JsOutProx
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
JSOutProx is a multi-stage, heavily obfuscated JavaScript-based remote access trojan active since at least late 2019 and used primarily in targeted campaigns against financial institutions and government organizations in Asia, with later activity also affecting APAC, MENA, Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. It has been associated with phishing operations attributed in public reporting to Solar Spider and has repeatedly targeted Indian banking entities, including co-operative banks and other financial-sector organizations, as well as selected government institutions.
Initial access is commonly achieved through spearphishing emails carrying compressed attachments that contain malicious JavaScript or HTA content, often themed to match the recipient’s business context such as banking, compliance, payment notifications, or government workflows. Campaigns have used spoofed or compromised email accounts and masquerading techniques to make payloads appear as benign document-related files. Some operations also staged payloads on code-hosting platforms as part of the delivery chain.
Once executed through Windows Script Host or mshta, JSOutProx deobfuscates itself at runtime and establishes command-and-control communications over HTTP. It profiles the victim host by collecting system and user information and has been observed encoding victim metadata into HTTP cookies. The malware supports a modular plugin architecture and a broad command set for remote administration, including command execution, script evaluation, file and process operations, implant update and removal, host restart or shutdown, and configurable beacon timing.
Observed plugin functionality includes system reconnaissance, screenshot capture, remote keyboard and mouse interaction, clipboard theft and manipulation, Outlook account and contact harvesting, DNS and proxy configuration changes, and theft of one-time passwords from Symantec VIP. Newer variants added the ability to download and execute .NET assemblies directly in memory, making JSOutProx a hybrid JavaScript and .NET attack framework. Public reporting also describes privilege-escalation and UAC-bypass features, persistence mechanisms, and defense-evasion measures such as extreme obfuscation, hidden execution windows, and techniques intended to improve execution of downloaded payloads.
The malware has been used in financially motivated campaigns, especially against smaller banks and finance companies that may have weaker defensive maturity, though government targeting has also been documented. Reporting has noted similarities between JSOutProx activity and earlier Adwind-related campaigns against Indian institutions, but any deeper attribution linkage remains uncertain.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Resecurity has detected a new version of JSOutProx, targeting financial services and organizations in the APAC and MENA regions. JSOutProx is a sophisticated attack framework utilizing both JavaScript and .NET.
Techniques & procedures
19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Multiple banking customers were targeted via an impersonation attack using the "mike.will@my[.]com" email account. The actors employed a fake SWIFT payment notification (for enterprise customers) and a Moneygram template (for private customers), using misleading notifications to confuse victims and execute malicious code.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Additionally, WMI is utilized to retrieve information about the system.
In the result of the multi-stage infection chain, the actors drop multiple JS-based obfuscated payloads to collect sensitive information and plant a proxy server to connect remotely to the victim.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
CensorMiniPlugin Enables/disables proxy settings on user machine by modifying registry key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyEnable"
PriviledgePlugin In this, the option "UAC" allows to write in registry location "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\" by setting value 0 for keys EnableLUA and ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
It also has options for using UAC bypass techniques like fodhelper.exe, Slui File Handler Hijacking, CompMgmtLauncher, EventViewer.exe etc.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
The JSOutProx RAT malware features complex obfuscation within its JavaScript backdoor structure... They were then obfuscated using obfuscator.io. After deobfuscating them, we obtained the decoded JavaScript code.
Solar Spider is employing the classic Masquerading technique (T1036), disguising its code as a PDF file rather than JS code.
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
CensorMiniPlugin Enables/disables proxy settings on user machine by modifying registry key "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyEnable"
PriviledgePlugin In this, the option "UAC" allows to write in registry location "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\" by setting value 0 for keys EnableLUA and ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin.
Credential Access
2 techniques
Credential Access
TokensPlugin Steal OTP received from SymantecVIP application.
PriviledgePlugin In this, the option "UAC" allows to write in registry location "SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\" by setting value 0 for keys EnableLUA and ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Using WMI, the implant collects information about the victim's environment.
It boasts a modular plugin architecture, which enables it to execute shell commands, handle file uploads and downloads, run files, modify the file system...
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
It boasts a modular plugin architecture, which enables it to execute shell commands, handle file uploads and downloads, run files, modify the file system, ensure persistence, capture screenshots, and control keyboard and mouse actions.
ClipboardPlugin It is used to copy the clipboard data and send it to C2. It can also modify clipboard data.
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
One unique feature of the malware is its use of the Cookie header field in its command and control (C2C) communication.
In the result of the multi-stage infection chain, the actors drop multiple JS-based obfuscated payloads to collect sensitive information and plant a proxy server to connect remotely to the victim.
Once executed, the malware enables the framework to load various plugins, which conduct additional malicious activities on the target.
The implant communicates with command and control (C2C) servers deployed using Dynamic DNS, for example: http://mdytreudsgurifedei.ddns.net:9708/
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
During its initialization routine, the malware gathers various types of information. These information values are separated by the delimiter "_|_", concatenated, hex-encoded, and then set in the Cookie header field.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
DnsPlugin Used to set DNS path. Add or modify new path in C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts.
Observables
49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.