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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Sysget

Tracked since Jan 23, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs96Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Sysget, also known as HelloBridge, is a Windows backdoor associated with the DragonOK espionage group and used in targeted intrusions, particularly against organizations in Japan. Reported targeting has included manufacturing, high-technology, higher education, energy, and semiconductor entities, with additional lure themes suggesting interest in victims connected to Taiwan, Tibet, and Russia.

Sysget has been delivered through phishing emails carrying disguised malicious executables and through malicious RTF documents exploiting CVE-2015-1641 in Microsoft Office. Operators commonly used decoy documents and misleading file icons to induce execution. In observed campaigns, Sysget functioned as an initial foothold payload that established persistence, contacted command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, and enabled follow-on deployment of additional malware families used by DragonOK, including PlugX, PoisonIvy, NewCT, NFlog, and FormerFirstRAT.

Across documented variants, Sysget supports remote command execution, file upload, and file download. It uses single-instance controls, persists through Windows autorun mechanisms, and in later versions adopted stronger encryption for configuration and network traffic, including a shift from RC4 to AES-128. Newer variants also introduced anti-debugging and anti-virtual-machine checks, encrypted or obfuscated network URIs, and other refinements intended to hinder analysis and detection. Some versions retrieve configuration material from the command-and-control server when local configuration is absent. Reported installation behavior includes copying itself to user-accessible startup or temporary locations and using command shell execution to create persistence entries.

Sysget is best characterized as a modular first-stage backdoor within DragonOK operations, combining social-engineering delivery, persistence, encrypted command-and-control, and basic remote administration capabilities to support longer-term espionage activity on compromised Windows systems.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-1641via paloalto researchcenter historicExploited in the wildMicrosoft Office RTF Memory Corruption VulnerabilitySysget malware was delivered both directly via phishing emails, as well as in Rich Text Format (RTF) documents exploiting the CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability (patched in MS15-033) that in turn leveraged a very unique shellcode. | Multiple new variants of the previously discussed sysget malware family have been observed in use by DragonOK. Sysget malware was delivered both directly via phishing emails, as well as in Rich Text Format (RTF) documents exploiting the CVE-2015-1641 vulnerability.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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DragonOK

This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge.

via paloaltonetworks historic blogblog.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence3

This campaign involved five separate phishing attacks, each carrying a different variant of Sysget malware, also known as HelloBridge. The malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into opening the malware.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

Sysget samples were attached to e-mails and used various icons to trick users into infecting their systems.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The remote server can also send the following example response. This response will instruct the malware to execute the given command.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2

It then spawns a new instance of 'C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe' with a window name of 'Chrome-Update'... and then proceeds to send the following command to this executable.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Malicious RTF files which exploit CVE-2015-1641. ... This CVE is memory corruption vulnerability which allows for arbitrary code execution in various versions of Microsoft Office.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The malware was included as an attachment intended to trick the user into opening the malware.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

reg add hkcu \ software \ microsoft \ windows \ currentversion \ run / v netshare / f / d % temp % \ notilv . exe / t REG_EXPAND_SZ

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The ROR7 operation is a very common technique in shellcode to obfuscate what functions are being called. The author added the XOR operation to add another layer of obfuscation. ... all HTTP URIs in this version of sysget are encrypted.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence3

This included altering the icon of the executable to appear as other file types as well as decoy documents to trick users into thinking they had opened a legitimate file.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Some of the biggest changes witnessed in version 3 of sysget includes numerous anti-debug and anti-vm detections added ... it performs the following checks to ensure it is not being debugged and not running in a sandbox or virtualized environment.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

goto wrong "[file_path]"; Read a specific file and return its contents. ... Browse List specified directory

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Some of the biggest changes witnessed in version 3 of sysget includes numerous anti-debug and anti-vm detections added ... it performs the following checks to ensure it is not being debugged and not running in a sandbox or virtualized environment.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

図6は、PIPXが使用する一部の特徴的な通信先を元に、Maltegoで関連する要素をマッピングしたものです。通信先であるC2サーバのドメイン登録者のメールアドレスは...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Sysget communicates with this server using the HTTP protocol... FormerFirstRAT communicates using unencrypted HTTP over port 443... All data is sent via HTTP POST requests.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

At this stage, the remote server can send a number of different responses. The following example response will instruct the malware to download a remote executable file.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

This response will instruct the malware to upload the specified file... The results of this execution are stored in a temporary text file... An example upload of these results can be seen below.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

96 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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lac watchNews · Dec 18, 2017PlugXと攻撃者グループ "DragonOK"の関連性|ラックピープル|アーカイブ | 株式会社ラックDragonOKが利用するマルウェアの1つ。PIPXの通信先インフラとの重複から関連付けられており、日本では少なくとも2014年ごろから利用され、2017年11月下旬の標的型攻撃でも使用が確認された。本文ではSysget v4の亜種に相当するとされる。Read more ↗paloalto researchcenter historicNews · Jan 5, 2017DragonOK Updates Toolset and Targets Multiple Geographic RegionsA DragonOK-associated backdoor/Trojan family delivered via phishing attachments and malicious RTF exploit documents. The variants provide persistence, retrieve configuration from C2, encrypt communications, execute commands, upload/download files, and include newer anti-debug/anti-VM and URI obfuscation features.Read more ↗paloalto researchcenter historicNews · Apr 14, 2015Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese TargetsA first-stage phishing-delivered malware used as a downloader/backdoor. It drops files, establishes persistence via a Run registry key, contacts a C2 over HTTP, decrypts tasking with RC4, and can download files, upload files, and execute commands.Read more ↗paloaltonetworks historic blogNews · Apr 14, 2015Unit 42 Identifies New DragonOK Backdoor Malware Deployed Against Japanese TargetsA first-stage payload delivered via phishing attachments. It drops files, establishes persistence via a Run key, contacts a C2 server over HTTP, retrieves an RC4 key, and can download files, upload files, and execute commands indirectly through cmd.exe.Read more ↗
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IOC matching96Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.