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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

PowerModul

PowerModul is a PowerShell implant/loader used by the GOFFEE APT group in campaigns against organizations in Russia. The first observed uses were in early 2024, and it was documented in attacks during July-December 2024 targeting media, telecommunications, construction, government, and energy organizations. GOFFEE reportedly used targeted phishing emails with malicious RAR archives as the primary initial access vector. Observed delivery chains included RAR archives containing macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents; when macros were enabled, the document created an HTA file and a PowerShell file, set HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LOAD for persistence, and launched JavaScript that executed the PowerModul PowerShell implant stored as UserCache.ini. One reported PowerModul sample, UserCache.ini, had MD5 60A53D2C653991F086C4E6663D652CF2 and SHA256 BE1D0FAF1C253FAACBA1059971B01D1D646256D7B2E557DA55ED059542AFDBCD.

PowerModul retrieves additional PowerShell payloads from a command-and-control server and executes them. It appends a victim identifier containing the computer name, username, and disk serial number to the C2 URL, and receives XML responses containing Base64-encoded scripts. Researchers identified a distinct protocol, payload types, and C2 infrastructure compared with PowerTaskel, and therefore classified PowerModul as a separate malware family. The implant includes an OfflineWorker() function that decodes and executes embedded Base64 content; this functionality was observed carrying code for the FlashFileGrabber data theft tool.

Observed payloads delivered by PowerModul included PowerTaskel, FlashFileGrabber, and USB Worm. FlashFileGrabber searched removable media for files with targeted extensions and copied them to %TEMP%\CacheStore\connect<VolumeSerialNumber>, storing metadata in ftree.db and MD5 hashes of that metadata in %AppData%\internal_profiles.db. USB Worm infected removable media by hiding original files, copying PowerModul as UserCache.ini, and creating hidden VBS and BAT launchers plus deceptive shortcuts. PowerModul is associated with GOFFEE's broader post-exploitation activity, which also included use of Mythic agents, PsExec, mshta.exe, and WinRM for privilege escalation and lateral movement.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Paper Werewolf

Во второй половине 2024 года APT-группа GOFFEE продолжала атаковать организации в России, используя PowerTaskel — непубличный агент для Mythic на PowerShell, а также новый имплант, который мы назвали PowerModul.

via securelist rusecurelist.ru
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

USB Worm способен заражать съемные носители копией PowerModul

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

группа GOFFEE ... атаковала ... используя целевые фишинговые письма с вредоносными вложениями

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

PowerModul — это скрипт PowerShell, который может получать с командного сервера дополнительные PowerShell-скрипты и выполнять их

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

червь создает скрытые VBS- и BAT-файлы для запуска PowerModul и открытия документа-приманки | архив RAR содержит документ Microsoft Office с макросом, который выполняет роль дроппера

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1
TacticExecution

HTA-файл ... записать на диск файл JavaScript с именем UserCacheHelper.lnk.js, а затем запускает этот JS-файл

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

Нажатие на кнопку «Включить содержимое» активирует макрос

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

макрос ... записывает путь к HTA-файлу в значение LOAD раздела реестра HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

макрос ... записывает путь к HTA-файлу в значение LOAD раздела реестра HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

код PowerModul встроен ... в виде строки, закодированной по алгоритму Base64 ... Ответ от командного сервера приходит ... содержит скрипты, закодированные по алгоритму Base64

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

RAR-архив с исполняемым файлом, замаскированным под документ. В некоторых случаях имя файла включает двойное расширение, например .pdf.exe или .doc.exe.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1
TacticStealth

червь дает файлам на съемном носителе случайные имена ... и скрывает их

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

USB Worm способен заражать съемные носители копией PowerModul

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

PowerModul ... может получать с командного сервера дополнительные PowerShell-скрипты и выполнять их

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
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IOC matching4

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping11

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.