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Malware2 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Headlace

Tracked since Dec 17, 2025 · Updated 27 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs12Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Initial accessPost exploitationPersistenceExfiltrationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
PhishingLure
Platforms
Windows

HeadLace is a lightweight, modular Windows backdoor used by APT28, also known as Fancy Bear, BlueDelta, Fighting Ursa, and Forest Blizzard, a Russian military intelligence-linked cyberespionage group. Observed in European initial-access campaigns since 2023, it provides staged execution of attacker-supplied commands and follow-on payloads. Its components include Windows batch scripts, command scripts, and VBScript. It uses browser-mediated communications and legitimate internet services for command-and-control, with headless or hidden browser execution helping conceal its activity. HeadLace has also been used for persistence and data exfiltration.

Distribution campaigns have used phishing and topical social-engineering lures, including Israel–Hamas war decoys and a fraudulent diplomatic car-sale advertisement. In a March 2024 campaign, a malicious web page checked for Windows before delivering an archive containing a legitimate executable disguised as an image, a malicious DLL, and a batch script. DLL sideloading initiated the script, which launched Microsoft Edge with encoded content to retrieve and execute a subsequent command payload. The script then deleted itself to reduce forensic traces.

HeadLace targeting has included European diplomatic organizations and Ukrainian critical energy infrastructure. It has also appeared in APT28 operations against Western logistics and technology organizations supporting aid delivery to Ukraine.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-23397via thecyberexpress com vulnerabilitiesZero-click NTLM credential disclosure in Microsoft Outlook for WindowsThe Russian GRU cyber campaign also involves malware such as HEADLACE and MASEPIE, which are used for persistence and data exfiltration.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-38831via thecyberexpress com vulnerabilitiesArbitrary Code Execution in WinRAR Before 6.23 via Crafted ArchivesThe Russian GRU cyber campaign also involves malware such as HEADLACE and MASEPIE, which are used for persistence and data exfiltration.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT28

HOOKEDGE is the documented successor to HEADLACE, an older APT28 modular Windows backdoor.

via tech timestechtimes.com
GRU Unit 26165

The Russian GRU cyber campaign also involves malware such as HEADLACE and MASEPIE, which are used for persistence and data exfiltration.

via thecyberexpress com vulnerabilitiesthecyberexpress.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

For example, in January 2022, GRU Unit 29155 launched WhisperGate, a wiper malware attack that overwrote the master boot records of Ukrainian government systems.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

A significant aspect of the campaign involves the exploitation of known vulnerabilities. The actors have weaponized multiple CVEs, including: CVE-2023-23397 in Microsoft Outlook to harvest credentials Roundcube vulnerabilities for email server access CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR for remote code execution

T1566PhishingEvidence5

The Russia-linked threat actor known as APT28 has been linked to multiple ongoing phishing campaigns that employ lure documents imitating government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and North and South America.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The phishing attacks impersonate entities from several countries such as Argentina, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the U.S., putting to use a mix of authentic publicly available government and non-government lure documents to activate the infection chains.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The URL kicking off this infection chain was hosted by a legitimate service named Webhook.site... Fighting Ursa abused Webhook.site to craft a URL that returned a malicious HTML page.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“In some cases, operators of the intrusion set attempted to establish a means of persistence by creating a scheduled task.”

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

HOOKEDGE is a lightweight Windows batch backdoor that enables remote command execution by retrieving arbitrary .cmd payloads from a staging webhook.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

HeadLace : multi-component backdoor (CMD/VBS/BAT).

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

The actors have weaponized multiple CVEs, including: CVE-2023-23397 in Microsoft Outlook to harvest credentials ... CVE-2023-38831 in WinRAR for remote code execution

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

This is a common tactic used by threat actors to trick potential victims into double-clicking the file, in this case believing it will open a car for sale advertisement.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“In some cases, operators of the intrusion set attempted to establish a means of persistence by creating a scheduled task.”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“In some cases, operators of the intrusion set attempted to establish a means of persistence by creating a scheduled task.”

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Changes included modifications to lure documents and VBA obfuscation... Second-stage payloads retrieved by HOOKEDGE also share... base64 encoding schemes with payloads previously observed in HEADLACE campaigns.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

The second-stage payloads retrieved by HOOKEDGE share JavaScript code ... using identical variable names, properties, structure, and base64 encoding schemes for automated file downloads.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Table 1 above shows that the first file IMG-387470302099.jpg.exe has a double file extension of .jpg.exe. Windows hosts with a default configuration hide file extensions, so the .jpg.exe file extension only shows as .jpg in the file name.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Finally, the batch file executes IMG387470302099.cmd, then deletes itself as a way to remove any obvious trace of malicious activity.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Throughout three phases, BlueDelta used phishing emails, legitimate internet services, and living-off-the-land binaries to extract intelligence from key networks across Europe.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

First, it checks if the visiting computer is Windows-based. If not, it redirects to a decoy image... As the final payload is Windows based, this operating system check is probably an effort to ensure that further actions taken in the attack are only taken for Windows visitors.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

Earlier variants executed Edge in headless mode, while later versions used hidden browser windows.

Discovery

1 technique
T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

First, it checks if the visiting computer is Windows-based. If not, it redirects to a decoy image... As the final payload is Windows based, this operating system check is probably an effort to ensure that further actions taken in the attack are only taken for Windows visitors.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Outbound connections from infected hosts are directed to a legitimate HTTPS service, with a web browser serving as the HTTP client.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence4

HOOKEDGE routes command retrieval and data exfiltration through webhook[.]site using Microsoft Edge.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Webhook services were used for “payload staging,” and “for targets assessed as having higher intelligence value, BlueDelta deployed a second-stage HOOKEDGE payload.”

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

HOOKEDGE’s code and structural design have significant overlap with HEADLACE... right down to identical JavaScript variable names and the same base64 encoding scheme for automated downloads.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The report states that BlueDelta abused legitimate webhook services for “data exfiltration” and that webhook[.]site was the group’s exclusive service choice across these campaigns.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.