ABYSSWORKER
ABYSSWORKER is a malicious Windows kernel-mode driver/rootkit used primarily as an EDR killer and defense-evasion component in ransomware intrusions. Reporting describes it as a custom malicious driver masquerading as a legitimate Palo Alto driver, while Elastic Security Labs analyzed a 64-bit Windows PE driver named smuol.sys that imitates a legitimate CrowdStrike Falcon driver. It has also been referred to as Poortry, and Elastic assessed Google Cloud Mandiant’s 2022 POORTRY disclosure as likely the earliest public mention of the same driver family.
ABYSSWORKER has been observed in financially motivated campaigns, especially alongside MEDUSA ransomware, where a HEARTCRYPT-packed loader installs the driver and uses it to target and silence different EDR vendors. ESET also reported AbyssKiller, a commercially sold tool pairing the ABYSSWORKER rootkit with a HeartCrypt-packed loader, as one of the most frequently seen commercial EDR killers in the wild. Telemetry linked AbyssKiller/ABYSSWORKER usage to affiliates associated with Medusa, DragonForce, and the now-disrupted BlackSuit gang. Symantec also reported DragonForce actors using ABYSSWORKER in a December 2025 intrusion against a major U.S. services company. Additional reporting cited its use in BYOVD-style attacks to terminate antivirus processes and disable endpoint security products, including in an Osiris ransomware intrusion.
Technically, ABYSSWORKER is signed with likely stolen and revoked certificates from Chinese companies. Elastic observed samples on VirusTotal dated from 2024-08-08 to 2025-02-24, with most packed using VMProtect. The driver uses obfuscation including constant-returning functions, opaque predicates, and derivation functions. During initialization it resolves kernel module pointers, creates a device at \device\czx9umpTReqbOOKF and a symbolic link at \??\fqg0Et4KlNt4s1JT, and initializes a client-protection mechanism.
Its capabilities include protecting the malware client process by stripping existing handles from other processes and registering ObRegisterCallback pre-operation callbacks to deny new handles to protected processes and threads. Through multiple IOCTL handlers, it supports file manipulation, process and thread termination, callback removal, driver tampering, mini-filter detachment, hook restoration, and system rebooting. Elastic reported a hardcoded enablement password delivered via IOCTL 0x222080: 7N6bCAoECbItsUR5-h4Rp2nkQxybfKb0F-wgbJGHGh20pWUuN1-ZxfXdiOYps6HTp0X. IOCTL 0x2220c0 loads kernel API pointers and related structures, including callback lists and 25 function mappings supplied by the client.
Documented kernel-level actions include removing registered notification callbacks associated with PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine, PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine, PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine, ObRegisterCallbacks, and CmRegisterCallback; removing MiniFilter callbacks and devices by module name; replacing all major functions of a targeted driver module with IopInvalidDeviceRequest; detaching devices associated with FltMgr.sys; brute-forcing thread IDs to locate system threads belonging to a targeted module and terminating them via APCs that call PsTerminateSystemThread; restoring original major functions for NTFS and PNP drivers when hooks are detected outside legitimate modules; and rebooting the machine via HalReturnToFirmware. It also performs file copy and deletion by manually constructing IRPs and invoking device major functions directly.
Overall, ABYSSWORKER is best characterized as a commercially used kernel-mode EDR-killer/rootkit employed in ransomware operations to gain kernel privileges, disable security tooling, and facilitate later-stage encryption and data theft activity.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.
Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.
Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.
Techniques & procedures
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Other
2 techniques
Other
Next, they used BYOVD techniques with multiple drivers such as Huawei’s HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys, Topaz Antifraud wsftprm.sys (CVE-2023-52271), Tower of Fantasy GameDriverx64.sys (CVE-2025-61155), and K7 Security K7RKScan.sys (CVE-2025-1055), to obtain kernel-level privileges and terminate security tools on the host.
IOCs tracked for this family
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Recent activity
9 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A custom malicious driver used in the intrusion to aid defense evasion, masquerading as a legitimate Palo Alto driver.
Rootkit component paired with AbyssKiller to help disable or evade endpoint security protections during ransomware attacks.
A commercial EDR killer offered as a service on underground marketplaces to neutralize endpoint protections.
Kernel-mode rootkit used to cripple security solutions; also forms the basis of a commercial EDR-killer offering when paired with a packed loader.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.