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Malware1 associated actor2 associated CVEs

MountLocker

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 12 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionLateral movementReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

MountLocker is a Windows ransomware family first observed in July 2020. It encrypts files on local drives, network drives, and shared resources using ChaCha20 and RSA-2048. Analyzed variants protect per-file ChaCha20 keys with a global ChaCha20 key, which is itself encrypted with an embedded RSA public key. Encrypted key material is appended to affected files, and HTML ransom notes are placed in processed directories. MountLocker operations have also stolen unencrypted victim data for double extortion.

Version 5.0 includes worm-like propagation across Windows networks. It discovers domain computers through Active Directory LDAP queries using the IDirectorySearch COM interface, authenticates to remote systems with operator-supplied credentials, and copies itself to accessible shares. Remote execution occurs through newly created Windows services or WMI using IWbemServices. These mechanisms enable automated lateral movement rather than credential theft or vulnerability exploitation by the ransomware itself.

Before encryption, MountLocker collects host and account information and can terminate selected database, email, office, and analysis processes and services. It supports configurable encryption targets, partial-file encryption, logging, and exclusions intended to avoid selected system files and directories. It can delete its executable after execution through a temporary batch script. MountLocker has been used by the XingLocker ransomware group and deployed through the BumbleBee loader. Documented victims include a clothing company.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-14750via dark readingExploited in the wildOracle WebLogic Server Console Path Traversal and Unauthenticated Remote Code ExecutionResearchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-14882via dark readingExploited in the wildOracle WebLogic Server Administration Console Authentication BypassResearchers noticed a recent trend in which Prophet Spider uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold into target environments. Both CVEs relate to path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ToyMaker

Prophet Spider functioned as an access broker and likely granted access to Egregor and MountLocker ransomware operators in exchange for payment.

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"attackers exploit Oracle WebLogic server flaws to access target environments" ... "uses CVE-2020-14882 and CVE-2020-14750 to get a foothold" ... "path traversal vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to access the WebLogic administrative console, which then allows for unauthenticated remote code execution." | "Prophet Spider has also been seen using older Oracle CVEs such as CVE-2016-0545, as well as gaining initial access via SQL injection."

Execution

5 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence3

If the /NETWORK argument provided is w , it launches the executable through Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The function starts parsing the arguments... we can see the strings "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="... the others are more features/options of MountLocker

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

First, this full cmd.exe command is built. cmd.exe /c start "ransomware_path PARAMS_VALUE /NOLOG"

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

Unlike WannaCry , this ransomware does not use any fancy 0-day but instead just COM interfaces such as IDirectorySearch and IWbemServices to spread and execute itself.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

Execute payload through a service. Service Name : Update<rand_num> Command: cmd.exe /c start ... CreateServiceW ... StartServiceW

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Create registry key for opening RecoveryManual.html : // Software\Classes\.%0.8X\shell\Open\command ... SHRegSetUSValueW(... L"explorer.exe RecoveryManual.html")

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

After a service called "Update{GetTickCount()}" will be created with lpBinaryPathName equal to the path where the sample has been dropped

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

After a service called "Update{GetTickCount()}" will be created with lpBinaryPathName equal to the path where the sample has been dropped

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

If the /NODEL argument is set to 0, MountLocker will delete its own executable.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD="

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Create registry key for opening RecoveryManual.html : // Software\Classes\.%0.8X\shell\Open\command ... SHRegSetUSValueW(... L"explorer.exe RecoveryManual.html")

Discovery

9 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence2

EnumServicesStatusA(schSCManager, SERVICE_WIN32, 1u, lpServices ... kills all services with these strings in their name: "SQL", "database", "msexchange"

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

After creating these worker threads, the main thread begins enumerating the Windows domain that the current host is in.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The client ID embedded inside the ransom note is generated from the victim’s computer name and a hard-coded string in memory.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Seems the worm feature is divided in two categories: Enum PC into domain Enum PC into network

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

The ransomware first calls ZwQuerySystemInformation with the information class of SystemProcessInformation to get an array of SYSTEM_PROCESS_INFORMATION structures.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Collect victim’s system info: ... CORE COUNT, TOTAL MEM, WIN VER, WIN ARCH, USER NAME, PC NAME, IN DOMAIN, IS ADMIN, IN GROUPS, CMDLINE

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

f_ml_enum_target_drive ... f_ml_recursive_enum_folder ... check target (folder / file) can be encrypted ... skipped folder is in ignored list

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

When enumerating through network servers, it will use WNetOpenEnumW and WNetEnumResourceW instead.

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1

Use IDirectorySearch COM interface to enumerate PC into domain ... search for all computers in domain ... ExecuteSearch(... L"(objectClass=computer)")

Lateral Movement

4 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence2

Seems the worm feature is divided in two categories: Enum PC into domain Enum PC into network Both share the need of "/LOGIN=" and "/PASSWORD=" After getting access to the computer it will drop the same executable

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

wsprintfW(remoteProgramData_path, L"\\\\%s\\C$\\ProgramData", DN_PC_Name); ... CopyFileW(lpMountLockerPath, victim_info->file_path, 0)

T1021.004SSHEvidence1

If the /NETWORK argument provided is s , it launches the executable through a service.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence2

Finally, it drops the ransomware on the target PC by calling CopyFileW.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

try to drop ransomware to remote target PC ... CopyFileW(lpMountLockerPath, victim_info->file_path, 0)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

These ransomware groups typically gain access to a victim computer or computer network, steal victim data, and then encrypt the victim computers making them unusable.

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

The ransomware groups then extort the victims, seeking payment to (1) return access to the victim computers; and/or (2) stop the release of the victim’s stolen data on the internet.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence4

check is valid to be encrypted ... f_ml_push_target_in_queue ... Update log stats, deletes itself ... Total crypted | drop a ransom note in the folder ... lstrcatW(&target_info->target_ransom_note_name, L"RecoveryManual.html")

T1489Service StopEvidence3

If a service contains any of the three strings above, MountLocker will terminate it by calling OpenServiceA to obtain a service control handle and calling ControlService to send a control stop code. | If the process name is in the list, it calls OpenProcess to get the handle of that process and terminates it using TerminateProcess.

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

The ransomware groups then extort the victims, seeking payment to (1) return access to the victim computers; and/or (2) stop the release of the victim’s stolen data on the internet.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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dark readingNews · Aug 5, 2021Prophet Spider Exploits WebLogic CVEs to Enable Ransomware AttacksRansomware family referenced as a downstream payload/operator that may have received access from Prophet Spider for ransomware deployment.Read more ↗kienmanowar blogNews · Aug 4, 2021[QuickNote] MountLocker - Some pseudo-code snippets | 0day in {REA_TEAM}MountLocker is a ransomware family that encrypts files, drops a ransom note named RecoveryManual.html, gathers victim system information, kills services and processes that may interfere with encryption, skips selected folders and file types, can propagate laterally across a domain via LDAP enumeration, SMB share copying, remote service creation, and WMI execution, logs encryption statistics, and can delete itself after execution.Read more ↗bleeping computerNews · Jul 27, 2021LockBit ransomware now encrypts Windows domains using group policiesReferenced for comparison as ransomware that previously used Windows Active Directory APIs to perform LDAP queries.Read more ↗chuongdong blogNews · May 23, 2021MountLocker Ransomware | Chuong DongMountLocker is ransomware that encrypts files using a hybrid RSA-2048 and ChaCha20 scheme, appends encrypted key material to each file, drops an HTML ransom note, kills selected services and processes, can self-delete, and in this version includes worm-like propagation across networks via LDAP/Active Directory discovery, SMB share copying, service creation, and WMI-based remote execution.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.