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Malware

SolarMarker

SolarMarker is a sophisticated malware family and backdoor, also known as Deimos, Jupyter Infostealer, Polazert, and Yellow Cockatoo, that has been active since at least September 2020. The provided content describes it as an SEO-poisoning backdoor with infostealer capability. It has been used in classic search-engine-optimization poisoning campaigns that rely on tiered infrastructure and content farms to attract victims through search results and route them through filtering gates. SolarMarker is capable of stealing data from multiple web browsers and cryptocurrency wallets, and it can deploy additional payloads. The content also notes infrastructure associations: servers clustered with malicious activity were linked alongside BumbleBee, Raccoon Stealer, RecordBreaker, and SolarMarker, and one referenced sample contained a HuggingFace API key. The content recommends organizational controls against SolarMarker but does not provide specific mitigations or high-confidence IOCs beyond these infrastructure and sample references.

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For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence1

Classic Search Engine Optimization (SEO) poisoning already proved resilient at scale: SolarMarker and peers used tiered infrastructure and content farms to meet victims at intent, then route them through filtering gates.

Execution

1 technique
T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The implant executes various commands, which are inserted into the registry key HKCU\ Classes\ms-settings\CurVer . It then tries to execute two different Windows components ... fodhelper.exe ... ComputerDefaults.exe

Persistence

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The implant executes various commands, which are inserted into the registry key HKCU\ Classes\ms-settings\CurVer... creates registry keys to register a custom file extension and a custom command to open files of that extension.

Stealth

1 technique
T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The implant executes various commands, which are inserted into the registry key HKCU\ Classes\ms-settings\CurVer . It then tries to execute two different Windows components ... fodhelper.exe ... ComputerDefaults.exe

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

The implant executes various commands, which are inserted into the registry key HKCU\ Classes\ms-settings\CurVer... creates registry keys to register a custom file extension and a custom command to open files of that extension.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

Developers routinely hardcode credentials directly into apps, config files, and scripts. These credentials can be found in GitHub in open-source projects, while closed-source projects contain the credentials in the app itself.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Among the malware families in the intro table, LameHug/PROMPTSTEAL is the cleanest example of this route in the wild: it calls HuggingFace’s Inference API for Qwen 2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct to drive reconnaissance and data theft...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app28 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.