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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Bablock

Tracked since Dec 17, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK38Techniques
IOCs70Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationLateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injectionExtortion
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
LinuxWindowsEsxi

Rorschach, also known as BabLock, is a ransomware family first publicly identified in 2023 and assessed to have been active since at least 2022. It is notable for unusually fast encryption and for combining design elements associated with multiple ransomware lineages, including leaked Babuk code and traits resembling LockBit and DarkSide. The Windows variant is more customized and technically sophisticated than the Linux and ESXi variants, which have been linked to Babuk-derived code bases.

Rorschach has been observed in targeted intrusions against enterprise environments, including industrial organizations, and has also been linked in public reporting to attacks affecting academic institutions. It has been used against Windows systems, Linux hosts, VMware ESXi environments, and network shares. Reported operations have included exploitation of internet-facing software vulnerabilities for initial access, followed by lateral movement with administrative remote access and post-compromise tooling. Associated intrusion activity has included use of credential theft utilities, tunneling tools, reconnaissance scanners, and Kerberos-focused tooling.

On Windows, Rorschach has been deployed as a multi-component package that uses DLL sideloading with a legitimate executable, an encrypted payload component, and a loader commonly referred to as DarkLoader. The loader decrypts the ransomware payload and injects it into memory, including into a suspended benign process, after validating required execution parameters. Reported anti-analysis and evasion features include direct syscalls, string obfuscation, packing, process argument spoofing, and in-memory execution. The malware has also been observed clearing event logs, deleting shadow copies and backups, disabling recovery options, attempting to weaken host defenses, and abusing a legitimate security-product uninstaller to terminate antivirus, EDR, backup, and database processes.

Rorschach supports propagation and enterprise-scale impact through Active Directory abuse. When executed with sufficient privileges on a domain controller, it can enumerate domain systems and deploy malicious Group Policy objects and scheduled tasks to spread across hosts. Public reporting also describes encryption of local disks, shared storage, and virtualized infrastructure. The family has been characterized as primarily single-extortion oriented, with victim communication conducted directly rather than through a conventional leak site, although public reporting has not consistently established data theft in all observed incidents.

The malware family includes platform-specific cryptographic implementations across Windows, Linux, and ESXi variants, and its ransom-note content and operational tradecraft indicate a hybrid construction rather than a straightforward reuse of a single predecessor family. Security vendors and incident responders commonly refer to this ransomware as Rorschach, while BabLock remains a widely used alternate name.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2022-41352via group ibExploited in the wildUnauthenticated remote code execution in Zimbra Collaboration Suite via Amavis archive extractionTo gain initial access to the victim’s infrastructure, the attackers used a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the email software Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0, namely CVE-2022-41352 that enables a threat actor to remotely execute arbitrary code. | The strain, first uncovered by Group-IB researchers in January 2023, was codenamed BabLock, because its versions for Linux and ESXi share similarities with the leaked Babuk ransomware. Additionally, BabLock gang (also tracked under the name “Rorschach” by CheckPoint)...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Femwar02

Public reports confirm that the University suffered a ransomware attack that disrupted its operations... “What appears certain is the use of a next-generation ransomware strain known as ‘Bablock,’ ... The media report links the security breach to Bablock/Rorschach ransomware based on malware traits and tactics. First seen in 2023, this malware family borrows code from leaked Babuk, LockBit v2.0, and DarkSide code.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

38 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

After successfully exploiting this vulnerability, the attackers connected to the domain controller from a compromised Zimbra server via a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To do so, they used a domain administrator account.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

To gain initial access to the victim’s infrastructure, the attackers used a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the email software Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) 8.8.15 and 9.0, namely CVE-2022-41352.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

For the ransomware to spread in the victim’s infrastructure, a group policy (GPO) is used, which creates scheduled tasks on domain hosts to launch the ransomware and stop SQL system services.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Group policies on domain computers are updated using the following PowerShell command: powershell.exe -Command "Get-ADComputer -filter * ... Invoke-GPUpdate ..."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

A CMD file to execute the non-malicious binary using the correct password

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

BabLock Ransomware MITRE ATT&CK ... T1059.004 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell The attackers used Unix Shell to perform various actions on hosts running Linux.

T1106Native APIEvidence2

The DarkLoader DLL uses Direct SysCall APIs to a select few, but important, calls to avoid API reading analysis.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Furthermore, it is running the same commands to execute GPUpdate for the AD.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The notepad.exe file is injected with an API call thread to RtlTestBit, which has been patched/hooked to jump to the malicious routine

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

For the ransomware to spread in the victim’s infrastructure, a group policy (GPO) is used, which creates scheduled tasks on domain hosts to launch the ransomware and stop SQL system services.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

After successfully exploiting this vulnerability, the attackers connected to the domain controller from a compromised Zimbra server via a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To do so, they used a domain administrator account.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The files Registry.pol and comment.cmtx ... are intended for disabling Windows Defender on hosts by modifying relevant parameters in the system registry.

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

For the ransomware to spread in the victim’s infrastructure, a group policy (GPO) is used, which creates scheduled tasks on domain hosts to launch the ransomware and stop SQL system services.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

BabLock is loaded via the threat injection of a hooked API Ntdll.RtlTestBit to jump to memory containing the ransomware code.

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

When winutils.dll is loaded, its code decrypts ... a shellcode from the file config.ini, launches the process %SystemRoot%\system32\notepad.exe in a suspended state, and injects the shellcode in it.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

After successfully exploiting this vulnerability, the attackers connected to the domain controller from a compromised Zimbra server via a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To do so, they used a domain administrator account.

T1484Domain or Tenant Policy ModificationEvidence1

combined with BabLock/LockBit possessing the capability to set active directory (AD) Group Policies for easier propagation

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

If the ransomware has been launched on the domain controller with administrator privileges, it uses a group policy to share access to hosts’ disks, stop services and terminate processes on hosts, and spread itself in the local area network.

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The winutils.dll module is compressed using a modified UPX 3.96 packer ... Unpacking revealed other protective techniques in the DLL, such as string obfuscation, junk code...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

It separates and hides the actual payload into an encrypted file. It uses normal applications as loaders

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

BabLock is loaded via the threat injection of a hooked API Ntdll.RtlTestBit to jump to memory containing the ransomware code.

T1055.002Portable Executable InjectionEvidence1

When winutils.dll is loaded, its code decrypts ... a shellcode from the file config.ini, launches the process %SystemRoot%\system32\notepad.exe in a suspended state, and injects the shellcode in it.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

After successfully exploiting this vulnerability, the attackers connected to the domain controller from a compromised Zimbra server via a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To do so, they used a domain administrator account.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

When winutils.dll is loaded, its code decrypts (using RC4 encryption algorithm) a shellcode from the file config.ini.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

BabLock illustrates the danger of that sequence. The ransomware was observed abusing a legitimate vendor uninstaller, terminating a set of antivirus, EDR, backup, and database processes, then clearing Security and System event logs.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The decrypted BabLock ransomware is always packed with VMProtect for anti-virtualization.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...create Linux encryptors targeting VMware ESXi servers.

T1564.010Process Argument SpoofingEvidence1

When these commands are executed, the ransomware uses an artifact hiding technique called process argument spoofing: it creates a system program process in a suspended state, writes command-line arguments directly into the PEB, and then resumes the process.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The notepad.exe file is injected with an API call thread to RtlTestBit, which has been patched/hooked to jump to the malicious routine

Defense Impairment

5 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The files Registry.pol and comment.cmtx ... are intended for disabling Windows Defender on hosts by modifying relevant parameters in the system registry.

T1484Domain or Tenant Policy ModificationEvidence1

combined with BabLock/LockBit possessing the capability to set active directory (AD) Group Policies for easier propagation

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence1

If the ransomware has been launched on the domain controller with administrator privileges, it uses a group policy to share access to hosts’ disks, stop services and terminate processes on hosts, and spread itself in the local area network.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

BEST_uninstallTool.exe is a legitimate utility for uninstalling Bitdefender Endpoint Security Tools.

T1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsEvidence2

wevtutil.exe clear-log Application wevtutil.exe clear-log Security wevtutil.exe clear-log System wevtutil.exe clear-log "windows powershell"

Discovery

8 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The ransomware stops the following security, backup, database management and other system services: vss ccSetMgr veeam sql ...

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

To search for network resources, the ransomware also enumerates Active Directory computers using LDAP queries.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Fscan - A scanning tool

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The ransomware also terminates the following processes of database management systems, email clients, office applications, etc.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The ransomware encrypts files on disks and available network resources. Before encryption, the ransomware mounts hidden volumes.

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

The ransomware encrypts files on disks and available network resources.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The decrypted BabLock ransomware is always packed with VMProtect for anti-virtualization.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

...create Linux encryptors targeting VMware ESXi servers.

Lateral Movement

3 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

After successfully exploiting this vulnerability, the attackers connected to the domain controller from a compromised Zimbra server via a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP).

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

To gain access to Linux systems, the attackers used a utility called PuTTY.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

The day after the initial connection to the domain controller, the following files were copied: BEST_uninstallTool.exe cy.exe winutils.dll config.ini

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence1

Chisel - A transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP) tunnel

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The day after the initial connection to the domain controller, the following files were copied: BEST_uninstallTool.exe cy.exe winutils.dll config.ini

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence6

As a result, files in Windows systems and network shares as well as files belonging to VMware ESXi virtual machines were encrypted.

T1489Service StopEvidence2

The ransomware stops security, backup, database and other services.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

BabLock removes shadow copies by executing the following command lines: vssadmin.exe delete shadows /All /Quiet

Indicators of compromise

Observables

70 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching70Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping38Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.