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Mallory
Malware

BrowserVenom

Tracked since Dec 19, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs12Tracked

BrowserVenom is a Windows implant delivered via a targeted phishing and malvertising campaign that impersonates the DeepSeek-R1 website, including the fake domain deepseek-platform[.]com, and distributes a trojanized installer such as AI_Launcher_1.21.exe from r1deepseek-ai[.]com. The infection chain uses fake CAPTCHA pages, deceptive download prompts, and decoy software references including Ollama and LM Studio. The malware attempts to add the user profile to Microsoft Defender exclusions via PowerShell, uses AES-256-CBC-decrypted components, and can retrieve additional payloads from app-updater[.]app infrastructure including app-updater1[.]app and app-updater2[.]app. BrowserVenom checks for administrative privileges and exits if they are not present. When executed with sufficient privileges, it installs a hard-coded root certificate into the LocalMachine Root certificate store and reconfigures Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers, including Mozilla and Tor Browser, to force traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy by modifying browser settings and shortcut files. Reported proxy infrastructure includes 141.105.130[.]106:37121, and the malware appends victim ID and HWID values to the User-Agent for tracking. Its purpose is to intercept and collect browser traffic and associated data; reporting also describes it as capable of stealing credentials, session cookies, financial details, personal documents, and email content. Observed infections were reported in Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, India, Nepal, South Africa, and Egypt. Reporting noted Russian-language comments in the malicious site code and assessed the operators as likely Russian-speaking.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The infection was launched from a phishing site, located at https[:]//deepseek-platform[.]com . It was spread via malvertising, intentionally placed as the top result when a user searched for “deepseek r1”.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

The malware is delivered via a phishing site that masquerades as the official DeepSeek homepage. The website was promoted in the search results via Google Ads.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The decrypted buffer contains a PowerShell command that performs the exclusion once executed by the malicious function.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Clicking that results in downloading the malicious installer named AI_Launcher_1.21.exe

Persistence

2 techniques
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

For Chromium-based instances (i.e., Chrome or Microsoft Edge), it adds the proxy-server argument and modifies all existent LNK files

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

For Chromium-based instances (i.e., Chrome or Microsoft Edge), it adds the proxy-server argument and modifies all existent LNK files

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The code for this screen is obfuscated JavaScript, which performs a series of checks to make sure that the user is not a bot.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The malware is delivered via a phishing site that masquerades as the official DeepSeek homepage.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

the malicious function tries to exclude the user’s folder from Windows Defender’s protection by decrypting a buffer using the AES encryption algorithm... Then the MLInstaller.Runner.Run() function locates a hardcoded stage two payload... This executable is decrypted with the same AES algorithm

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1553.004Install Root CertificateEvidence1

BrowserVenom checks if the current user has administrator rights – exiting if not – and installs a hardcoded certificate created by the threat actor

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence1

BrowserVenom because it reconfigures all browsing instances to force traffic through a proxy controlled by the threat actors.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After that, another PowerShell command runs, downloading an executable from a malicious domain... The downloaded executable is saved as %USERPROFILE%\Music\1.exe under the user’s profile and then executed.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching12Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.