observables

44 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
malware newsNews · Nov 17, 20263 Cybercrime Campaigns Targeting US Logistics: How Attackers Exploit Freight Workflows - Malware News - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsLegitimate remote administration software deployed by attackers in the Fake Freight Portals campaign to facilitate unauthorized remote access. The observed infection chain begins with a WebDAV shortcut disguised as a business resource.Read more ↗anyrun blogNews · Nov 17, 2026US Logistics Cyber Threats: 3 Campaigns & Defense | ANY.RUNLegitimate remote administration software deployed by attackers in the Fake Freight Portals campaign to enable unauthorized remote access. The observed infection chain begins with a WebDAV shortcut disguised as a business resource.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 11, 2026New GhostFrame Malware Lets Hackers Hijack VMware ESXi VMs and Steal Windows Credentials | Cryptika CybersecurityLegitimate remote management software explicitly described as abused for maintaining attacker access. Infrastructure tracked in the TAG-218 investigation connected to both GhostFrame and MeshCentral servers; separate Huntress reporting tied MeshCentral to Settra.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Nov 11, 2026New GhostFrame Malware Lets Hackers Hijack VMware ESXi VMs and Steal Windows CredentialsLegitimate remote-management software explicitly described as abused for maintaining attacker access. Its server appears as supporting infrastructure associated with the observed activity; the article does not describe a trojanized version.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching44Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping35Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.