JSCoreRunner
JSCoreRunner, also known as FileRipple, is a macOS malware family/campaign first identified in August 2025 and linked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 to cybercrime cluster CL-CRI-1089. It was distributed via malvertising and fake applications targeting Apple systems, and is described as the earlier stage or predecessor of the later FlutterShell malware used in Operation FlutterBridge. Unit 42 reported that FlutterShell shares JSCoreRunner’s core command structure, including functions for executing commands, reading files, and listing directories, indicating JSCoreRunner had backdoor capabilities for command execution and file-system interaction. Compared with FlutterShell’s dynamic remote logic-loading design, JSCoreRunner reportedly embedded its malicious logic statically in the binary. The activity is associated with the broader CL-CRI-1089 malvertising ecosystem, which has targeted macOS users and used fake Google ads and trojanized applications. High-confidence aliases and associations in the reporting identify JSCoreRunner as FileRipple and place it as a precursor to the Operation FlutterBridge/FlutterShell activity.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
However, from August 2025, the network shifted to Apple systems with a campaign known as JSCoreRunner, also called FileRipple.
Techniques & procedures
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
Unit 42 reported a large-scale malvertising scam running since late 2025. In this scam, called Operation FlutterBridge, cybercriminals are using fake Google search ads to lure Mac owners into downloading malware.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
It gives attackers full remote control over the infected system, including the ability to execute commands... FlutterShell shares its core command structure with a previously documented macOS malware called JSCoreRunner, including functions for executing commands.
FlutterShell has a set of built-in commands that provide attackers with the following capabilities: Arbitrary command execution.
TamperedChef (aka EvilAI), an ongoing series of campaigns that involve using trojanized versions of productivity software to deliver potentially unwanted programs (PUPs) and adware.
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Capability FlutterShell JSCoreRunner ... Get Home Directory get_home_dir _osHomedir
FlutterShell shares its core command structure with a previously documented macOS malware called JSCoreRunner, including functions for executing commands, reading files, and listing directories.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Upon installation, FlutterShell fingerprints the machine... Next, the malware targets the Google Chrome “Secure Preferences” file... changing the url and new_tab_url values to the attacker-controlled domain.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
This design lets attackers change what the malware does at any moment, without updating the app itself... FlutterShell retrieves it dynamically, making detection far more difficult.
Observables
2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.