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Malware1 associated actor

JSCoreRunner

Tracked since Jan 16, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs2Tracked

JSCoreRunner, also known as FileRipple, is a macOS malware family/campaign first identified in August 2025 and linked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 to cybercrime cluster CL-CRI-1089. It was distributed via malvertising and fake applications targeting Apple systems, and is described as the earlier stage or predecessor of the later FlutterShell malware used in Operation FlutterBridge. Unit 42 reported that FlutterShell shares JSCoreRunner’s core command structure, including functions for executing commands, reading files, and listing directories, indicating JSCoreRunner had backdoor capabilities for command execution and file-system interaction. Compared with FlutterShell’s dynamic remote logic-loading design, JSCoreRunner reportedly embedded its malicious logic statically in the binary. The activity is associated with the broader CL-CRI-1089 malvertising ecosystem, which has targeted macOS users and used fake Google ads and trojanized applications. High-confidence aliases and associations in the reporting identify JSCoreRunner as FileRipple and place it as a precursor to the Operation FlutterBridge/FlutterShell activity.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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CL-CRI-1089

However, from August 2025, the network shifted to Apple systems with a campaign known as JSCoreRunner, also called FileRipple.

via hackreadhackread.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence4

Unit 42 reported a large-scale malvertising scam running since late 2025. In this scam, called Operation FlutterBridge, cybercriminals are using fake Google search ads to lure Mac owners into downloading malware.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

It gives attackers full remote control over the infected system, including the ability to execute commands... FlutterShell shares its core command structure with a previously documented macOS malware called JSCoreRunner, including functions for executing commands.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

FlutterShell has a set of built-in commands that provide attackers with the following capabilities: Arbitrary command execution.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

TamperedChef (aka EvilAI), an ongoing series of campaigns that involve using trojanized versions of productivity software to deliver potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) and adware.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Capability FlutterShell JSCoreRunner ... Get Home Directory get_home_dir _osHomedir

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

FlutterShell shares its core command structure with a previously documented macOS malware called JSCoreRunner, including functions for executing commands, reading files, and listing directories.

Collection

1 technique
T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

Upon installation, FlutterShell fingerprints the machine... Next, the malware targets the Google Chrome “Secure Preferences” file... changing the url and new_tab_url values to the attacker-controlled domain.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

This design lets attackers change what the malware does at any moment, without updating the app itself... FlutterShell retrieves it dynamically, making detection far more difficult.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.