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Malware2 associated actors

SilentRaid

Tracked since Jan 8, 2026 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this week#100of 30,237 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days3 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs17Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationCredential theftDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device
Also known asMystRodX

SilentRaid, also known as MystRodX and TrustFall, is a modular C++ backdoor used to maintain persistent access to compromised Linux systems, particularly edge networking devices. It is deployed by the China-nexus threat actor UAT-7290 in espionage operations targeting telecommunications providers and other critical infrastructure organizations in South Asia and Southeastern Europe.

SilentRaid uses embedded plugins selected at compile time to provide remote command execution, reverse shells, file management, port forwarding, and socket management. Its data-collection functionality includes credential-related information, system files, and X.509 certificate attributes. In documented infection chains, the RushDrop dropper installs SilentRaid alongside DriveSwitch, which launches the backdoor, and a legitimate BusyBox utility used for shell execution. These deployments follow exploitation of known vulnerabilities or targeted SSH brute-force attacks against public-facing devices. A launcher and backdoor can maintain execution by restarting one another.

SilentRaid resolves command-and-control infrastructure through public DNS resolvers. MystRodX variants support configurable TCP or HTTP communications with optional AES traffic encryption, as well as a passive activation mode that monitors raw network traffic without opening a listening port. Specially crafted DNS or ICMP packets can trigger an outbound command-and-control connection. Anti-analysis measures include virtual-machine and debugger checks, encrypted configuration data, and layered obfuscation of strings and embedded payloads.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAT-7290

SilentRaid (also known as MystRodX) ... is built around a modular plugin architecture that enables the threat actor to compose a tailored capability set at compile time.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
Liminal Panda

SilentRaid (aka MystRodX), a C++-based implant that establishes persistent access ... plugin-like approach to communicate with an external server, open a remote shell, set up port forwarding, and perform file operations

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1587Develop CapabilitiesEvidence1

T1587: Develop Capabilities – UAT-7290 custom telecommunications malware development

T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

Once inside, they deploy a diverse arsenal of tools, including custom Linux malware variants such as RushDrop, DriveSwitch, and SilentRaid (the primary implant for persistence).

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public-facing edge devices to gain initial access...

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

UAT-7290 typically leverages public proof-of-concepts (PoCs) for various vulnerabilities and SSH brute force attacks to compromise public-facing devices.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence7

It prioritizes initial access to edge networking devices... Mitigation Harden edge networking devices by eliminating default credentials, restricting management exposure, and rapidly patching known one-day vulnerabilities.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

...support capabilities such as command execution, file management, and reverse shell establishment... any evidence of spawned reverse shells. | ...support capabilities such as command execution... Monitor for anomalous DNS behavior... along with unusual BusyBox command usage...

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence4

Plugin: my_rsh — Opens a remote shell by executing 'sh' via either busybox or '/bin/sh', enabling arbitrary remote command execution on the compromised system.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public-facing edge devices to gain initial access...

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

UAT-7290 typically leverages public proof-of-concepts (PoCs) for various vulnerabilities and SSH brute force attacks to compromise public-facing devices.

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

T1543: Create or Modify System Process – Telecommunications system persistence establishment

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

SilentRaid serves as the primary implant, designed to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and execute tasks defined by the attacker.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

ChronosRAT, a modular ELF binary that's capable of shellcode execution

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public-facing edge devices to gain initial access...

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence2

T1543: Create or Modify System Process – Telecommunications system persistence establishment

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

SilentRaid serves as the primary implant, designed to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints, communicate with command-and-control infrastructure, and execute tasks defined by the attacker.

Stealth

9 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

C2 address is stored in an encoded configuration file in the /tmp directory, with the same filename as the malware binary and a '.cfg' extension appended.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

T1027.002: Software Packing – Packed telecommunications malware

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

ChronosRAT, a modular ELF binary that's capable of shellcode execution

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Remove a file or directory using the “rm” command - via busybox

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

UAT-7290 leverages one-day exploits and target-specific SSH brute force to compromise public-facing edge devices to gain initial access...

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

Creates a hidden directory named '.pkgdb' in the working directory and decodes three embedded binaries into it.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

RushDrop ... Performs anti-VM and sandbox-evasion checks on execution. If the checks fail, it deletes itself from disk to prevent analysis. SilentRaid ... Anti-VM and anti-analysis checks on startup.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

T1564: Hide Artifacts – Concealment of telecommunications compromise

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

T1564.001: Hidden Files and Directories – Hidden malware on telecommunications devices

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

ChronosRAT, a modular ELF binary that's capable of shellcode execution, file management, keylogging, port forwarding, remote shell, screenshot capture, and proxy.

T1110Brute ForceEvidence3

UAT-7290 typically leverages public proof-of-concepts (PoCs) for various vulnerabilities and SSH brute force attacks to compromise public-facing devices.

T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

SilentRaid establishes persistent command-and-control access to telecommunications infrastructure, enabling remote shell execution, port forwarding, file manipulation, and credential theft from telecommunications systems.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

T1552.001: Credentials In Files – Harvesting telecommunications configuration credentials

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery – Telecommunications network mapping

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

T1082: System Information Discovery – Telecommunications system enumeration

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

Annex B - MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques ... Discovery | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

RushDrop ... Performs anti-VM and sandbox-evasion checks on execution. If the checks fail, it deletes itself from disk to prevent analysis. SilentRaid ... Anti-VM and anti-analysis checks on startup.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence2

UAT-7290 typically leverages public proof-of-concepts (PoCs) for various vulnerabilities and SSH brute force attacks to compromise public-facing devices.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

T1005: Data from Local System – Intelligence collection from telecommunications infrastructure

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

ChronosRAT, a modular ELF binary that's capable of shellcode execution, file management, keylogging, port forwarding, remote shell, screenshot capture, and proxy.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

ChronosRAT, a modular ELF binary that's capable of shellcode execution, file management, keylogging, port forwarding, remote shell, screenshot capture, and proxy.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Archive directories specified by the C2 using “tar -cvf” - executed via busybox

Command and Control

14 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

SilentRaid communicates with its C2 server, usually in the form of a domain and can carry out action as instructed by the C2.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Annex B - MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques ... Command and Control | T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols.

T1071.004DNSEvidence3

Plugin: my_socks_mgr This plugin handles communication to C2 server. It obtains the C2 IP by resolving a domain using “8[.]8[.]8[.]8” and passes commands received from the C2 to the appropriate plugin.

T1090ProxyEvidence4

SilentRaid operates using a modular plugin system that gives attackers multiple capabilities. The malware can open remote shells, forward internet ports, and manage files on infected systems.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence4

These plugins enable remote shells, file access, port forwarding, command execution, and data collection

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

Plugin:port_fwd_mgr This plugin sets up port forwarding between ports specified — a local port and a port on a remote server. It can also set up port forwarding across multiple ports.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Beyond espionage, the threat actor appears to have recently established Operational Relay Box (ORB) infrastructure, effectively converting compromised systems into relay nodes that can be leveraged by other China-nexus groups.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

RushDrop then decodes and drops three binaries to the “.pkgdb” folder: “daytime” ... tracked as DriveSwitch. “chargen” ... tracked as SilentRaid. “busybox” - Busybox is a legitimate Linux utility that can be used to execute arbitrary commands on the system.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

T1132: Data Encoding – Encoded telecommunications C2 traffic

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

SilentRaid is the main implant in the intrusion meant to establish persistent access to compromised endpoints. It communicates with its command-and-control server (C2) and carries out tasks defined in the malware.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

When SilentRaid starts, it communicates with its control server using a domain name and Google’s public DNS service (8.8.8.8) to find the server’s address.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence2

T1572: Protocol Tunneling – Traffic tunneling through telecommunications infrastructure

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

T1573: Encrypted Channel – Encrypted telecommunications C2 communications

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

T1573.002: Asymmetric Cryptography – Public key cryptography for telecommunications C2

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

T1041: Exfiltration Over C2 Channel – Data exfiltration from telecommunications networks

Indicators of compromise

Observables

17 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

28 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching17Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.