MountLocker
- Type
- Ransomware
- Capabilities
- ExtortionLateral movementReconnaissanceDefense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
MountLocker is a Windows ransomware family first observed in July 2020. It encrypts files on local drives, network drives, and shared resources using ChaCha20 and RSA-2048. Analyzed variants protect per-file ChaCha20 keys with a global ChaCha20 key, which is itself encrypted with an embedded RSA public key. Encrypted key material is appended to affected files, and HTML ransom notes are placed in processed directories. MountLocker operations have also stolen unencrypted victim data for double extortion.
Version 5.0 includes worm-like propagation across Windows networks. It discovers domain computers through Active Directory LDAP queries using the IDirectorySearch COM interface, authenticates to remote systems with operator-supplied credentials, and copies itself to accessible shares. Remote execution occurs through newly created Windows services or WMI using IWbemServices. These mechanisms enable automated lateral movement rather than credential theft or vulnerability exploitation by the ransomware itself.
Before encryption, MountLocker collects host and account information and can terminate selected database, email, office, and analysis processes and services. It supports configurable encryption targets, partial-file encryption, logging, and exclusions intended to avoid selected system files and directories. It can delete its executable after execution through a temporary batch script. MountLocker has been used by the XingLocker ransomware group and deployed through the BumbleBee loader. Documented victims include a clothing company.
Associated vulnerabilities
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Prophet Spider functioned as an access broker and likely granted access to Egregor and MountLocker ransomware operators in exchange for payment.
Techniques & procedures
29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="
"attackers exploit Oracle WebLogic server flaws to access target environments" ... "uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold" ... "path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution." | "Prophet Spider has also been seen using older Oracle CVEs such as CVE-2016-0545, as well as gaining initial access via SQL injection."
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
If the /NETWORK argument provided is w , it launches the executable through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).
The function starts parsing the arguments... we can see the strings "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="... the others are more features/options of MountLocker
First, this full cmd.exe command is built. cmd.exe /c start "ransomware_path PARAMS_VALUE /NOLOG"
Unlike WannaCry , this ransomware does not use any fancy 0-day but instead just COM interfaces such as IDirectorySearch and IWbemServices to spread and execute itself.
Execute payload through a service. Service Name : Update<rand_num> Command: cmd.exe /c start ... CreateServiceW ... StartServiceW
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="
Create registry key for opening RecoveryManual.html : // Software\Classes\.%0.8X\shell\Open\command ... SHRegSetUSValueW(... L"explorer.exe RecoveryManual.html")
After a service called "Update{GetTickCount()}" will be created with lpBinaryPathName equal to the path where the sample has been dropped
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="
After a service called "Update{GetTickCount()}" will be created with lpBinaryPathName equal to the path where the sample has been dropped
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
If the /NODEL argument is set to 0, MountLocker will delete its own executable.
Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
Create registry key for opening RecoveryManual.html : // Software\Classes\.%0.8X\shell\Open\command ... SHRegSetUSValueW(... L"explorer.exe RecoveryManual.html")
Discovery
9 techniques
Discovery
EnumServicesStatusA(schSCManager, SERVICE_WIN32, 1u, lpServices ... kills all services with these strings in their name: "SQL", "database", "msexchange"
After creating these worker threads, the main thread begins enumerating the Windows domain that the current host is in.
The client ID embedded inside the ransom note is generated from the victim’s computer name and a hard-coded string in memory.
Seems the worm feature is divided in two categories: Enum PC into domain Enum PC into network
The ransomware first calls ZwQuerySystemInformation with the information class of SystemProcessInformation to get an array of SYSTEM_PROCESS_INFORMATION structures.
Collect victim’s system info: ... CORE COUNT, TOTAL MEM, WIN VER, WIN ARCH, USER NAME, PC NAME, IN DOMAIN, IS ADMIN, IN GROUPS, CMDLINE
f_ml_enum_target_drive ... f_ml_recursive_enum_folder ... check target (folder / file) can be encrypted ... skipped folder is in ignored list
When enumerating through network servers, it will use WNetOpenEnumW and WNetEnumResourceW instead.
Use IDirectorySearch COM interface to enumerate PC into domain ... search for all computers in domain ... ExecuteSearch(... L"(objectClass=computer)")
Lateral Movement
4 techniques
Lateral Movement
Seems the worm feature is divided in two categories: Enum PC into domain Enum PC into network Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD=" After getting access to the computer it will drop the same executable
wsprintfW(remoteProgramData_path, L"\\\\%s\\C$\\ProgramData", DN_PC_Name); ... CopyFileW(lpMountLockerPath, victim_info->file_path, 0)
If the /NETWORK argument provided is s , it launches the executable through a service.
Finally, it drops the ransomware on the target PC by calling CopyFileW.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
try to drop ransomware to remote target PC ... CopyFileW(lpMountLockerPath, victim_info->file_path, 0)
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
These ransomware groups typically gain access to a victim computer or computer network, steal victim data, and then encrypt the victim computers making them unusable.
The ransomware groups then extort the victims, seeking payment to (1) return access to the victim computers; and/or (2) stop the release of the victim’s stolen data on the internet.
Impact
3 techniques
Impact
check is valid to be encrypted ... f_ml_push_target_in_queue ... Update log stats, deletes itself ... Total crypted | drop a ransom note in the folder ... lstrcatW(&target_info->target_ransom_note_name, L"RecoveryManual.html")
If a service contains any of the three strings above, MountLocker will terminate it by calling OpenServiceA to obtain a service control handle and calling ControlService to send a control stop code. | If the process name is in the list, it calls OpenProcess to get the handle of that process and terminates it using TerminateProcess.
The ransomware groups then extort the victims, seeking payment to (1) return access to the victim computers; and/or (2) stop the release of the victim’s stolen data on the internet.
Observables
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.