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Malware3 associated actors

Wonderland

Tracked since Dec 22, 2025 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK3Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Also known aswretchedcat

Wonderland is an Android SMS-stealer malware family, formerly known as WretchedCat, associated with the financially motivated TrickyWonders cybercriminal group. It has been observed targeting users in Uzbekistan and the broader Central Asia region, with reporting also noting similar tactics in neighboring countries, Turkey, and India. Group-IB described it as a major mobile threat in the region and reported large-scale infections in Uzbekistan.

Wonderland is distributed primarily through Telegram-based social engineering and sideloaded APKs, often via fake apps, fake Google Play pages, social media ads, dating apps, fake websites, and highly obfuscated dropper malware such as MidnightDat and the AES-based RoundRift. Attackers also abuse stolen Telegram sessions to message victims’ contacts and propagate the malware. The operation has been described as using an affiliate model in which core developers and affiliates distribute malware for profit.

Its core capability is theft of SMS messages, including one-time passwords used for banking and authentication. Reported functionality also includes hijacking Telegram accounts by intercepting authentication codes, retrieving phone numbers, exfiltrating contact lists, sending arbitrary SMS messages, suppressing push notifications to hide security alerts and OTPs, and facilitating unauthorized financial transactions. Group-IB reported that Wonderland supports bidirectional command-and-control over WebSocket, enabling real-time command execution, arbitrary USSD requests, call-forwarding abuse, and other fraud-enabling actions on infected Android devices.

The malware uses heavy code obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques, including emulator, rooted-device, and sandbox detection, and may terminate itself when analysis environments are detected. Reporting also notes that each APK build may be tied to a unique, frequently rotated C2 domain to complicate blacklisting and monitoring. Wonderland has been described as masquerading as legitimate applications, including Google Play, and as part of multi-stage infection chains in which droppers silently deploy the SMS-stealing payload.

The campaign is financially motivated, with monetization centered on intercepting banking OTPs, draining victims’ bank accounts or cards, and reselling compromised Telegram sessions. Victims are primarily Android users who rely on Telegram, banking apps, and social media, especially in Uzbekistan.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ajina

"The attackers were observed using the SMS stealer Wonderland, dropper malware MidnightDat, the AES-based dropper RoundRift, money stealing malware Ajina.Banker, and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
trickywonders

"The attackers were observed using the SMS stealer Wonderland, dropper malware MidnightDat, the AES-based dropper RoundRift, money stealing malware Ajina.Banker, and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
blazefang

"The attackers were observed using the SMS stealer Wonderland, dropper malware MidnightDat, the AES-based dropper RoundRift, money stealing malware Ajina.Banker, and SMS stealer Qwizzserial."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

"Massiv ... masquerades as seemingly harmless IPTV apps to deceive victims"; "malicious dropper apps masquerading as legitimate applications"; "masquerade as package delivery service apps"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"Wonderland ... facilitates bidirectional command-and-control (C2) communication to execute commands in real-time"; "null-routed ... command-and-control (C2) nodes associated with the AISURU/Kimwolf botnet"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"adversaries increasingly deploy droppers ... contains a built-in malicious payload, which is deployed locally after installation"; "Keenadu ... multi-stage loader"; "DocSwap ... decrypts an embedded encrypted APK"

Activity feed

Recent activity

9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping3Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.