BrowserVenom
BrowserVenom is a Windows implant delivered via a targeted phishing and malvertising campaign that impersonates the DeepSeek-R1 website, including the fake domain deepseek-platform[.]com, and distributes a trojanized installer such as AI_Launcher_1.21.exe from r1deepseek-ai[.]com. The infection chain uses fake CAPTCHA pages, deceptive download prompts, and decoy software references including Ollama and LM Studio. The malware attempts to add the user profile to Microsoft Defender exclusions via PowerShell, uses AES-256-CBC-decrypted components, and can retrieve additional payloads from app-updater[.]app infrastructure including app-updater1[.]app and app-updater2[.]app. BrowserVenom checks for administrative privileges and exits if they are not present. When executed with sufficient privileges, it installs a hard-coded root certificate into the LocalMachine Root certificate store and reconfigures Chromium- and Gecko-based browsers, including Mozilla and Tor Browser, to force traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy by modifying browser settings and shortcut files. Reported proxy infrastructure includes 141.105.130[.]106:37121, and the malware appends victim ID and HWID values to the User-Agent for tracking. Its purpose is to intercept and collect browser traffic and associated data; reporting also describes it as capable of stealing credentials, session cookies, financial details, personal documents, and email content. Observed infections were reported in Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, India, Nepal, South Africa, and Egypt. Reporting noted Russian-language comments in the malicious site code and assessed the operators as likely Russian-speaking.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The infection was launched from a phishing site, located at https[:]//deepseek-platform[.]com . It was spread via malvertising, intentionally placed as the top result when a user searched for “deepseek r1”.
The malware is delivered via a phishing site that masquerades as the official DeepSeek homepage. The website was promoted in the search results via Google Ads.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
The decrypted buffer contains a PowerShell command that performs the exclusion once executed by the malicious function.
Clicking that results in downloading the malicious installer named AI_Launcher_1.21.exe
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
For Chromium-based instances (i.e., Chrome or Microsoft Edge), it adds the proxy-server argument and modifies all existent LNK files
This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
For Chromium-based instances (i.e., Chrome or Microsoft Edge), it adds the proxy-server argument and modifies all existent LNK files
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
The code for this screen is obfuscated JavaScript, which performs a series of checks to make sure that the user is not a bot.
The malware is delivered via a phishing site that masquerades as the official DeepSeek homepage.
the malicious function tries to exclude the user’s folder from Windows Defender’s protection by decrypting a buffer using the AES encryption algorithm... Then the MLInstaller.Runner.Run() function locates a hardcoded stage two payload... This executable is decrypted with the same AES algorithm
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
BrowserVenom checks if the current user has administrator rights – exiting if not – and installs a hardcoded certificate created by the threat actor
This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
This enables them to sniff sensitive data and monitor the victim’s browsing activity while decrypting their traffic.
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
BrowserVenom because it reconfigures all browsing instances to force traffic through a proxy controlled by the threat actors.
After that, another PowerShell command runs, downloading an executable from a malicious domain... The downloaded executable is saved as %USERPROFILE%\Music\1.exe under the user’s profile and then executed.
Observables
12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.