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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

SnakeKeylogger

Tracked since Dec 18, 2025 · Updated 4 days ago
Trending this week#71of 30,226 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK46Techniques
IOCs63Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissanceProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

SnakeKeylogger, also known as 404 Keylogger, is a .NET-based information stealer targeting Windows systems that has been active since late 2020. It steals saved credentials and browser data, records keystrokes, and collects system information. Analyzed versions also capture clipboard contents and screenshots, harvest credentials from email and FTP clients, and steal Wi-Fi passwords, browser-stored payment-card information, and Discord authentication tokens. VIPKeylogger is a related variant.

SnakeKeylogger exfiltrates stolen information through SMTP and the Telegram Bot API, including through compromised legitimate mail servers. Some versions additionally support HTTP POST, FTP, and Discord webhooks. The malware also queries external services to determine a victim’s public IP address and geographic location.

Distribution commonly involves phishing emails with quotation, procurement, payment, project-proposal, or shipping lures. Attachments include malicious Office documents and archives containing obfuscated JavaScript or VBScript. Observed infection chains use PowerShell to decrypt and load payloads directly into memory, while others retrieve encoded payloads concealed in images or text. SnakeKeylogger has also been distributed by PureCrypter. Associated loaders employ encryption, script obfuscation, reflective .NET loading, and process hollowing into legitimate Windows processes to hinder detection. Some chains establish persistence through scheduled tasks or startup scripts.

SnakeKeylogger has been deployed by the financially motivated cybercrime group TA558 in the SteganoAmor campaign, which used malicious Office attachments, exploit-bearing documents, steganography, and compromised infrastructure. Its distribution is international, with campaigns affecting organizations across multiple industries, including government, manufacturing, technology, and banking.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-0199via trellix blogExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office and WordPad OLE Remote Code ExecutionThe attack begins with a phishing email containing an encrypted Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199. Upon opening the file, OLE objects are used to trigger the download and execution of a malicious HTA application.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-11882via ptsecurityExploited in the wildRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorThe group continues to exploit the fairly old CVE-2017-11882 in its attack chain. It uses steganography, an obfuscation technique, inside the chains to spread well-known malware used in other attacks in recent years.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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TA558

Finally, SnakeKeylogger forwards the information it stole to the compromised legitimate SMTP server.

via ptsecurityptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

46 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Resource Development Upload Malware T1608.001 Internet Archive and ByetHost payload staging

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

ASEC recently confirmed that phishing emails disguised as project proposals are being circulated. The body of the email pretends to request that the proposal and confirmed delivery schedule be submitted as soon as possible, and prompts the recipient to download the attached compressed file.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

The initial delivery vector is a DHL-themed phishing email carrying a VBScript attachment.

Execution

8 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2

Execution is handled through WMI rather than direct process creation ... infare.Get("Win32_Process").Create(avaram, Null, circumsail, mayas)

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Kill Chain Summary ... Persist: VBS startup + Scheduled Task

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

When executed, the JavaScript malware executes PowerShell commands...

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

When executed, the JavaScript malware executes PowerShell commands as shown in [Figure 4].

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

%11%\cMd.exe /C morE /E +29 %TEmP%\VN.inf > %TEmP%\cvr.tmp

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence4

the first check we need to observe when it comes to office files is the existence of Macros which are used by the TA to execute VBA commands | FlkMT is responsible for building the payload which will be written in TEMP Directory using WHTLE function

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

When executed, the JavaScript malware executes PowerShell commands... The PowerShell script receives encrypted SnakeKeylogger data as an argument from within the JavaScript file

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

When a user downloads and decompresses the attached compressed file, they will find JS malware disguised as a proposal.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Kill Chain Summary ... Persist: VBS startup + Scheduled Task

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Defense Evasion Modify Registry T1112 Assessed: stage 3 persistence via registry

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Kill Chain Summary ... Persist: VBS startup + Scheduled Task

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys T1547.001 Assessed: stage 3 persistence

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Kill Chain Summary ... Persist: VBS startup + Scheduled Task

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

"It performs process hollowing into Aspnet_compiler.exe -- a legitimate .NET Framework tool"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Kill Chain Summary ... Persist: VBS startup + Scheduled Task

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys T1547.001 Assessed: stage 3 persistence

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The PowerShell script receives encrypted SnakeKeylogger data as an argument from within the JavaScript file, decrypts it, and executes it in memory without saving it to disk. [Figure 3] Part of the obfuscated JavaScript malware [Figure 4] Part of the obfuscated PowerShell script

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The extracted assembly ... includes anti-analysis checks ... An encrypted configuration blob in the User Strings heap contains the Telegram bot token and SMTP credentials -- protected by Babel's obfuscation layer

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

The decoded PowerShell downloads a JPEG image from Cloudinary CDN ... with 1.55 MB of Base64-encoded .NET assembly appended after the image data.

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

Defense Evasion Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation T1027.010 Character-by-character URL concatenation

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Defense Evasion Masquerading T1036 Payloads disguised as PNG image files

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence3

"It performs process hollowing into Aspnet_compiler.exe -- a legitimate .NET Framework tool"

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

then it will erase his row existence as the process has been executed and delete the 3 dropped files (VN.inf , cvr.tmp, and xhd.jpg)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Defense Evasion Deobfuscate/Decode Files T1140 Multi-layer base64 + XOR decryption at runtime

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1

ruNDLl32 %TEmP%\xhd.jpg,main here the TA uses Rundll32 which is used to run a DLL and execute xhd.jpg and the export function here is main | Snake uses this method to run the Inf file under a legitimate container or process... it calls a function called tAcKs() and this function is defined as LunachINFSectionW from Advpack.dll

T1480Execution GuardrailsEvidence1

Defense Evasion Execution Guardrails T1480 Timer ensures sandbox timeout before payload

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion T1497.003 2.2-second timer sleep

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

The PowerShell script receives encrypted SnakeKeylogger data as an argument from within the JavaScript file, decrypts it, and executes it in memory without saving it to disk.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It includes anti-analysis checks for dnspy, vsdbg, de4dot, plus CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, IsDebuggerPresent, and NtQueryInformationProcess.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Defense Evasion Modify Registry T1112 Assessed: stage 3 persistence via registry

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

A keylogger is a type of software that monitors and records the keystrokes entered on a computer... they are used to steal sensitive information such as authentication credentials, credit card details, and various confidential data entered through the keyboard.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Credential Access Steal Application Access Token T1528 Discord token extraction from LevelDB

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

This type of malware steals all kinds of data from the system it infects, including credentials (passwords and cookies) for VPNs, RDP, business services, banking and social media, stored by a variety of apps (including popular browsers like Chrome and Firefox).

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence3

Útočník dokonca môže heslá extrahovať na ďalšie použitie.

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Credential Access Email Credentials T1555.005 Outlook, Foxmail, Thunderbird credential theft

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Other kinds of highly sensitive data that infostealers often collect are screenshots, keylogs, clipboard, cryptocurrency wallets and autofill data...

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

VIPKeylogger ... conducts victim recon via checkip.dyndns.org with a spoofed MSIE 6.0 User-Agent

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Discovery System Information Discovery T1082 PC name, date/time collection

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

Defense Evasion Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Evasion T1497.003 2.2-second timer sleep

T1614System Location DiscoveryEvidence1

Discovery System Location Discovery T1614 Country via reallyfreegeoip.org

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

It includes anti-analysis checks for dnspy, vsdbg, de4dot, plus CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent, IsDebuggerPresent, and NtQueryInformationProcess.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

SnakeKeylogger—an Infostealer—collects various types of information from the infected system, such as web browser data, system information, and keylogging data

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

A keylogger is a type of software that monitors and records the keystrokes entered on a computer... they are used to steal sensitive information such as authentication credentials, credit card details, and various confidential data entered through the keyboard.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence4

Other kinds of highly sensitive data that infostealers often collect are screenshots, keylogs, clipboard, cryptocurrency wallets and autofill data...

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence5

Other kinds of highly sensitive data that infostealers often collect are screenshots, keylogs, clipboard, cryptocurrency wallets and autofill data...

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Command and Control Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 HTTP GET to C2 on port 80

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

Command and Control Web Service T1102 Cloudinary/Internet Archive for staging

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

the dropped file is a 32-bit Dll, and exploring its string I found some interesting ones, that clarify this payload as a Downloader. so we need to locate the C2 which will be used to download the next stage

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Command and Control Dynamic Resolution: DNS T1568.002 DuckDNS, Dynu, DNS.Army DDNS

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Exfiltration Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041 SMTP/HTTP exfiltration

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence3

Like the average Infostealer, DarkCloud steals the account credentials of users that have been saved on web browsers, FTP, and email clients. It is also similar to other Infostealers like AgentTesla and SnakeKeylogger as it uses SMTP or the Telegram API to send the collected information to the C&C server.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence2

This blog post focuses on analyzing logs exfiltrated by infostealers, specifically to Telegram, through their Bot API.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

63 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

29 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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malware newsNews · Nov 12, 2026Beware of phishing emails disguised as quote requests (SnakeKeylogger) - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and IndicatorsIdentified in the linked article title as the malware associated with phishing emails impersonating purchasing department personnel and requesting quotation reviews. The excerpt describes a download lure but provides no technical details about the malware's behavior.Read more ↗trellix blogNews · Aug 24, 2026Unmasking the Hidden Threat: Inside a Sophisticated Excel-Based Attack Delivering Fileless Remcos RATListed as a payload in separate 2024 campaigns using a comparable delivery chain. The report does not describe its capabilities.Read more ↗ahnlab asec blogNews · Jul 8, 2026Beware of Phishing Emails Disguised as Project Proposals - ASECAn infostealer/keylogger delivered via phishing emails as a JavaScript attachment. The JavaScript launches PowerShell, which decrypts the SnakeKeylogger payload and executes it in memory. It steals browser data, system information, and keystrokes, then exfiltrates the data via SMTP or Telegram.Read more ↗breakglass intelNews · Mar 15, 2026Competent Malware, Incompetent Infrastructure: A VIPKeylogger Operator Builds a Steganographic Kill Chain, Leaves XAMPP Dashboard Open, and Leaks Their Own SMTP Credentials - Breakglass Intelligence - Breakglass IntelligenceA keylogger family also known as 404 Keylogger. In this content it is described as the parent family/variant lineage for VIPKeylogger, with VIPKeylogger adding dual-channel SMTP and Telegram exfiltration.Read more ↗
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IOC matching63Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping46Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.