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Mallory
Malware4 associated actors

Thanos

Tracked since Jan 5, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors4Associated
ATT&CK23Techniques
IOCs121Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionPersistenceLateral movementDefense evasionProcess injection
Delivery
PhishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Thanos is a Windows ransomware family and customizable ransomware-as-a-service platform written in C# for the .NET framework. Advertised on underground forums since 2019 and identified in February 2020, its builder enables operators to generate variants with configurable capabilities. The subsequent leak of its builder and code contributed to the emergence of multiple derivatives, including Prometheus, Haron, AlumniLocker, Spook, and Midas. Shared code does not establish common ownership or operator attribution among these operations.

Thanos encrypts documents, databases, archives, backups, virtual-machine disks, and other files to demand payment for recovery. Analyzed variants use AES-CBC for file encryption and RSA to protect encryption keys. It can delete shadow copies and backup files, stop antivirus-related services, and maintain persistence through a startup-folder self-copy. Network-spreading functionality uses remote administration software to execute ransomware on other Windows machines, while Wake-on-LAN functionality can activate connected systems. Observed execution chains use obfuscated PowerShell, embedded C# code, and shellcode injection into legitimate processes.

Defense-evasion capabilities include debugger and virtual-environment checks, interference with analysis tools, process security-descriptor changes that hinder termination, and rebooting into Safe Mode. Some samples use ProcessHide to hook the NtQuerySystemInformation API and conceal their processes from monitoring applications. Thanos also implements RIPlace, which abuses Windows file-renaming behavior and device aliases to evade some anti-ransomware protections.

Thanos has been used by financially motivated operators targeting businesses and by the Iranian intelligence-linked actor MuddyWater in regional disruptive campaigns. PowGoop has delivered Thanos variants to state-run organizations in the Middle East and North Africa. Other derivatives have been distributed through malicious invoice-themed email attachments. Several Thanos-derived operations combine encryption with threats to publish stolen data.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Thanos Ransomware Group

He also supplied Initial Access to Thanos Ransomware Group back in 2020.

via theravenfile blogtheravenfile.com
MuddyWater

MuddyWater has previously attempted to deploy ransomware, such as Thanos, on victim networks to either destroy evidence of their intrusions or disrupt operations.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Prometheus

Cyble researchers have found a sample of the Thanos ransomware being used by the Prometheus group for a recent ransomware attack.

via cyble blog historicblog.cyble.com
TarnishedGauntlet activity cluster

"...overlap between targeted intrusion operations by STATIC KITTEN and disruption-oriented Thanos ransomware activity..."

via crowdstrike bloggo.crowdstrike.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP...

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

...обманных загрузок, ботнетов, эксплойтов, вредоносной рекламы, веб-инжектов, фальшивых обновлений, перепакованных и заражённых инсталляторов.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP, с помощью email-спама и вредоносных вложений...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

AlumniLocker arrives via a malicious PDF email attachment. Based on our investigation, the PDF is a fake invoice that urges the victim to download it.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1106Native APIEvidence1

ProcessHide then hooks the NtQuerySystemInformation API call to hide the process from being listed by the monitoring applications.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The ZIP archive also contains a fake JPG file, which is actually a PowerShell script that will download and execute the AlumniLocker payload by abusing a Background Intelligent Service Transfer (BITS) module.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence1

The malicious PDF contains a link (hxxps://femto[.]pw/cyp5) that, once clicked, will download a ZIP archive containing a downloader.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1569.002 Service Execution

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Defense Evasion The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry [T1112]

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Может распространяться путём взлома через незащищенную конфигурацию RDP...

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The ZIP archive also contains a fake JPG file, which is actually a PowerShell script that will download and execute the AlumniLocker payload by abusing a Background Intelligent Service Transfer (BITS) module.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence, Privilege Escalation The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001]

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

Persistence, Privilege Escalation The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder [T1547.001]

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Файл может называться: firefox.exe или chrome32.exe, opera32.exe, firefox.exe, server.exe, client.exe и пр.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The ZIP archive also contains a fake JPG file, which is actually a PowerShell script that will download and execute the AlumniLocker payload by abusing a Background Intelligent Service Transfer (BITS) module.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Использует службу поиска внешних IP-адресов: hxxx://checkip.dyndns.org

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

For example, the Thanos ransomware uses a tool, called ProcessHide, to hide its presence on an infected machine. ProcessHide takes as parameters the process IDs of the monitoring applications processes and the process name to hide.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

Defense Evasion The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry [T1112]

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

Defense Evasion The below courses of action mitigate the following techniques: Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Modify Registry [T1112]

Discovery

4 techniques
T1010Application Window DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1010 Application Window Discovery

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1057 Process Discovery

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Использует службу поиска внешних IP-адресов: hxxx://checkip.dyndns.org

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1518.001 Security Software Discovery

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

Загружает и использует утилиту PsExec.exe с сайта с SysInternals.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence14

All your documents, photos, databases and other important files have been encrypted .

T1489Service StopEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1489 Service Stop

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Technique ID Technique T1490 Inhibit System Recovery

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

The ransomware actors also threaten to publish their victims’ data on their “wall of shame” website if they don’t send the payment within 48 hours.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

121 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching121Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors4Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping23Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.