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Malware3 associated actors

SIESTAGRAPH

Tracked since Jan 13, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

SiestaGraph is a Windows .NET backdoor associated with the espionage intrusion set REF2924. It was publicly documented in December 2022 during an intrusion into the Foreign Affairs Office of an unnamed ASEAN member state. It uses the Microsoft Graph API to communicate through Microsoft 365 Mail and OneDrive, allowing command-and-control traffic to blend with legitimate Microsoft cloud activity.

The implant obtains Graph API access tokens using a hard-coded tenant identifier and OAuth refresh token. It identifies infected systems using session information derived from the process identifier, hostname, username, and operating system. Outlook draft messages carry session information, operator commands, and command results, while OneDrive supports file uploads and downloads. Its default command-polling interval is five seconds and can be changed by the operator.

SiestaGraph supports execution through the Windows command interpreter; enumeration of drives, directories, files, processes, and network connections; process termination; file renaming and deletion; bidirectional file transfer; and screenshot capture. Captured screenshots are Base64-encoded and returned through draft email messages. These functions enable remote control, reconnaissance, and data exfiltration from compromised Windows systems. A variant identified in September 2023 used different command identifiers from earlier versions, demonstrating continued development.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Chamelgang

SIESTAGRAPH is a .NET backdoor that leverages the Microsoft Graph interface, a collection of APIs for accessing various Microsoft services.

via elastic security labselastic.co
APT41

SIESTAGRAPH is a .NET backdoor that leverages the Microsoft Graph interface, a collection of APIs for accessing various Microsoft services.

via elastic security labselastic.co
REF2924

This environment has already seen the emergence of the REF2924 intrusion set (SIESTAGRAPH, NAPLISTENER, SOMNIRECORD, and DOORME).

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Hunting guidance identifies SiestaGraph's compiled filename, windowss.exe, running from a scheduled task.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

The resulting command will always be cmd /c <command to run>. This is a common way to run commands if one does not have direct access to an interactive shell.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Hunting guidance identifies SiestaGraph's compiled filename, windowss.exe, running from a scheduled task.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Hunting guidance identifies SiestaGraph's compiled filename, windowss.exe, running from a scheduled task.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

The executable renamed itself svchost.exe before installing itself as a service.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The REF2924 intrusion set, using SIESTAGRAPH, DOORME, SHADOWPAD, and the system binary proxy execution technique (among others) represents an attack group...

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

SiestaGraph was named for its long sleep timer.

Discovery

6 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The NET command gathers information about open TCP connections from the system's TCP table... This code helps the attacker to get a better insight into the system's purpose within the network.

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

The NET command gathers information about open TCP connections from the system's TCP table.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

P Get a list of running processes.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

After obtaining authentication and session tokens, the malware collects system information and exfiltrates it using a method called sendSession... A session token (sessionToken) is created by concatenating the process ID, machine name, username, and operating system.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

GetDirectories Send a list of given subdirectories; GetFiles Send a list of files in a given directory.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence2

SiestaGraph was named for its long sleep timer.

Collection

1 technique
T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

SS - Take screenshot... takes a screenshot of the primary monitor and returns the screenshot as a Base64 encoded string.

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

SIESTAGRAPH interacts with Microsoft’s GraphAPI for command and control using Outlook and OneDrive... The implant utilizes the Microsoft Graph API to access Microsoft 365 Mail and OneDrive for its C2 communication.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

SIESTAGRAPH... uses the Microsoft Graph API to access Microsoft 365 Mail and OneDrive for its C2 communication.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

Inspecting the sendSession method we see that it creates an email message and saves it as a draft. Using draft messages is common C2 tradecraft as a way to avoid email interception and inspection... the implant will use the getMessages method to check for any draft emails with commands from the attacker.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

SIESTAGRAPH is a purpose-built and full-featured implant... [that] uses legitimate and common, but adversary-controlled, infrastructure to deliver remote capabilities on the infected host.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

U - Download from OneDrive... the file is downloaded from OneDrive by the implant, but uploaded by the attacker.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

The D command... will then upload the requested file to OneDrive... achieving the goal of exfiltrating data from the victim.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.