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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Osiris

Osiris is a malware name used in the provided content for multiple distinct threats. Most prominently, it refers to a newly observed ransomware family first seen in November 2025 in a targeted attack against a major food service franchisee operator in Southeast Asia. Researchers reported that this ransomware is unrelated to the 2016 Locky variant also called Osiris. In the 2025 intrusion, attackers used living-off-the-land and dual-use tools including Netscan, Netexec, MeshAgent, a modified RustDesk binary disguised as "WinZip Remote Desktop," Mimikatz/kaz.exe for credential dumping, and Rclone to exfiltrate data to Wasabi cloud storage prior to encryption. The operation also used the POORTRY/Abyssworker malicious driver in a BYOVD-style defense evasion technique, including masquerading as a Malwarebytes component, to disable security software; KillAV was also reported in some coverage. The ransomware is full-featured, using hybrid ECC and AES-128-CTR encryption with a unique key per file, supporting partial or full encryption via command-line options, appending the .Osiris extension, deleting Volume Shadow Copies, terminating numerous database, backup, mail, office, browser, and other processes/services, handling Hyper-V-related options, and dropping a ransom note named Osiris-MESSAGE.txt with negotiation links. Reporting noted tactical and tooling overlaps with prior Inc ransomware activity, but attribution remained uncertain.

The content also uses Osiris to refer to a Windows banking malware sample analyzed in August 2019. That sample persisted by adding itself to startup and copying itself to %APPDATA%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Protected\setspn.exe, masquerading as the legitimate Microsoft setspn.exe. It dropped files in %APPDATA%\Roaming and %temp%, used Nullsoft Scriptable Installer components for a headless install, and used a Mini-Tor proof-of-concept implementation to communicate over the Tor network, likely for anonymized data exfiltration. Reported indicators for that sample included SHA-256 0325714eeb2af235a0f543ad9e11b5d852a61be78c9ece308c651412d97edd39 and URLs httpx://naot[.]org/cms/file/fixed111[.]exe and httpx://borel[.]fr/notices/CanadaPost[.]zip.

Separately, the content mentions the publicly available Osiris jailbreak bundled inside the Phenakite iOS surveillance implant used by Arid Viper/APT-C-23. In that context, Osiris is jailbreak code rather than the primary malware itself, and was used by Phenakite to elevate privileges on 64-bit devices running iOS 11.2 to 11.3.1.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Arid Viper

Phenakite comes bundled with the publicly available Osiris jailbreak and also includes the Sock Port exploit.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

After running the sample for the first time it adds itself to system startup and copies itself to %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Protected\setspn.exe .

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

"Reynolds Ransomware Embeds BYOVD Driver to Disable EDR"; "Osiris... using POORTRY Driver in BYOVD"

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

After running the sample for the first time it adds itself to system startup and copies itself to %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Protected\setspn.exe .

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

After running the sample for the first time it adds itself to system startup and copies itself to %appdata%\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Protected\setspn.exe . Comparing the malicious setspn.exe with the Microsoft Original (which is normally found at C:\Windows\System32\setspn.exe) with the help of PEBear it is obvious that the files are not the same.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

this Osiris sample uses a POC implementation called Mini-Tor for communication with the Tor network.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

A quite interesting find: this Osiris sample uses a POC implementation called Mini-Tor for communication with the Tor network. Pretty convenient for the malware author as it keeps the size of the binary small, but still allows data exfiltration over an anonymized protocol.

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"...BYOVD driver to disable EDR security tools"

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
20 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching22

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.