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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

StealthVector

Tracked since Jan 5, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs19Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasionPersistencePost exploitationProcess injection
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

StealthVector is a Windows shellcode loader associated with the China-linked espionage actor tracked as Earth Baku, also known as APT41. It has been used in campaigns targeting organizations across the Indo-Pacific region, including sectors such as airlines, automotive, infrastructure, publishing, media, information technology, and computer hardware, and has also been observed in intrusions linked to broader APT41 activity.

StealthVector is implemented in C/C++ and is designed to decrypt and launch second-stage payloads in memory. Observed payloads include the modular backdoor ScrambleCross and Cobalt Strike Beacon. The loader emphasizes stealth and flexible execution. Reported capabilities include disabling Event Tracing for Windows, checking the current username for context awareness, configurable payload placement, and optional self-uninstallation after execution. Execution methods attributed to StealthVector include direct thread creation, local module stomping, Control Flow Guard bypass, and phantom DLL hollowing into remote processes. Some variants patch functionality in ntdll to facilitate CFG bypass.

Configuration data has been reported as encrypted with ChaCha20 using a nonstandard initial counter, while later related variants introduced stronger obfuscation and different cryptographic routines. StealthVector and its successor lineage have also been noted to re-encrypt payload material after initial execution using XOR keyed to the victim computer name, complicating forensic recovery and analysis.

StealthVector has been delivered through multiple intrusion chains. Documented access vectors in operations using this loader include SQL injection against public-facing applications backed by Microsoft SQL Server, exploitation of Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 to deploy web shells and follow-on malware, and a possible malicious attachment chain involving shortcut files. It has also been installed for persistence as a Windows service and loaded through DLL-based execution chains.

StealthVector is part of a malware family cluster that evolved alongside StealthMutant, a .NET implementation with similar purpose, and later loader variants such as StealthReacher and DodgeBox. It has also been observed in environments where ScrambleCross was deployed as an in-memory modular implant. The malware reflects a mature post-exploitation toolkit focused on covert payload delivery, defense evasion, and long-term espionage operations on Windows systems.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-26855via trendmicro comProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerOur analysis indicates that Earth Baku employs previously unidentified pieces of malware in this campaign: two shellcode loaders, which we have named StealthVector and StealthMutant, and a backdoor, which we have dubbed ScrambleCross.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT41

Compared to the older StealthVector, it uses AES algorithms for encryption and MD5 hashing for checksum. It’s noting that both StealthVector and StealthReacher will perform re-encryption after the first initiation via XOR encryption, with the key being the victim’s computer name.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Earth Baku performed an SQL injection attack on the victim’s web application to gain a foothold in the network... Another method involves a China Chopper web shell that is uploaded to Microsoft Exchange Server by exploiting the ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

we discovered that it is possible that the same threat actors have attempted to distribute StealthVector through LNK (link) files sent as email attachments

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

the malware creates install.bat, which installs StealthVector as a Windows service

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

This dropper decodes a specified Base64-encoded file, and then drops it in a specified file path.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

The BAT file installs StealthVector as a Windows service.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

After the decryption of its payload, StealthMutant executes this shellcode payload in a remote process by using the process hollowing technique.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

StealthReacher (aka DodgeBox) can be considered as an enhanced variant of StealthVector, featuring code obfuscation techniques such as FNV1-a and other defense evasion mechanisms. | both StealthVector and StealthReacher will perform re-encryption after the first initiation via XOR encryption, with the key being the victim’s computer name.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

Compared to the older StealthVector, it uses AES algorithms for encryption and MD5 hashing for checksum.

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

The LNK file renames CertUtil.exe, a legitimate Microsoft command-line tool, and uses the renamed tool to download both a decoy document and StealthVector

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

After the decryption of its payload, StealthMutant executes this shellcode payload in a remote process by using the process hollowing technique.

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

StealthMutant patches the EtwEventWrite function’s API to disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW)... StealthVector can disable ETW to cover its tracks

T1685.001Disable or Modify Windows Event LogEvidence1

It can be configured to uninstall itself, run its payload in a specific location, avoid detection by disabling Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) ... Like StealthVector, StealthMutant can disable ETW and go undetected by Windows’ built-in logging system.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Injection of an SQL script into the system’s Microsoft SQL Server to upload a malicious file

Indicators of compromise

Observables

19 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching19Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.