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Malware3 associated actors1 associated CVE

Microsocks

Tracked since Jan 9, 2026 · Updated 19 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Proxyware
Capabilities
Lateral movementPost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxNetwork deviceIOT

MicroSocks is an open-source SOCKS5 proxy server used legitimately for network proxying and abused by threat actors for tunneling, pivoting, and concealing malicious traffic. It is a dual-use utility rather than an inherently malicious implant. Attackers deploy it on compromised Linux hosts, routers, and security appliances to reach internal services or enroll devices into proxy infrastructure. Observed deployments include Ubiquiti EdgeRouters, SonicWall Secure Mobile Access appliances, FortiWeb firewalls, and TP-Link consumer routers.

In an intrusion culminating in Abyss ransomware, attackers used MicroSocks on a compromised SonicWall appliance to tunnel RDP traffic into the internal network, reducing the need for additional internal backdoors. Other deployments have supported residential proxy networks and covert access through telecommunications infrastructure. Adapted builds have used predefined listening settings and username-and-password authentication. Router deployment scripts have distributed architecture-specific binaries, disguised running processes, and established persistence through external startup mechanisms; these surrounding mechanisms are not intrinsic MicroSocks capabilities.

MicroSocks has appeared in criminal infrastructure also accessed by Pawn Storm, in Head Mare operations targeting Russian organizations, and in the telecommunications-focused toolkit of CL-STA-0969, which overlaps with Liminal Panda. Its availability and use across unrelated operations mean its presence alone does not establish threat-actor attribution.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-21833via ctrlaltintel blogOS command injection in TP-Link Archer and Deco routersIn December 2025, Ctrl-Alt-Intel identified an unknown threat actor leveraging the open-source tool microsocks, deployed to compromised FortiWeb firewalls. We have been hunting for abuse of microsocks ever since.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Water Zmeu

In some cases, the actor used a slightly different adapted version of MicroSocks with both the listening address (all interfaces) and port (56981/tcp) predefined.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
Head Mare

Также в рамках атак мы зафиксировали инструмент MicroSocks — реализацию SOCKS5-прокси, полученную из открытого репозитория на GitHub.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
Liminal Panda

...using a mix of custom and public tools such as Microsocks, FRP, FScan, and Responder...

via securityaffairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The primary payload, tplink_stager.sh, was designed for post-exploitation of CVE-2024-21833, an OS command injection vulnerability affecting TP-Link Archer and Deco series routers.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms: Cron -> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root or /etc/crontabs (every 5 minutes).

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

All payloads are POSIX shell scripts; command execution via eval.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms... RC scripts -> modification of /etc/rc.local.

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms: Cron -> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root or /etc/crontabs (every 5 minutes).

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms... NVRAM -> writing to rc_startup via nvram set / nvram commit.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1037.004RC ScriptsEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms... RC scripts -> modification of /etc/rc.local.

T1053.003CronEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms: Cron -> /var/spool/cron/crontabs/root or /etc/crontabs (every 5 minutes).

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

Using exec -a '[kworker/0:1]', the proxy binary masquerades as a kernel worker thread while starting a SOCKS5 listener.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

tplink_stager.sh self-deletes original and cleans wget/curl temp files.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

Persistence on the TP-Link devices was achieved through three mechanisms... NVRAM -> writing to rc_startup via nvram set / nvram commit.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

Dot-prefixed filenames on routers (/tmp/.m, /tmp/.s, /tmp/.bp, /tmp/.bid).

Discovery

2 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

The device’s public WAN IP is retrieved via ipinfo.io or ifconfig.me.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

All payloads collect hostname, username, and architecture via uname -m.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

In our investigation, the attacker tunneled RDP traffic into the internal network through the compromised SonicWall.

T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

In our investigation, the attacker tunneled RDP traffic into the internal network through the compromised SonicWall.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1090ProxyEvidence2

Deze software creëert een socks5 proxy wat vermoedelijk gebruikt wordt door actoren om malicieuze activiteiten te ontplooien.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy PhantomCore использовали механизм проксирования трафика для организации связи между скомпрометированными узлами Rsocx, tsocks, wstunnel, microsocks, localtonet

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence2

Также в рамках атак мы зафиксировали инструмент MicroSocks — реализацию SOCKS5-прокси, полученную из открытого репозитория на GitHub.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Jesta researchers studied the activity and determined that the agent's apparent objective was proxyjacking by compromising weakly secured servers and deploying MicroSocks SOCKS5 proxies to create a distributed network of relay infrastructure.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Downloading microsocks binaries, GOST, FRP, and scanner modules from C2.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
ctrlaltintel blogNews · Apr 10, 2026Supply-Chain Attacks, TP-Link devices & a pair of socks - Ctrl-Alt-IntelOpen-source SOCKS5 proxy tool deployed on compromised FortiWeb firewalls and TP-Link routers to enroll devices into a residential proxy network. In the TP-Link campaign it was downloaded by tplink_stager.sh, run under a masqueraded process name, and exposed on a random high port for proxying attacker traffic.Read more ↗securelist ruNews · Feb 13, 2026Как изменился арсенал группы Head Mare в начале 2026 года | SecurelistSOCKS5 proxy utility sourced from an open-source GitHub repository and used as part of post-exploitation tooling to organize network access.Read more ↗trendai security blogNews · Jan 1, 2026Router Roulette: Cybercriminals and Nation-States Sharing Compromised Networks | TrendAI (US)An open-source SOCKS5 server adapted and deployed as a proxy component on compromised botnet devices. Its listening port was reported to the botnet's command-and-control server. In late February 2024, operators recompiled and redeployed it with username-and-password authentication. It is included here because the report explicitly describes its modification and malicious deployment, not because the original software is inherently malicious.Read more ↗securityaffairsNews · Aug 4, 2025Nation-state group CL-STA-0969 targeted Southeast Asian telecoms in 2024A lightweight SOCKS5 proxy often used for tunneling traffic and establishing covert channels.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.