Malware

Smaug

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware will then attempt to establish persistence via LoadAppInit_DLLs key in the registry.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware will then attempt to establish persistence via LoadAppInit_DLLs key in the registry.

Stealth

1 technique

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

SMAUG is designed to evade traditional AV products. Along with crypting/obfuscation, the payloads have been developed to have as minimal a footprint as possible.

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The SMAUG payloads contain additional functionality to gather system information and stored browser credentials.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The SMAUG payloads contain additional functionality to gather system information and stored browser credentials.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041

Impact

2 techniques

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Data Encrypted for Impact T1486

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Inhibit System Recovery T1490

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

4 SOURCESView more in app

sentinelone labsNews

Apr 11, 2025

Cl0p Ransomware Targets Linux Systems with Flawed Encryption | Decryptor Available | SentinelOne

Smaug is mentioned as another ransomware family with Linux-targeting capability in the broader trend of multi-platform ransomware.

sentinelone labs subdomainNews

Mar 22, 2024

Multi-Platform SMAUG RaaS Aims To See Off Competitors - SentinelLabs

A multi-platform ransomware-as-a-service offering supporting 64-bit Windows, Linux, and macOS. It provides customizable campaigns, offline encryption capability, a company-wide decryption mode, persistence via registry modification on Windows, credential theft from browsers, and file encryption using AES-256 with RSA-2048 to protect the AES key.

bleeping computerNews

May 28, 2020

Michigan State University network breached in ransomware attack

A Linux ransomware sample found among malicious files during investigation of a Netwalker campaign.

sophos threat researchNews

May 27, 2020

Netwalker ransomware tools give insight into threat actor | SOPHOS

Linux ransomware sample found alongside Netwalker tooling/payloads in the same attacker archive.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

Smaug

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware will then attempt to establish persistence via LoadAppInit_DLLs key in the registry.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware will then attempt to establish persistence via LoadAppInit_DLLs key in the registry.

Stealth

1 technique

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

SMAUG is designed to evade traditional AV products. Along with crypting/obfuscation, the payloads have been developed to have as minimal a footprint as possible.

Credential Access

2 techniques

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The SMAUG payloads contain additional functionality to gather system information and stored browser credentials.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

The SMAUG payloads contain additional functionality to gather system information and stored browser credentials.

Exfiltration

1 technique

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Exfiltration Over C2 Channel T1041

Impact

2 techniques

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Data Encrypted for Impact T1486

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Inhibit System Recovery T1490

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Network

1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes

2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other

1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting

domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 months ago

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

email●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

4 SOURCESView more in app

sentinelone labsNews

Apr 11, 2025

Cl0p Ransomware Targets Linux Systems with Flawed Encryption | Decryptor Available | SentinelOne

Smaug is mentioned as another ransomware family with Linux-targeting capability in the broader trend of multi-platform ransomware.

sentinelone labs subdomainNews

Mar 22, 2024

Multi-Platform SMAUG RaaS Aims To See Off Competitors - SentinelLabs

bleeping computerNews

May 28, 2020

Michigan State University network breached in ransomware attack

A Linux ransomware sample found among malicious files during investigation of a Netwalker campaign.

sophos threat researchNews

May 27, 2020

Netwalker ransomware tools give insight into threat actor | SOPHOS

Linux ransomware sample found alongside Netwalker tooling/payloads in the same attacker archive.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.