Koadic is an open-source post-exploitation framework and malware/toolset used in intrusions to provide remote access and follow-on capability on compromised Windows systems. The provided content directly attributes to Koadic the ability to retrieve the current contents of the user clipboard, execute PowerShell with hidden windows using commands such as "Powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden," establish persistence via PowerShell and scheduled tasks, execute commands through WMI, scan for open TCP ports on the target network, identify logged-in users across the domain and view user sessions, enable Remote Desktop on victim machines, use SSL/TLS for communications, and use regsvr32 to execute additional payloads. The content also notes YARA detection references for Koadic and associates it with post-exploitation behaviors such as excessive process execution from Windows\Temp and large numbers of taskhost/taskhostex processes in Splunk analytics.
Koadic has been observed delivered through multiple intrusion chains. The content states that SocGholish (also known as FakeUpdates/GhoLoader) has been used to deploy Koadic, alongside other malware families. It also states that APT28 has obtained and used Koadic as an open-source tool, and that APT28 delivered JHUHUGIT and Koadic by executing PowerShell commands through DDE in Word documents. The content further lists Koadic among tools used in broader actor/tool catalogs that include BitPaymer, Mimikatz, Empire, and other offensive utilities. High-confidence indicators and associations in the content include the explicit malware name "Koadic," the command-line pattern using PowerShell hidden-window execution, references to WMI, scheduled-task persistence, regsvr32 payload execution, SSL/TLS communications, clipboard access, remote desktop enablement, and YARA rule naming such as "win.koadic_auto.yar" / "win_koadic_auto".
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
APT28 has obtained and used open-source tools like Koadic, Mimikatz, and Responder.
ToolsPowerStats, Koadic, LaZagne, Metasploit, FORELORD, CrackMapExec, Plink, Empire, Mimikatz, Mori, PowGoop, Small Sieve, Canopy, ScreenConnect, RemoteUtilities, Syncro, SimpleHelp, MiniDump, CredNinja, MKL64, Ligolo, MuddyC3, PhonyC2, MuddyC2Go, Venom Proxy, WMIExec, AnyDesk, Revsocks
UNC2198 has used Cobalt Strike BEACON, Metasploit METERPRETER, KOADIC, and PowerShell EMPIRE offensive security tools during this phase as well.
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
Cobalt Group has used a JavaScript backdoor that is capable of launching cmd.exe to execute shell commands. Orz can execute commands with JavaScript. Patchwork used JavaScript code and .SCT files on victim machines. Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution installation via JavaScript will launch follow-on commands via cmd.exe.
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.
After gaining access to networks, the threat actors map the Active Directory (AD) and connect to domain controllers, from which they exfiltrate credentials and export copies of the AD database ntds.dit [T1003.003]. In multiple instances, the threat actors have used Mimikatz to dump admin credentials from the domain controllers.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, nbtstat, netsh, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, domains, and network adapter/interface details.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking whether the current user is an administrator, enumerating user sessions, and gathering account details from compromised hosts.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware performing network scanning, port scanning, service enumeration, OS fingerprinting, and identifying open ports/services across victim environments.
The content is a long ATT&CK-style listing of malware and threat actors that collect host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, language, and other basic system characteristics; examples include use of commands like systeminfo, ver, uname, sw_vers, and WMI queries.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").
Examples include 'Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine,' 'DRATzarus can obtain a list of users from an infected machine,' 'Woody RAT can retrieve a list of user accounts and usernames from an infected machine,' and 'TrickBot can identify the user and groups the user belongs to on a compromised host.'
During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, adversaries utilized RDP to log into jump hosts and then moved laterally to other victim devices to include a domain controller.
"PsExec ... can be used to execute binaries on remote systems using a temporary Windows service"; "RemoteCMD can execute commands remotely by creating a new service on the remote system"; "Winexe installs a service on the remote system, executes the command, then uninstalls the service"
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."
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62 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Remote access/post-exploitation tool previously distributed via SocGholish.
Named malware/tool family deployed via SocGholish.
Post-exploitation framework/RAT associated with using multiple taskhost.exe/taskhostex.exe processes to support discovery and lateral movement.
Koadic is referenced via a YARA rule name and sample match output as the malware family being identified in the analyzed executable.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.