Loading malware…
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Patching CVE-2026–21509 is necessary, but not sufficient. Malicious .doc → CVE- 2026 - 21509 exploit → LNK shortcut + SimpleLoader DLL → EhStoreShell .dll (steganography loader) → SplashScreen .png (shellcode hidden in PNG image) → CovenantGrunt (in-memory .NET backdoor) → filen .io (C2 communication)
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
SplashScreen .png (shellcode hidden in PNG image) → CovenantGrunt (in-memory .NET backdoor) → filen .io (C2 communication)
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
CovenantGrunt (in-memory .NET backdoor) → filen .io (C2 communication)
All beaconing and tasking occurs via HTTPS requests to filen.io API endpoints, appearing as normal cloud storage traffic.
Command and Control T1090.003 Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy Multiple filen[.]io gateway domains
The threat actors abuse legitimate cloud storage (filen.io) as command-and-control (C2) infrastructure... All beaconing and tasking occurs via HTTPS requests to filen.io API endpoints.
36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
An in-memory .NET backdoor used for command-and-control communications via filen.io as part of the described intrusion chain.
A modified Covenant implant reengineered to use filen.io cloud storage for command and control. It performs encrypted key exchange, fileless execution, tasking, .NET assembly loading, PowerShell execution, reconnaissance, and data exfiltration.
A malware deployed by APT28 via weaponized Office documents, details unspecified.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.