VMProtect
- Capabilities
- Defense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
VMProtect is a legitimate commercial software-protection and code-obfuscation framework, not a standalone malware family. Threat actors use it to pack and obfuscate Windows executables and DLLs, hindering static and dynamic analysis and helping malicious code evade antivirus detection.
Observed malicious uses include protecting AVKiller tooling encountered during ransomware intrusions involving RansomHub and MedusaLocker, obfuscating the Sagerunex backdoor used by Lotus Blossom, and protecting components associated with REF4033 operations that deploy BADIIS on compromised IIS servers. These uses span financially motivated activity and cyberespionage. The capabilities and infection vectors of protected payloads are distinct from those of VMProtect itself.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Most of these samples employ VMProtect, a commercial code-obfuscation framework, to hinder static and dynamic analysis.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
If it finds that it runs on a known system version, it uses the sysenter instruction to directly call into kernel mode for its checks, bypassing any user mode hooks
Stealth
10 techniques
Stealth
Les builds et modules utilisent « configuration obfusquée, protection VMProtect », ainsi que l'API hashing et le chiffrement de chaînes.
Appendix D lists "T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding"; the report discusses use of VMProtect, Themida, and script/binary obfuscation.
RomCom 3.0 binaries are protected with VMProtect.
the few valid functions initialize the VM and import the hidden API calls (via LoadLibraryA ) ... the complex functions perform VM-related initialization routine or decrypt API calls
If functions are large due to code obfuscation, they often contain dead code ... VMProtect ... uses dead code to bloat its code size.
非常に頑丈な商用プロテクターであるVMProtectによってパッキングされています。
VM Checks Overview of VM checks: cpuid hypervisor bit & hypervisor vendor Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB
Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid
the callback is triggered after a syscall has executed but before it returns, which means we cannot prevent changes such as setting the ThreadHideFromDebugger flag
VMProtect’s debugger checks don’t use any exotic techniques... PEB.BeingDebugged ProcessDebugPort ProcessDebugObjectHandle NtSetInformationThread ThreadHideFromDebugger CloseHandle with invalid handle value Non-zero debug registers in CONTEXT when catching exceptions
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB
非常に頑丈な商用プロテクターであるVMProtectによってパッキングされています。
VM Checks Overview of VM checks: cpuid hypervisor bit & hypervisor vendor Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB
Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid
VMProtect’s debugger checks don’t use any exotic techniques... PEB.BeingDebugged ProcessDebugPort ProcessDebugObjectHandle NtSetInformationThread ThreadHideFromDebugger CloseHandle with invalid handle value Non-zero debug registers in CONTEXT when catching exceptions
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.