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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

VMProtect

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
Windows

VMProtect is a legitimate commercial software-protection and code-obfuscation framework, not a standalone malware family. Threat actors use it to pack and obfuscate Windows executables and DLLs, hindering static and dynamic analysis and helping malicious code evade antivirus detection.

Observed malicious uses include protecting AVKiller tooling encountered during ransomware intrusions involving RansomHub and MedusaLocker, obfuscating the Sagerunex backdoor used by Lotus Blossom, and protecting components associated with REF4033 operations that deploy BADIIS on compromised IIS servers. These uses span financially motivated activity and cyberespionage. The capabilities and infection vectors of protected payloads are distinct from those of VMProtect itself.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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REF4033

Most of these samples employ VMProtect, a commercial code-obfuscation framework, to hinder static and dynamic analysis.

via elastic security labselastic.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1106Native APIEvidence1

If it finds that it runs on a known system version, it uses the sysenter instruction to directly call into kernel mode for its checks, bypassing any user mode hooks

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence11

Les builds et modules utilisent « configuration obfusquée, protection VMProtect », ainsi que l'API hashing et le chiffrement de chaînes.

T1027.001Binary PaddingEvidence1

Appendix D lists "T1027.001 Obfuscated Files or Information: Binary Padding"; the report discusses use of VMProtect, Themida, and script/binary obfuscation.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence7

RomCom 3.0 binaries are protected with VMProtect.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

the few valid functions initialize the VM and import the hidden API calls (via LoadLibraryA ) ... the complex functions perform VM-related initialization routine or decrypt API calls

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence1

If functions are large due to code obfuscation, they often contain dead code ... VMProtect ... uses dead code to bloat its code size.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

非常に頑丈な商用プロテクターであるVMProtectによってパッキングされています。

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

VM Checks Overview of VM checks: cpuid hypervisor bit & hypervisor vendor Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

the callback is triggered after a syscall has executed but before it returns, which means we cannot prevent changes such as setting the ThreadHideFromDebugger flag

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

VMProtect’s debugger checks don’t use any exotic techniques... PEB.BeingDebugged ProcessDebugPort ProcessDebugObjectHandle NtSetInformationThread ThreadHideFromDebugger CloseHandle with invalid handle value Non-zero debug registers in CONTEXT when catching exceptions

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

非常に頑丈な商用プロテクターであるVMProtectによってパッキングされています。

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

VM Checks Overview of VM checks: cpuid hypervisor bit & hypervisor vendor Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid NtQuerySystemInformation with SystemFirmwareTableInformation, TableIDs FIRM and RSMB

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Trap Flag tricks in combination with forced VM exit via rdtsc/cpuid

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence2

VMProtect’s debugger checks don’t use any exotic techniques... PEB.BeingDebugged ProcessDebugPort ProcessDebugObjectHandle NtSetInformationThread ThreadHideFromDebugger CloseHandle with invalid handle value Non-zero debug registers in CONTEXT when catching exceptions

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.