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BrowserVenom is a Windows implant delivered via a targeted phishing and malvertising campaign that impersonates the DeepSeek-R1 website, including the fake domain deepseek-platform[.]com, and distributes a trojanized installer such as AI_Launcher_1.21.exe from r1deepseek-ai[.]com. The infection chain uses fake CAPTCHA pages, deceptive download prompts, and decoy software references including Ollama and LM Studio. The malware attempts to add the user profile to Microsoft Defender exclusions via PowerShell, uses AES-256-CBC-decrypted components, and can retrieve additional payloads from app-updater[.]app infrastructure including app-updater1[.]app and app-updater2[.]app. BrowserVenom checks for administrative privileges and exits if they are not present. When executed with sufficient privileges, it installs a hard-coded root certificate into the LocalMachine Root certificate store and reconfigures Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers, including Mozilla and Tor Browser, to force traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy by modifying browser settings and shortcut files. Reported proxy infrastructure includes 141.105.130[.]106:37121, and the malware appends victim ID and HWID values to the User-Agent for tracking. Its purpose is to intercept and collect browser traffic and associated data; reporting also describes it as capable of stealing credentials, session cookies, financial details, personal documents, and email content. Observed infections were reported in Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, India, Nepal, South Africa, and Egypt. Reporting noted Russian-language comments in the malicious site code and assessed the operators as likely Russian-speaking.
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12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The code for this screen is obfuscated JavaScript, which performs a series of checks to make sure that the user is not a bot.
The malware is delivered via a phishing site that masquerades as the official DeepSeek homepage.
the malicious function tries to exclude the user’s folder from Windows Defender’s protection by decrypting a buffer using the AES encryption algorithm... Then the MLInstaller.Runner.Run() function locates a hardcoded stage two payload... This executable is decrypted with the same AES algorithm
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A previously unknown next-stage implant delivered via a fake DeepSeek installer. It installs a threat-actor-controlled root certificate, reconfigures Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers to use a malicious proxy, and enables interception, monitoring, and collection of victims’ browsing traffic and sensitive data.
Delivered via malvertising/phishing to a fake DeepSeek-R1 site and trojanized installer; functions as malicious proxyware by rerouting browser traffic through attacker-controlled servers to enable theft of credentials, session cookies, financial data, documents, and email content; attempts Defender exclusion tampering, checks for admin privileges, modifies browser configs/shortcuts, and can fetch additional payloads.
Windows malware that reconfigures browsers to route traffic through attacker-controlled proxies, enabling data sniffing and monitoring of browsing activity.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.